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ABSTRACT

Social Media Use During Crisis Events: A Mixed-Method Analysis of Information
Sources and Their Trustworthiness

by

Apoorva Chauhan, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2019

Major Professor: Amanda Lee Hughes, Ph.D.
Department: Computer Science

This dissertation consists of three studies that examine online communications
during crisis events. The first study identified and examined the information sources that
provided official information online during the 2014 Carlton Complex Wildfire.
Specifically, after the wildfire, a set of webpages and social media accounts were
discovered that were named after the wildfire—called Crisis Named Resources (or CNRs).
CNRs shared the highest percentage of wildfire-relevant information. To better understand
the role of CNRs in crisis response, the second study examined CNRs that were named
after the 2016 Fort McMurray Wildfire. Findings showed that many CNRs were created
around the wildfire, most of which either became inactive or were closed after the wildfire
containment. These CNRs shared wildfire-relevant information, served a variety of
purposes from information dissemination to offers of help to expressions of solidarity.
They also received good reviews and were followed by many people. These observations
about CNRs laid the foundation for the third study that sought to determine the factors that
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influence the trustworthiness of these resources. The third study involved 17 interviews
and 105 surveys with members of the public and experts in Crisis Informatics,
Communication Studies, and Emergency Management. Participants were asked to evaluate
the trustworthiness of CNRs that were named after the 2017 Hurricane Irma. Findings
indicate that participants evaluated the trustworthiness of CNRs based on their perceptions
of CNR content, information source(s), owner, and profile.
This dissertation provides the following contributions- (1) identification and
examination of online sources that provide official crisis information; (2) characteristics
and behaviors of CNRs during crisis events; and (3) factors that influence the
trustworthiness of CNRs.
(179 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Social Media Use During Crisis Events: A Mixed-Method Analysis of Information
Sources and Their Trustworthiness
Apoorva Chauhan
This dissertation consists of three studies that examine online communications
during crisis events. The first study identified and examined the information sources that
provided official information online during the 2014 Carlton Complex Wildfire.
Specifically, after the wildfire, a set of webpages and social media accounts were
discovered that were named after the wildfire—called Crisis Named Resources (or CNRs).
CNRs shared the highest percentage of wildfire-relevant information. Because CNRs are
named after a crisis event, they are easier to find and appear to be dedicated and/or official
sources around an event. They can, however, be created and deleted in a short time, and
the creators of CNRs are often unknown, which raises questions of trust and credibility
regarding the information CNRs provide.
To better understand the role of CNRs in crisis response, the second study examined
CNRs that were named after the 2016 Fort McMurray Wildfire. Findings showed that many
CNRs were created around the wildfire, most of which either became inactive or were
closed after the wildfire containment. These CNRs shared wildfire-relevant information
and served a variety of purposes from information dissemination to offers of help to
expressions of solidarity. Additionally, even though most CNR owners remained
anonymous, these resources received good reviews and were followed by many people.
These observations about CNRs laid the foundation for the third study that sought
to determine the factors that influence the trustworthiness of these resources. The third
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study involved 17 interviews and 105 surveys with members of the public and experts in
Crisis Informatics, Communication Studies, and Emergency Management. Participants
were asked to evaluate the trustworthiness of CNRs that were named after the 2017
Hurricane Irma. Findings indicate that participants evaluated the trustworthiness of CNRs
based on their perceptions of CNR content, information source(s), owner, and profile.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Social media are increasingly becoming popular communication platforms around
crisis events. While they can be effective communication tools for managing and
responding to crisis events [1], [2], at times, they also contribute to misinformation
(commonly referred to as “fake news”) and false rumors [3], [4].
As members of the public often use social media to access and share crisis-related
information, ask for and offer help, and show solidarity around crisis situations [5]–[8], it
is critical that the information sources they find on social media are credible and the
information is accurate. Unreliable and inaccurate information can adverse consequences
for the crisis-affected individuals [9]. Therefore, it is important to identify who contributes
to online crisis information (Study I), what they contribute (Study II), and how people
evaluate the trustworthiness of these contributions (Study III).

Research Design
This dissertation consists of the findings from three studies. The three studies were
executed sequentially with the results of each study informing the next. Here, I outline the
research context, research questions, methods, and results for the three studies.

STUDY 1
In this study, I identified online information sources that provided official
information during the 2014 Carlton Complex Wildfire. I analyzed the communication

2
behaviors of these resources and assessed the relevance and timeliness of the information
provided by them.
The research questions for this study were the following: (a) Who contributes
official information online during a crisis event? (b) What are the communication
behaviors of these official information sources? and (c) How do these official information
sources compare in terms of the relevance and timeliness of the information they share?
Data collection for this study involved three steps: (1) identification of the official
information sources that disseminated information during the 2014 Carlton Complex
Wildfire, (2) determination of the websites, public Facebook pages, and Twitter accounts
that belonged to each of these sources, and (3) collection of Facebook posts, tweets, and
webpages by these sources during the wildfire timeframe.
To answer my research questions, I first coded all the webpages, Facebook posts,
and tweets to determine if they were relevant to the wildfire. All the relevant posts were
further coded to distinguish the posts that had information about the number of homes
destroyed by the wildfire and/or the current wildfire evacuation level for the affected
communities. This data was then plotted by time to determine what information source first
reported each piece of information in the data set.
This work led to the discovery of four types of official information sources: Local
Responders, Local News Media, Cooperating Agencies, and a set of pages and social media
accounts that were named after the wildfire. The data show that the Local News Media
provided the highest quantity of relevant information and the timeliest information. It was
found that the social media resources named after the wildfire posted the highest percentage
of relevant posts around the wildfire. Though they seemed official, it was often unclear
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who created them and why. This finding laid the foundation for my second study, where I
studied these resources in depth.

STUDY II
This study provides an examination of the social media accounts that are named
after an event. I call these resources Crisis Named Resources (CNRs). In this study, I
studied the crisis response role of the CNRs around the 2016 Fort McMurray Wildfire. The
research questions for this study are as follows: (a) When are CNRs created, and deleted
(if applicable)? (b) What happens to CNRs after the completion of an event? (c) Do CNRs
post about the event they are named after? (d) What types of CNRs exist around an event?
and (e) What types of CNRs receive the most public attention?
Data collection for this study involved two activities: (1) identification and
monitoring of Fort McMurray Wildfire CNRs and (2) collection of messages posted by
these CNRs.
To answer my research questions, I performed many data analyses. First, to
understand the lifecycle of CNRs, I determined their creation and deletion dates, and
analyzed their longevity after the completion of the event. Second, I read each message
posted by the CNRs and marked it as related or unrelated to the crisis event. Third, to better
understand the different types of CNRs created around a wildfire, I categorized each CNR
by its account name, self-description and message content. Finally, I studied the accounts
that received the highest number of Facebook likes or Twitter followers to determine the
types of information they shared around the event.
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Findings show that CNRs appear spontaneously around an event and are often
deleted or left unused after the completion of an event. These resources shared a lot of
relevant information and covered a range of topics from information dissemination to
offers of help to expressions of solidarity. The most liked CNRs were the ones that provided
platforms for people to ask for or provide help. Additionally, in most cases, the creators of
these resources chose to stay anonymous. Despite having anonymous owners, these
resources, at times, were followed by tens of thousands of people. This observation laid
the foundation for my third and final study, where I determined the factors that influence
the trustworthiness of CNRs.

STUDY III
This study focuses on the trustworthiness of the Facebook and Twitter CNRs
created around the 2017 Hurricane Irma. The research questions for this study are as
follows: (a) What factors do experts and members of the public consider while judging the
trustworthiness of CNRs? (b) Do the factors used for judging the trustworthiness of
resources differ by gender, age, education, expertise, and comfort level with Facebook or
Twitter?
Data Collection for this study included 105 surveys and 17 interviews with
members of the public and experts in Crisis Informatics, Communication Studies, and
Emergency Management. During the interview and survey sessions, participants were
asked to evaluate the trustworthiness of CNRs created around 2017 Hurricane Irma.
To determine the factors that influence the trustworthiness of CNRs, I analyzed the
content of the interview transcriptions and open-ended survey responses. I also performed
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statistical analyses on the closed-ended survey responses and determined correlations
between the factors that influence the trustworthiness of CNRs.
Findings show that participants tended to trust CNRs that seem to share relevant,
timely, and accurate information and are linked to authoritative sources over the ones that
seem to share irrelevant content and seem unauthoritative. The factors that most influenced
trustworthiness of CNRs included participants’ perceptions of CNR content, information
source, owner, and profile.

Dissertation Overview
The dissertation consists of six chapters, including this introductory chapter.
Chapter 2 (Study I) identifies the information sources that provide official information
online and provides an assessment of their timeliness and relevance in crisis
communications. Chapter 3 (Study II) describes a study of the lifecycle, relevance, role,
and popularity of CNRs around a crisis event. Chapter 4 (part of Study III) describes the
qualitative analysis of interview and survey data and determines the factors that influence
the trustworthiness of CNRs. Chapter 5 (part of Study III) reports the quantitative analysis
of survey responses, and finds correlations between the factors that influence the
trustworthiness of CNRs. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation with broader
implications and future work for this research.

Integration of Previously Published Work
This dissertation incorporates previously published research. Chapter 2 was
published and presented at CHI 2017, the most prestigious conference venue for Human
Computer Interaction research [10]. Chapter 3 was published and presented at the
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Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management (ISCRAM) Conference 2018,
a well-known venue for researchers of Crisis Informatics [11]. This paper was also
nominated for the Best Student Paper Award. I plan to submit Chapter 4 to the 2020 Social
Media & Society conference and Chapter 5 to the ISCRAM 2020 conference. I am the first
author for these four publications.
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CHAPTER II
PROVIDING ONLINE CRISIS INFORMATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
OFFICIAL SOURCES DURING THE 2014 CARLTON COMPLEX WILDFIRE

Apoorva Chauhan
Department of Computer Science
Utah State University
apoorva.chauhan@aggiemail.usu.edu
ABSTRACT

Using the 2014 Carlton Complex Wildfire as a case
study, we examine who contributes official
information online during a crisis event, and the
timeliness and relevance of the information
provided. We identify and describe the
communication behaviors of four types of official
information sources (Event Based Resources, Local
Responders, Local News Media, and Cooperating
Agencies), and collect message data from each
source’s website, public Facebook page, and/or
Twitter account. The data show that the Local News
Media provided the highest quantity of relevant
information and the timeliest information. Event
Based Resources shared the highest percentage of
relevant information, however, it was often unclear
who managed these resources and the credibility of
the information. Based on these findings, we offer
suggestions for how providers of official crisis
information might better manage their online
communications and ways that the public can find
more timely and relevant online crisis information
from official sources.
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INTRODUCTION

Timely and accurate communication of official
information is a vital component of managing any
emergency or crisis event [17,19,29,44]. We define
“official information” as that information whose
source is perceived by the public as more
authoritative and/or trustworthy. Effective official
information can provide members of the public with
lifesaving protective measures, facilitate relief and
recovery efforts, and reduce anxiety and fears
[32,38,49]. This information may be distributed by
emergency response agencies (e.g., fire and police
departments,
emergency
management
organizations, non-profit disaster relief groups),
public officials (e.g., city mayors, governors),
public works organizations (e.g., transportation
authorities, utility companies), or the broadcast
news media [10].
A variety of traditional mechanisms exist for
distributing official information during a crisis
event, including broadcast media (television, radio,
and newspaper), sirens, phone messages, face-toface interactions, and community meetings [16]. In
addition, online media (websites, blogs, email, and
various forms of social media) have introduced
communication mechanisms that support more
timely and wide-spread interaction with the public
[6,11,15,21]. However, as online communication
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options continue to proliferate, decisions around
how to best communicate official information to the
online public have become increasingly difficult.
Decisions require knowledge about the capabilities
and limitations of each online media type, the
affected audience, and the circumstances of the
crisis event. Providers of official information must
also consider their ability to use and maintain each
online communication channel. Similarly, it can be
challenging for members of the public to know
where to look for official online information and to
understand what information can be trusted amidst
a flood of socially-generated data [2].
To better understand and address these challenges,
we examine how providers of official information
used multiple online media during the 2014 Carlton
Complex Wildfire. We identify and categorize the
types of sources that provided official information
in this context and describe their features and
communication behaviors. We also examine the
relevance and timeliness of the information these
sources provide. We conclude with suggestions for
how providers of official crisis information might
better manage their online communications and
ways that the public can find more timely and
relevant online crisis information from official
sources.
BACKGROUND
Online Media Use in Crisis

This research engages in a crisis informatics [8,23]
line of inquiry that turns a critical eye to the
complex socio-technical information environment
that surrounds a crisis event. In this context,
scholars have examined the role online media (and
in particular social media) play around many crisis
events, including both natural (e.g., 2004 Indian
Ocean Tsunami [20], 2005 Hurricane Katrina
[4,30], 2012 Hurricane Sandy [13,27], and 2013
Colorado floods [5]) and man-made (e.g., 2007
Virginia Tech shooting [23], 2010 Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill [41], and 2013 Boston Marathon
Bombing [9,43]) disasters. Through online media,
those affected by a crisis event converge online to
seek and share information and assist in response
efforts [12] regardless of location and more quickly
than what was previously possible [22]. Official
emergency responders and other providers of
official information increasingly use online media
to communicate and interact with the public that
they serve and to gather information that can be

used in their efforts [6,11,13,15,42]. In turn,
members of the public can find, generate, and
distribute online crisis information as they seek to
engage with others and understand how a crisis
event affects them [21,25,28,36].
Official Information through Online Media

A growing body of research examines how
providers of official information use online media
to convey their messages [1,6,13,15,26,43]. Social
media, in particular, have made emergency
responders reconsider the traditional one-way
communication model—where they only push
information to the public—in favor of a more
interactive two-way communication model [11,24].
Through online media, providers of official
information can engage in communication with the
public, which can help distribute information more
quickly and directly [6]. Researchers hypothesize
that this two-way communication may result in the
exchange of higher quality information and reduced
reliance on broadcast media to distribute official
crisis communications [11]. Consequently, in this
research, we seek to understand whether emergency
responders provided better information (in terms of
relevance, quantity, and timeliness) around the
Carlton Complex Wildfire than broadcast media
sources.
Providing timely official information online is
important because people affected by a crisis will
seek information elsewhere if they cannot find it
from official sources [31]. In seeking information
from non-official sources, people may act on
information that is incomplete or inaccurate. In
offering timely, accurate information, providers of
official information can also play an important role
in mitigating the spread of rumor during crisis
events [1]. However, the adoption of tools like
social media into emergency responder practice
pose many socio-technical challenges such as issues
of credibility and trust, lack of support from
management, organizational conflicts, poor tools,
and a shortage of resources and training
[3,11,15,26,33,39].
Despite much empirical work, we still know little
about how online media fit into official crisis
communication strategies [11,13]. Further, prior
research is limited in that it tends to focus on how a
single emergency responder or type of responder
uses online media (typically a single platform) to

9
communicate official information. In this paper, we
seek to better understand the different types of
official information providers and how they use
multiple online platforms (i.e., websites, Facebook,
and Twitter) to communicate crisis information. We
also evaluate the relevance and timeliness of
official online crisis information, to determine what
online platforms and official sources provide the
most relevant and timely information.
Event of Study – Carlton Complex Wildfire

On July 14, 2014, lightning in the Methow River
Valley started four wildfires: the Cougar Flat,
French Creek, Gold Hike, and Stokes fires. These
fires later merged (by July 20) to form the Carlton
Complex Wildfire.
The Carlton Complex Wildfire burned 256,108
acres to become the largest wildfire in the history of
the US state of Washington [18,34], affecting the
cities and communities of Okanogan and Chelan
counties (see Figure 1). The wildfire caused several
closures, evacuations and power outages in and
around the cities of Pateros, Malott, Brewster,
Carlton, Methow, Twisp and Winthrop. The
wildfire consumed more than 322 homes as well as
149 other structures and cost at least $60 million in
damages [18]. On July 23, 2014, US President
Barack Obama declared the Carlton Complex
Wildfire a federal emergency disaster. The fire
slowed due to rain on July 24, allowing 60%
containment by July 26 [34]. Finally, the fire was
100% contained by August 24, 2014 [48].
METHOD
Identifying Official Information Sources

We began this research by investigating the Carlton
Complex Wildfire and the circumstances
surrounding the event. Primary sources included
media coverage found through Google searches and
InciWeb (an interagency all-risk incident web
information management system that is run by the
United States Forest Service). Through this
investigation, we identified the geographic regions
affected by the wildfire and many of the official
information sources associated with the event (i.e.,
emergency responders and news media from the
affected regions, cities, communities, and counties).
Our purpose was to identify sources that those who
were directly affected by the Wildfire would have
turned to for official information. Names of many
of the agencies who participated in the event
response were obtained from the Carlton Complex

Figure 1. Carlton Complex Wildfire Perimeter
Map for August 20, 2014 [46]

Wildfire’s InciWeb page [47]. We also found
information sources by searching on “Carlton
Complex Wildfire” using the Google, Facebook,
and Twitter search engines. Finally, we uncovered
additional official sources as we analyzed
information sent from our initial list of sources.
Using iterative sorting and clustering, we divided
these official sources into four categories based on
their purpose: 1) Event Based Resources, 2) Local
Responders, 3) Local News Media, and 4)
Cooperating Agencies. In total, we identified 8
Event Based Resources, 25 Local Responders, 7
Local News Media, and 5 Cooperating Agencies.
Event Based Resources

Event based resources were named after the Carlton
Complex Wildfire and were dedicated to reporting
information about it. An example of this resource
type is the public Carlton Complex Wildfire
Facebook page, which describes itself as a provider
of “official fire information.” These resources are
of particular interest because while they appear to
be sources of official information about the
Wildfire, it was often unclear who actually
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maintained and posted the information found there.
Event Based Resources have been mentioned in
prior research [37], but not beyond noting that they
exist and provide information specific to the crisis
event they are associated with.
Local Responders

Local responders are the agencies of the affected
cities and communities who were most directly
involved in the Carlton Complex Wildfire response.
Examples of Local Responders include the police,
fire and emergency medical services of the affected
region, and the emergency management agencies of
the affected counties.
Local News Media (LNM)

Local news media include the broadcast media
agencies of all the affected cities, communities, and
counties. The area did not have a local television
station, but they did have several newspapers and
radio stations that maintained an online presence.
We did not include media sources outside the
immediately affected region in our dataset, though
the Wildfire did receive national attention; nonlocal media sources tend to repeat information
already conveyed by the local media but with less
detail and frequency [40].

number of websites, Facebook pages, and Twitter
accounts found for each official information source
type.
We then collected all the Facebook posts and tweets
of these official information sources using the
Facebook Graph API and the Twitter Search API
respectively. The relevant pages (those concerning
the Carlton Complex Wildfire) from the identified
websites were downloaded and stored as pdf
documents for coding and analysis. The data
collection timeframe was July 14 – Aug 24, 2014.
We chose these dates because the Carlton Complex
Wildfire began on July 14, 2014 and was reported
100% contained on August 24, 2014. Table 2 lists
the number of websites, pages, or accounts found,
and the number of pages, posts, or tweets collected
for all three online media.
Official
Sources

#
Webs
ites

# FB
Page
s

#
Twitte
r
Accou
nts

Total

Event Based
Resources

1

5

2

8

Local
Responders

20

15

7

42

Local News
Media

4

7

7

18

Cooperating
Agencies

5

4

5
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Cooperating Agencies

Cooperating agencies are those agencies that
assisted in the response to the Carlton Complex
Wildfire, yet their assistance was usually on the
periphery and not as central as Local Responders.
This category includes non-profit service
organizations (e.g., American Red Cross), federal
agencies (e.g., Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of
Land Management, and Fish and Wildlife service),
and state agencies (e.g., Washington State
Department of Natural Resources, and Washington
State Department of Transportation).
Data Collection

Next, we determined the websites, public Facebook
pages, and Twitter accounts that belonged to each
of the official information sources identified
above—if they existed. We assumed that if a
webpage or social media page or account could not
be reasonably found via a basic web search (or a
couple of basic web searches) using the Google,
Facebook, and Twitter search engines, it was
unlikely to have served as a useful source of official
information around the event. Table 1 shows the

Table 1: Number of Websites, Facebook (FB) Pages,
and Twitter Accounts that belong to Official
Information Sources

Online
Media

#
# Pages,
Websites,
Posts or
Pages or
Tweets
Accounts

# On-Topic
Pages,
Posts or
Tweets

Websites

30

83

83

Facebook

31

2,232

1,576

Twitter

21

3,416

2,466
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Table 2. Number of Websites, Facebook Pages, &
Twitter Accounts and the Related Pages, Posts, &
Tweets Analyzed
Data Analysis

We began data analysis by reading all the collected
pages, posts, and tweets to determine which were
about the Carlton Complex Wildfire. All coding
schemes were iteratively developed between the
two authors (both experienced coders). Each author
labeled the posts separately, after which the results
were compared. Any conflicts were collaboratively
discussed until consensus could be reached.
Messages relevant to this event, such as size of the
wildfire,
wildfire
containment,
wildfire
progression, evacuation related information,
weather and smoke conditions, donations,
fundraisers, etc., were marked as on-topic.
Messages that were irrelevant to this event, such as
updates about other wildfires (that were burning at
the same time as the Carlton Complex Wildfire but
did not directly impact the same area), construction
closures, and other local news, such as information
about thefts, road accidents, etc., were marked as
off-topic. Table 2 lists the total numbers of on-topic
pages, posts, and tweets analyzed.

Figure 2: Number of On-Topic Messages during
the Carlton Complex Wildfire (July 14, 2014 –
August 24, 2014)
Figure 2 shows the number of on-topic Facebook
posts, and tweets during each day of the collection
timeframe. The significant increase in on-topic
posts around July 22 related to the growing size of
the wildfire, which resulted in mass evacuations and
property damage. The spike on August 2 was
caused by another fire—the Rising Eagle Road
Fire—that started on August 1 [50]. Due to its
proximity, this fire was later included in the Carlton
Complex Wildfire [51].

To better trace when information was available and
who was providing it across the online media in our
datasets, we identified two important pieces of
public information typically conveyed during a
wildfire event: 1) the number of homes destroyed
by the fire and 2) the current fire evacuation level
for the affected communities. Information
regarding the number of houses consumed by a
wildfire indicates the effect of the fire on the
community and the severity of the wildfire when
compared to other (or previously experienced) fires.
Information regarding evacuation levels can inform
protective measures and save lives [45]. In addition
to their importance, we used these two pieces of
information because they were easier to track
compared to other more variable types of
information such as the location of evacuation
centers, donation drop-off areas, roads/forest
closures, etc. We read and coded every tweet, post,
and webpage to determine if they contained
information about the number of houses consumed
by the wildfire and/or fire evacuation levels.
Next, we plotted this data by time for the reports of
homes burned and evacuation levels (reported later
in this paper). These plots allowed us to cluster the
data around particular pieces of information within
the larger information stream, such as a report of a
level 3 evacuation or a report that 100 homes had
burned. These clusters were then used to determine
what information source first reported each piece of
information in our data set. Finally, we also
determined who posted the most relevant (on-topic)
information as well as the highest percentage of
relevant information.
FINDINGS

We report our findings in two sections. The first
section describes the characteristics and
information sharing behaviors of the four types of
official information sources identified in this study.
The second section traces official reports of the
number of houses burned and evacuation levels
during the Carlton Complex Wildfire.
Official Information Sources
Event Based Resources

Event Based Resources refer to online media that
were specifically dedicated to the Carlton Complex
Wildfire. The name of each of these resources
typically made them easier to find and helped
people know that they offered information about the
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Carlton Complex Wildfire. Some resources were
named directly after the Wildfire (e.g.,
@CarltonComplex), while some were named after
the Wildfire’s location (e.g., Methow Valley Fire
Information). Other resources had names that
described their purpose. For example, the Carlton
Complex, WA Wildfire Lost and Found PetsNDARRT Facebook page was dedicated to helping
pets displaced by the Wildfire. In another case, we
discovered that the administrator of the
@CarltonComplex Twitter account had stopped
updates once the fire had subsided and started
channeling
communications
through
the
@upperfallsfire Twitter account:
@CarltonComplex via Twitter (08/11/2014
04:23pm): In an effort to consolidate fire
information sources, @CarltonComplex will
no longer be updated. Follow @upperfallsfire
for updates.
The Upper Falls Fire was another prominent fire in
the area at the time. Because of the message above,
we suspected that the @upperfallsfire Twitter
account might also be a source for information
about the Carlton Complex Wildfire. Indeed, we
found that 37.8% (see Table 3) of the messages
posted by @upperfallsfire were relevant to the
Carlton Complex Wildfire, and so we included it in
our dataset as an Event Based Resource.
Name

First
Post

Last
Post

# OnTopic

03/26/1
5

4

Website
Carlton
Complex
Assistance
Network

07/27/1
4

Facebook Pages
Carlton
Complex
Wildfire

07/17/1
4

08/11/1
4

172
(89.1
%)

Carlton
Complex
(Camp)

07/20/1
4

09/16/1
5

2
(100
%)

Carlton
Complex Fire
Relief &
Assistance
Network

07/23/1
4

10/15/1
6

47
(52.2
%)

First
Post

Name

Last
Post

# OnTopic

03/26/1
5

4

Website
Carlton
Complex
Assistance
Network

07/27/1
4

Facebook Pages
Methow
Valley Fire
Information

07/17/1
4

08/25/1
6

88
(97.8
%)

Carlton
Complex, WA
Wildfire Lost
and Found
Pets-NDARRT

07/18/1
4

10/14/1
6

96
(88.1
%)

Twitter Accounts
@CarltonCom
plex

07/19/1
4

08/11/1
4

406
(95.3
%)

@upperfallsfir
e

08/06/1
4

08/23/1
4

17
(37.8
%)

Table 3: Event Based Resources and On-Topic Posts

Most (5 of 8) of the Event Based Resources did not
provide information about who or what
organization managed these websites and social
media accounts. Thus, it was not always clear
whether the information provided was accurate or
who was accountable for the information. One
resource (the @CarltonComplex Twitter account)
was described as a source of “official information”
but no further evidence was offered around who
was running the account. In another case, we
discovered that the US Forest Service managed one
of the Event Based Resources (the Carlton Complex
Wildfire Facebook page). However, this
information was only discovered indirectly through
a Facebook post by a Local News Media agency.
Because these Event Based Resources were so tied
to the Carlton Complex Wildfire (unlike the other
resources in our dataset), we tracked how long these
resources remained active following the event (see
Table 3). We defined event based resources as
‘active’ if they had some kind of recent activity on
their pages or accounts within the past year (2016).
This is interesting because event based resources, in
most cases, were created to provide information
about a particular event. If they remain active today
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(after 2+ years), it is evident that their purpose has
changed over time. Findings show that some (3 of
8) resources became inactive within two months
after 100% containment of Wildfire. A few (2 of 8)
resources were still active up to a year following the
event, while the last three resources remain active
today (having most recently posted in August and
October 2016). These three active Event Based
Resources have since broadened their scope of
concern beyond the Carlton Complex Wildfire to
include wildfire events at the county and/or state
level.
Online Media Type

# On-Topic Messages

Facebook

405 (83.7%)

Twitter

423 (89.8%)

Table 4: Average Number of On-Topic Posts by Event
Based Resources on Facebook and Twitter

Event Based Resources averaged the most on-topic
Facebook (83.7%) and Twitter (89.8%) posts of any
official information type. Even though none of
these Event Based Resources existed prior to the
Wildfire, they attracted much interest in a short
amount of time. The most popular Facebook
Page—Carlton Complex Wildfire—collected over
10,500 likes. The Carlton Complex Wildfire
Facebook Page (172 on-topic posts) and
@CarltonComplex Twitter account (406 on-topic
tweets) were the most active Event Based
Resources.

Winthrop Washington via Facebook
(07/21/2014 12:37pm): The latest update is that
Winthrop expects to have power restored by
the weekend!
In the first post, the Okanogan County Sheriff
Office offers information about three different cities
that fall within their county. In the second post,
Winthrop city officials provide information for the
city of Winthrop only.
More than half of the online messages (72%
Facebook posts and 56% tweets) posted by the
Local Responders were wildfire-related (see Table
5). The Okanogan County Sheriff Office Facebook
Page (189 on-topic posts) and Chelan County
Emergency Management Twitter account (700 ontopic tweets) were the most active.
Online Media Type

# On-Topic
Messages

Facebook

224 (72.0%)

Twitter

757 (56.0%)

Table 5: Average Number of On-Topic Posts by Local
Responders on Facebook and Twitter
Local News Media

Different Local Responders have different
jurisdictions. For example, a county agency has
responsibilities around the entire county, whereas a
city agency is responsible only for city activities.
This difference is reflected in the online messages
of these agencies:

Our Local News Media dataset consists of the
official websites, Facebook pages, and Twitter
accounts of the online local news media (e.g.,
Okanogan Valley Gazette-Tribune, Quad City
Herald, and Methow Valley News) and the online
local radio stations (e.g., Okanogan County
Amateur Radio Club W7ORC and KTRT 97.5 The
Root). The Local News Media have a broader scope
of concern compared to the Local Responders who
were primarily dedicated to a specific aspect of the
response effort. Thus, their websites, Facebook
pages, and Twitter accounts posted a wide variety
of information around the wildfires, including
messages about the number of houses burned by
wildfire, fire evacuation levels, local events,
business closures, power outages/restoration, and
road closures.

Okanogan County Sheriff Office via
Facebook (07/19/2014 10:11am): Currently
the information available to us is that there
have been NO STATUS CHANGES. Omak is
still at Level 0 Okanogan is at Level 1 and
Malott is at Level 3.

The Local News Media averaged the second highest
number of on-topic messages, following the Event
Based Resources. Table 6 shows that 79.5%
Facebook posts and 80.3% tweets by Local News
Media were on-topic. The Methow Valley News
Facebook Page (479 On-Topic posts) and the

Local Responders

The dataset of Local Responders includes the
official websites, Facebook pages, and Twitter
accounts of the public officials, fire and police
departments, and emergency management agencies
of the affected area.
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@MethowNews Twitter account (442 On-Topic
tweets) were the most active Local News Media.
Online Media
Type

# On-Topic
Messages

Facebook

910 (79.5%)

Twitter

937 (80.3%)

Table 6: Average Number of On-Topic Posts by Local
News Media on Facebook and Twitter
Cooperating Agencies

Our dataset of Cooperating Agencies comprises the
websites, Facebook pages, and Twitter accounts of
service organizations, and federal and state
agencies that supported the Wildfire response.
Every agency in this category had a narrowly
defined role and set of responsibilities with regard
to the Carlton Complex Wildfire. For example, the
Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife
(WDFW) mostly posted about the effects of
wildfire on natural habitats, whereas the
Washington State Department of Transportation
(WSDOT) posted about the effects of wildfire on
transportation (e.g., road closures and detours).
Cooperating Agencies averaged the least on-topic
Facebook (12.6%) and Twitter (38.9%) posts of any
official information type (see Table 7). This low
level of relevant content was likely because these
agencies were less involved in the Carlton Complex
Wildfire response efforts. The Washington State
Department of Natural Resources Facebook page
(32 on-topic posts) and @waDNR_fire Twitter
account (221 on-topic tweets) were the most active
Cooperating Agencies.
Online Media Type

# On-Topic Messages

Facebook

37 (12.6%)

Twitter

349 (38.9%)

Resources was to report information around the
Wildfire. The Local News Media were heavily
involved in distributing important crisis
information to the public. Local Responders were
responsible for much of the local response effort,
but their reporting of the event was less significant,
and once the Wildfire lessened in severity, many
responders moved on to reporting other, unrelated
types of information. Cooperating Agencies had the
least relevant information, which is not surprising
considering they were more peripherally involved
with the Wildfire response efforts.
Analysis of Online Media Content
Houses Consumed by Wildfire

First, we analyzed the number of houses consumed
by the Carlton Complex Wildfire. This information
can help city and government officials to estimate
the damage caused by a fire. It is also useful for
determining if a disaster qualifies for a federal
emergency declaration and federal aid [7]. This
information can also help affected citizens
understand the severity of the fire, which in turn
might affect their decision to take protective action
or to evacuate.
We plotted the collected data (see Figure 3) to
determine 1) how the information regarding houses
consumed by wildfire was conveyed over time, and
2) the first reporters of the information. The graph
depicts how the Wildfire temporally progressed,
showing how reports of the number of houses
burned changed from only a few houses on July 17
to around 300 houses on July 25—a span of only 8
days.

Table 7: Average Number of On-Topic Posts by
Cooperating Agencies on Facebook and Twitter
Relevance of Official Information Sources

Event Based Resources averaged the highest
percentage of on-topic messages within their own
message streams, followed by the Local News
Media, Local Responders, and finally, Cooperating
Agencies. This order reflects the role that each of
these official information sources played in the
response. The purpose of the Event Based

Figure 3. First Reports of the Number of Houses
Consumed by the Carlton Complex Wildfire

Information around the number of houses burned
was sometimes difficult to graph. In a few
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instances, agencies did not report the exact number
of houses burned, but rather gave a range (e.g., 80100 homes burned) or they described it using nonspecific, approximate language (e.g., several homes
burned). Such data is not represented in Figure 3.
#
Official
# Web
# FB
Tota
Twee
Sources
Pages
Posts
l
ts
Event
Based
Resources

0

Local
Responders

0

3

25

28

Local
News
Media

13

76

54

143

Cooperatin
g Agencies

2

1

3

6

29

7

evacuation level for a community is a critical
(possibly lifesaving) piece of information. Here we
analyze the messages regarding evacuation levels,
the way these levels changed during the fire, and
when they were reported to the public through the
online media examined in this study. The
evacuation levels for this wildfire ranged in severity
from 0 to 3. Level 0 indicates no evacuations, while
level 3 indicates immediate emergency evacuations.

36

Table 8. Number of Official Web Pages, Facebook
(FB) Posts, and Tweets that Reported the Number of
Houses Consumed by the Carlton Complex Wildfire

Official
Sources

#
Web
Posts

# FB
Posts

#
Tweets

Total

Event Based
Resources

0

0

0

0

Local
Responders

0

1

1

2

Local News
Media

2

2

4

8

Cooperating
Agencies

2

0

0

2

Table 9. First Reports of Houses Consumed by the
Wildfire

Local News Media (143 posts) were the most active
reporters for houses consumed by the wildfire (see
Table 8). Most first reports of the number of houses
consumed by fire came from the Local News Media
(66.7%), and in most cases, the Local News Media
reported this information via Twitter (see Table 9).
This finding suggests that the official Twitter
accounts of Local News Media sent information
earlier than the other information resources in our
dataset. However, care should be taken when
applying this finding because the sample rate is low
(N=12).
Fire Evacuation Levels

Next, we analyzed reports of fire evacuation levels
during the Carlton Complex Wildfire. The

To simplify our analysis, we considered fire
evacuation level messages only for cities. We did
not consider levels given for forests and roads
because they were difficult to map to a particular
geographic location for comparison. No fire
evacuation levels were issued at the county level.
We grouped our data based on geographic regions,
creating a different group of data for each city
affected by the Carlton Complex Wildfire. Table 10
shows the number of evacuation level messages for
each of the 15 cities found in the data. The more
severely a city was affected by the wildfire, the
more evacuation level messages were issued.
Fire evacuation levels were always reported with
respect to a specific geographic region. Unlike
reports of the number of homes burned, evacuation
level reports were always expressed in integer
values (in the range 0-4), and were never reported
in a range or in a descriptive way:
@CarltonComplex via Twitter (07/21/2014
03:48pm): #CarltonComplex Urgent Update:
Pleasant Valley area now under LEVEL 3
IMMEDIATE EVACUATION. Highway 20
closed between Twisp & Okanogan
The Local News Media were the most active
reporters of fire evacuation levels (see Table 11).

City

Number of
Evacuation Level
Messages

Winthrop

48

Carlton

38

Twisp

38

Pateros

33

Pleasant Valley

32

16

City

Number of
Evacuation Level
Messages

Brewster

23

Chiliwist

16

Omak

12

Okanogan City

11

Chelan

6

Malott

6

Manson

6

Tonasket

3

Union Valley

1

Event Based
Resources

# FB
Posts

0

101

# FB
Posts

#
Twe
ets

Total

Cooperating
Agencies

15

2

16

33

Relevance of Provided Information

Next, we mapped the data for each cities and
identified the first reporters of each change in
evacuation level. The Local News Media were the
first to report 57.3% of the fire evacuation levels
(see Table 12). The Local News Media reported
most of this information (all but 3 messages)
equally across Facebook and Twitter. Upon further
investigation, we discovered that some of the Local
News Media had linked their Facebook and Twitter
accounts and many identical messages were pushed
out over the two platforms at the same time. In this
case, the official Twitter accounts and Facebook
pages of Local News Media sent information earlier
than the Local News Media’s websites.

Official
Sources

#
Web
Pages

Table 11. Number of Official Web Pages, Facebook
Posts, and Tweets that Contain Evacuation Level
Information

Table 10. Number of Evacuation Level Messages per
City

#
Web
Pages

Official
Sources

#
Twe
ets

Total

100

201

Using the data collected around the number of
houses consumed by fire and the evacuation levels,
the Local News Media provided the most relevant
information in terms of quantity, followed by Event
Based Resources, Local Responders, and lastly,
Cooperating Agencies. Local News Media sources
provided more than double the number of messages
that the Event Based Resources provided. This
finding demonstrates how much more involved the
Local News Media were in sharing information, and
as a result they may be a richer source of crisis
information for the affected public.
Official
Sources

# Web
Pages

# FB
Posts

#
Tweet
s

Total

Event
Based
Resources

0

7

4

11

Local
Responders

0

9

1

10

Local
News
Media

3

18

18

39

Cooperatin
g Agencies

8

0

0

8

Table 12. First Reports of Evacuation Levels for the
15 Cities Affected by the Carlton Complex Wildfire
DISCUSSION

Local
Responders

0

52

98

150

Local News
Media

47

204

202

453

In this paper, we identified four types of official
information sources and analyzed the timeliness
and relevance of the information these sources
provided during the 2014 Carlton Complex
Wildfire. This categorization better articulates the
roles, interests, and responsibilities of different
official information sources and helps explain what
type of information emergency responders,
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members of the public, and researchers might
expect from these sources. We now discuss broader
implication of this research and offer
recommendations for how to improve the
effectiveness
of
official
online
crisis
communications.
Timeliness of Official Information Sources

For both the number of houses consumed by fire
and the evacuation levels, the Local News Media
had the most first reports of this information.
Earlier, we hypothesized that local responders
would provide the most timely information because
they now have more ability through online media to
share information directly with the public through
social media [11]. The data, however, disproves this
hypothesis because it demonstrates that the Local
News Media are still heavily relied upon to
distribute timely information to the public in an
online setting (at least for the Carlton Complex
Wildfire).
Event Based Resources

We included Event Based Resources as sources of
official information because we found that in many
cases these resources either claimed to be a source
of official information or they were managed by an
official emergency response agency. In other cases,
where “official” status was not so clear, the name of
the online account tied it to the Carlton Complex
Wildfire. So, at least in name, the account appeared
to be official. Recent research has shown that
official accounts can shape social media
conversation and mitigate misinformation and false
rumor around a crisis event [1]. Thus,
understanding who manages these Event Based
accounts, their purpose in creating these accounts,
and the current intentions of account owners is
important and would reveal much about the
lifecycle of these accounts and their usefulness for
crisis information seekers. To this end, we plan to
study Event Based Resources more deeply in future
crisis events.
Three of the Event Based Resources in this study
continue to remain active long after the Wildfire for
which they were originally created. These resources
clearly filled an outstanding need in the community
and continue to do so. Thus, Event Based Resources
can serve another purpose in bringing community
needs and challenges around a crisis event to the
attention of a broader audience. As such, these

resources may be a good place for emergency
responders, humanitarian organizations, and
volunteers to look for unmet crisis needs that they
can help address. From a Human Computer
Interaction (HCI) perspective, we might consider
how we can better support the shifting purpose and
role of a social media group or community over
time. For instance, how can we design a platform
that makes the history of an online community more
transparent?
Toward More Effective Official Online Crisis
Information

We suggest several ways that providers of official
information can improve their communication
efforts. First, information providers should clearly
identify themselves and their purpose when using
online media. Doing so lends credibility to the
information source and gives the affected public
someone to hold accountable for the quality of
information [10]. Many of the Event Based
Resources were managed by reputable emergency
response agencies, but they never clearly identified
themselves. Similarly, we could not identify the
source for several Event Based Resources that made
claims that they were official sources of
information, whether through the name of the
resource or through its description. We recommend
that official emergency responders monitor these
accounts to ensure that the information they provide
is accurate, especially if the public sees them as a
source of official information. Monitoring these
accounts will allow emergency responders to adjust
their
own
communications
to
correct
misinformation or respond to requests for
information. Responders may even point the public
to these sources if the information they provide is
credible and meets a particular need that cannot be
met by the official response (e.g., helping reunite
pets with their owners).
We also offer insight into how members of the
public might choose information sources from the
many available options to obtain better official
information during a crisis event. Based on our
findings, the Local News Media provided the
timeliest information and the highest number of
relevant messages around the event, which suggests
that the Local News Media were the best source of
general information about the Wildfire. While the
Event Based Resources provided the highest
percentage of relevant information, it was not
always clear how trustworthy the information was.
If members of the public are looking for a specific
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type of information (i.e., road closures), the best
source of information is likely to be an official
source more directly affiliated with that information
(i.e., a transportation authority). Lastly, most social
media platforms are open and anyone can create an
account/page around a particular event or topic.
One solution for helping the public understand
which Event Based Resources are more
authoritative is to verify the resource’s account. On
some social media platforms, accounts can be
verified so that people know that the account is run
by the entity that claims to own the account.
However, this verification process can take
considerable time to complete. The problem is that
Event Based Resources are created in response to a
specific event (usually unforeseen), which leaves
no time to complete such a verification process
before the account would need to be used.
Streamlining the verification process, or perhaps
allowing a new account to be directly linked to a
previously verified account may be a possible
technical solution to this problem.
Broader Implications

Though this research only looks at data from the
Carlton Complex Wildfire, findings can also inform
future research of crisis information more broadly.
Specifically, this research unpacks who is providing
official information during a crisis and identifies the
different types of information each provides. This
analysis lays the foundation for richer and more
nuanced study of official crisis information sources,
beyond assuming they all share similar motivations,
behaviors, challenges, and scopes of concern—a
simplifying assumption that much research in the
domain makes. Better understanding of the types of
official information available around a crisis and
their features can also inform machine learning
algorithms and text classifiers that seek to extract
important crisis information from social media
streams [14]. For example, a tool that automatically
detects new Event Based Resources around an
emerging crisis event could benefit both emergency
responders and members of the public as they try to
quickly assess the impact of the event.
Beyond the crisis context, this research also applies
to other HCI domains where it is important to
understand what online information is available and
what online sources are credible. For example, the
design considerations shared above around how to
provide a more robust verification process for social

media accounts and how to support the shifting
purpose and role of a social media group over time
are broadly applicable to more general use of any
social media platform. As another example, social
media accounts are created and used every day
around different types of non-crisis events (e.g.,
political rallies, sporting events, celebrations, etc.),
and Event Based Resources regularly appear during
these events (i.e., a Twitter account created to report
on a particular political election). Study of the
characteristics and content of these event specific
social media accounts (as was done in this study)
can help researchers and the public better
understand how to interpret and filter the
information these accounts provide.
Limitations & Future Work

Our focus on online media limits what can be said
about all the official information available to those
affected by the Carlton Complex Wildfire. Further,
we used trace online data in our analyses, which
does not allow us to account for the intentions of
those who provided the information. Future work
could take a more comprehensive approach to
mapping the public information space around a
crisis event by including additional sources of
official information such as briefings and public
meetings, TV news media content, and physical
information booths and boards. This information
could be supplemented with interviews of official
information providers. Together these data would
allow researchers to create a more complete picture
of how official information is created and shared
around a crisis event and across both online and
offline media platforms. Next, when designing this
research, we considered conducting interviews with
the public affected by this Wildfire to understand
how the public used and perceived online official
information, but too much time had passed. The
challenge of collecting ephemeral data is a wellknown problem in the disaster research domain
[35]. Thus, our ongoing research will seek to
develop interview protocols for obtaining timely
feedback from populations affected by disaster
events. Finally, we may also look at the information
dissemination patterns for other types of events
(such as terrorist attacks, hurricanes, etc.) in the
future to see if findings from this research apply in
different contexts.
CONCLUSION
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By analyzing the online media posts of official
information providers during the Carlton Complex
Wildfire, we offer new empirical insight into who
provides this information, how the information is
provided, and the timeliness and relevance of the
information. In particular, we note that the Local
News Media continue to play a primary role in
distributing official crisis information online
despite new possibilities for emergency responders
to share information directly with the public
through social media. As online communications
continue to proliferate, it becomes increasingly
difficult for the public to sort through the deluge of
available data to find credible crisis information
that is relevant and helpful. This research is an
important first step toward understanding what
types of official online information is provided and
how members of the public might find it.
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ABSTRACT

Crisis Named Resources (CNRs) are the social media accounts and pages named after a crisis event. CNRs
typically appear spontaneously after an event as places for information exchange. They are easy to find when
searching for information about the event. Yet in most cases, it is unclear who manages these resources.
Thus, it is important to understand what kinds of information they provide and what role they play in crisis
response. This paper describes a study of Facebook and Twitter CNRs around the 2016 Fort McMurray
wildfire. We report on CNR lifecycles, and their relevance to the event. Based on the information provided
by these resources, we categorize them into 8 categories: donations, fundraisers, prayers, reactions, reports,
needs and offers, stories, and unrelated. We also report on the most popular CNR on both Facebook and
Twitter. We conclude by discussing the role of CNRs and the need for future investigation.
Keywords

Crisis Informatics, Crisis Named Resources, Social Media.
INTRODUCTION

Individuals and organizations (such as crisis responders, governments, news media, companies, etc.) use
social media during crisis events to share event updates, facilitate communication, offer help, express
opinions, and show support and solidarity (Palen and Hughes 2018; Palen and Liu 2007; Sutton et al. 2008).
Social media allow anyone with an Internet connection to participate in the exchange of information around
a crisis event. In this paper, we draw attention to a phenomenon that occurs after most larger crisis events
where people spontaneously create social media accounts and pages that are named after the event. We call
these social media products Crisis Named Resources (CNRs).
CNRs are important to study for several reasons. First, CNRs appear to be dedicated venues for information
exchange around an event, and they easily appear when searching for information about an event. Due to this
visibility, these resources tend to attract more attention than other sources of information. Second, CNRs
could be mistaken by the public as official sources of information, which could be harmful if these sources
then shared false or inaccurate information (Lindsay 2011). Third, CNRs are typically created soon after a
crisis occurs which leaves little to no opportunity for assessing the identity or intentions of a CNR’s
administrator(s) based on past activity. Lastly, most CNRs disseminate information about an event (though
some do not), so it is critical to understand what kinds of information they provide and what role they play
in a response.
To learn more about these resources, we analyzed the online activities of Facebook and Twitter CNRs created
during the 2016 Fort McMurray wildfire. We report on the lifecycle (creation and deletion) of these resources,
and how they were used for sharing information around the wildfire. We categorize these resources based on
their social media profiles and posted content to understand the different roles these resources played in the
crisis response. We also investigate the CNRs with the most number of Facebook likes and Twitter followers
to discover why so many people followed them. The focus of this study is to determine the type of information
disseminated by these CNRs, understand the role of CNRs in crisis response efforts, and lay a foundation for
future analysis.
BACKGROUND
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This research lies in the domain of crisis informatics (Palen et al. 2007; Palen and Anderson 2016) and is
grounded in sociotechnical theory. This perspective advocates that technology and social systems are not
only intertwined, but they also dynamically and recursively shape and influence one another (Orlikowski
1992). We see evidence of this influence in the research literature that describes how social media can
empower communities to participate in crisis response (Ling et al. 2015). Members of the public often use
social media to provide response and rescue relevant data, relief assistance, and emotive and evaluative
support around crisis events (Palen and Liu 2007; Liu et al. 2008). People also use social media to collaborate
during disasters. For instance, in the aftermath of 2007 Virginia Tech Shootings, people worked together
online to discover the names of those who had died in the shootings (Vieweg et al. 2008). A similar kind of
self-organizing behavior of members of the public was also observed during the response and recovery phase
of the 2010 Haiti Earthquake (Starbird and Palen 2011). These emergent uses of social media during crisis
events have in turn, shaped social norms around social media use as well as the technical affordances of the
different social media platforms.
Though social media have proved useful around crisis events, they have also contributed to the spread of
false rumors (intentionally or unintentionally) during crises (Huang et al. 2015). These false rumors can lead
people to make potentially life threatening decisions (Starbird et al. 2016). Therefore, it is important to
investigate who is using social media during a crisis event and how.
To better understand the sociotechnical role of social media in crisis response, researchers in crisis
informatics have sought to identify the kinds of users who post and/or share crisis related information. Crisis
informatics researchers have also tried to determine the types of information that these users share, and their
intentions in doing so. For example, Olteanu and colleagues (2015) studied Twitter communications around
26 natural and human-induced crises, and found that the provided information were mainly about the affected
individuals, infrastructure and utilities, donations and volunteering, caution and advice, and sympathy and
emotional support. They also reported that the sources of information, comprised eyewitnesses, government,
non-governmental organizations, businesses, traditional or Internet media, and outsiders (individuals who are
not personally involved or affected by the event). Similarly, Purohit and Chan (2017) studied the online
communications around Hurricane Matthew and Louisiana floods, and classified users into three categories
(organization, organization-affiliated, and non-affiliated). They also reported how users in each of these
categories have unique ways of disseminating information, for example, the organization users are less likely
to retweet in contrast to non-affiliated users who are the most likely to retweet. In this research, we take a
similar approach as we seek to determine the types of CNRs that were created around the 2016 Fort
McMurray wildfires and their purpose.
Prior crisis informatics research has also observed the existence of dedicated sources that are created in
response to a crisis event. For instance, Shklovski and colleagues (2008) discovered that a community-based
volunteer website was a useful information source during the 2007 Southern California Wildfires. Created
by a member of a rural community that had been evacuated due to the wildfire, the website played an
important role in reconnecting community members and facilitating information exchange about the wildfire
status and humanitarian relief efforts in the area. More recently, we examined the online communications of
official sources during the 2014 Carlton Complex wildfire (Chauhan and Hughes 2017), and found that many
Facebook pages, Twitter accounts, and websites (or CNRs) were created in response to and were named after
the wildfire. These resources played an active role in disseminating information around the event. However,
in most cases, it was difficult to determine who administered these online resources, which also made it
difficult to assess their credibility. In this study, we expand upon the Carlton Complex wildfire research with
a deeper examination of CNRs. Our goal is to identify the types of CNRs that appear around an event and to
learn more about the different roles they play in crisis response.
EVENT OF STUDY – THE 2016 FORT MCMURRAY WILDFIRE

A wildfire in the southwest of Fort McMurray, Alberta, Canada started on May 1, 2016. On May 3, the
wildfire entered the city of Fort McMurray and forced a mass evacuation of 80,000 residents—the largest
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wildfire evacuation in Alberta's history (Fritz 2016). The wildfire burned nearly 600,000 hectares and
destroyed over 2,400 structures (CBC News 2016). Evacuees experienced an extended period away from
their homes and were only allowed to re-enter their city under a voluntary phased reentry program from June
1- June 15 (Ramsay 2016a). On June 13, 2016, the wildfire was classified as ‘being held’ (Giovannetti 2016)
and the wildfire was finally considered ‘under control’ on July 5, 2016 (Ramsay 2016b).
DATA COLLECTION

Our data collection involved two activities. First, throughout the Fort McMurray Wildfire, we periodically
looked for new CNRs while continuing to monitor the CNRs we had previously found. Second, we collected
all Facebook posts and tweets from the CNRs we identified during the wildfire timeframe. We discuss these
activities in more detail below.
Identification and Monitoring of Crisis Named Resources

We recorded the creation and deletion dates of CNRs on both Facebook and Twitter once a day during the
data collection time period (May 1 – July 5, 2016). Using Facebook and Twitter search engines we
determined the Facebook pages and Twitter accounts, whose name had any of the following keywords‘Horse River Fire’, ‘YMM Fire’, ‘Fort McMurray Fire’, ‘Fort McMurray Wildfire’, ‘Fort mc fire’, and ‘Fort
Mac Fire.’ This was done daily to ensure that we did not miss the CNRs that were created over the course of
the event. The account creation date for all Twitter accounts was retrieved from their respective account
profiles. For Facebook, we considered the date of their first post to be their account creation date since most
of the pages did not have information about when they were created. We also recorded the number of CNR
Facebook page likes and Twitter followers on the last day of the data collection timeframe.
We revisited all the identified Facebook and Twitter CNRs daily to see if they continued to exist. For the
CNRs that were deleted, we recorded the date when we found this information.
Messages posted by Crisis Named Resources

All Facebook posts and tweets by Fort McMurray CNRs during the timeframe May 1- July 5, 2016 (the entire
duration of wildfire) were collected using the Facebook Graph API and Twitter Search API respectively.
Table 13 gives the number of CNRs and the number of messages posted by these resources on Facebook and
Twitter.
# of CNRs

Total # of Posts (May 1 – July 5, 2016)

Facebook
70
2657 messages
Twitter
13
5011 tweets
Table 13. Total Number of CNRs and Posts on Facebook and Twitter.
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

We report the findings of our study in four subsections: (1) life of CNRs, (2) relevance of CNRs, (3) types
of CNRs, and (4) popular CNRs. The first subsection reports the time at which the CNRs were created and
deleted (if applicable). The second subsection determines if the messages posted by these CNRs were about
the Fort McMurray wildfire. The third subsection examines different types of CNRs and the fourth subsection
investigates the most popular Fort McMurray CNR on both Facebook and Twitter.
Life of Crisis Named Resources

To understand the lifecycle of CNRs, we determined their creation and deletion dates, and analyzed their
longevity after the completion of the event.
Creation of Crisis Named Resources

A CNR’s creation date is an indicator of whether a new resource was created or if an existing resource was
adapted in response to a crisis event. For an event of prolonged duration, such as the Fort McMurray wildfire,
a CNR’s creation date might also correlate with a significant subevent within the event (e.g., an evacuation).
Table 14 gives the number of CNRs created on Facebook and Twitter before, during, and after the wildfire.
Our findings show that most Facebook (98.5%) and Twitter CNRs (92.3%) were created during the wildfire.
There were, however, 2 resources (1 Facebook and 1 Twitter) created before the wildfire.
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Date of CNR Creation
Facebook
Twitter
before May 1, 2016 (before wildfire)
1 out of 70 (1.4%)
1 out of 13 (7.6%)
between May 1 - July 5, 2016 (during wildfire)
69 out of 70 (98.5%)
12 out of 13 (92.3%)
Table 14. Number of CNRs Created on Facebook and Twitter.
First, we look at the two CNRs created before the wildfire. The first CNR is a Facebook page that was created
in April 2012 (4 years before the wildfire). According to the page description, it was created to increase safety
on Highway 63. The administrators of this page posted 4 messages during the Fort McMurray wildfire, all of
which were relevant to the wildfire. The second CNR created before the wildfire is a Twitter account that
was created in May 2014 (2 years before the wildfire). This CNR is owned by a woman who described herself
as a proud mom of a UCLA bound student, an Ivy League grad, and an editor. During the fire, she changed
her username to ‘Support #ymmfire,’ which is why the account was considered a CNR in our dataset. Later
(on May 26, 2016) she changed her username back to her given name. She posted 27 messages during the
data collection timeframe, none of which were relevant to the wildfire. From the data we collected, it is
impossible to know why she changed the name of her account. We speculate that it could have been a way
to show support for the wildfire affected population. We would have to interview the account owner to know
for certain, which was not possible in this case.

May 8 - 14

May 15 - 21

May 22 – 28

May 29 – Jun 4

Jun 5 – 11

Jun 12 – 18

Jun 19 – 25

Jun 26 – Jul 2

Jul 3 –5

Facebook
Twitter

May 1 - 7

Next, we look at the CNRs created during the wildfire. To find possible correlations between the CNR
creation dates and the event progression, we determined the number of CNRs that were created each week
of the wildfire (see Table 15). Findings show that most of the CNRs on Facebook (68.5%) and Twitter
(53.8%) were created during the first week (May 1 – May 7) of the wildfire—the week that saw rapid wildfire
growth and forced massive evacuations. Therefore, it appears that the creation of most of the CNRs in the
first week of the wildfire reflects the chaos caused by the wildfire during that timeframe.

48
7

8
2

7
0

1
0

1
2

1
0

0
0

1
1

0
0

2
0

Table 15. Number of CNRs Created During the Wildfire.
Deletion of Crisis Named Resources

Table 16 shows the number of CNRs deleted from Facebook and Twitter during and after the wildfire. We
were surprised to find that a significant number of CNRs were deleted during the wildfire, 16 (22.8%)
Facebook CNRs (and none of the Twitter CNRs). When we checked for the existence of these CNRs in the
month of March 2018 (just prior to submitting the final version of this paper), we found that an additional 27
(38.5%) Facebook and 2 (15.3%) Twitter CNRs have been deleted, bringing the total number of deleted
CNRs to 43 (61.4%) on Facebook and 2 (15.3%) on Twitter.
Date of CNRs’ Deletion

Facebook

Twitter

between May 1 - July 5, 2016 (during wildfire)
16 out of 70 (22.8%)
0 out of 13 (0.0%)
after July 5, 2016 (after wildfire controlled)
27 out of 70 (38.5%)
2 out of 13 (15.3%)
Table 16. Number of CNRs Deleted on Facebook and Twitter.
We did not investigate the CNRs that were deleted after the wildfire because the deletion of a CNR after the
conclusion of an event is in alignment with the goal of serving as a resource during an event. However, the
deletion of CNRs while an event is still happening needs more inspection.
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We first looked at the number of Facebook CNRs deleted each week of the wildfire (see Table 17). The data
show a fairly uniform distribution of the number of deleted accounts during the wildfire, and thus there seems
to be no correlation with the deletion of CNRs and event progression. Since these 16 CNRs were deleted
during the wildfire, we do not report on the details of these resources and the messages they posted. In some
cases, the CNRs were deleted before we could even retrieve their messages.

May 8 - 14

May 15 - 21

May 22 – 28

May 29 – Jun 4

Jun 5 – 11

Jun 12 – 18

Jun 19 – 25

Jun 26 – Jul 2

Jul 3 –5

Facebook

May 1 - 7

The deletion of CNRs during an ongoing event prompts the question of why these accounts were deleted. We
were unable to find any messages from the deleted CNRs that indicated why they were deleted, thus answers
to this question are unknown. Also, since these CNRs left no record of their existence (such as an alternate
page or account), questioning the administrators about the reasons for deleting their CNRs is now impossible.

1

2

2

2

0

3

2

0

1

3

Table 17. Number of CNRs Deleted by Week During the Wildfire.
Crisis Named Resources After the Event

Next, we looked at the CNRs that continue to exist in the month of March 2018. We revisited all the CNRs
identified earlier in the study and found that of the 27 Facebook CNRs and 11 Twitter CNRs that continue to
exist, 18 Facebook CNRs and all 11 Twitter CNRs have not posted anything since the month the wildfire
was considered under control, i.e., after July 2016. This means that even though these resources still exist,
people are no longer contributing content to them. There were 9 Facebook CNRs that continue to exist and
have shown some online activity after July 2016 (see Table 18).
Facebook
Page
Name*

Page Description*

#Likes and
#Followers

Fort
McMurray
CNR 1

The administrator was
saddened by the wildfires
and wanted to help in some
way with this page.
This page was a place where
people shared and collected
photos of the event.

60 Likes.
52
Followers.

Fort
McMurray
CNR 3

Fort
McMurray
CNR 4

Fort
McMurray
CNR 2

# Posts
Since
July
2016
1

Content of Posts Since
July 2016

28,982
Likes.
28,675
Followers.

4

This page aims to help
victims by collecting stories,
information and offers of
help.

160 Likes.
159
Followers.

17

-

31 Likes.
30
Followers.

1

Post about community
gatherings on the
anniversary of Fort Mc
wildfire, and some photos
of wildfire.
Posts about legalizing
marijuana, unemployment,
immigration, oil and gas
industry workers, B.C.
wildfire, and Fort
McMurray wildfire.
Post about Roller Derby.

Funny Video.
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Fort
McMurray
CNR 5

This page was created to help 40 Likes.
23
Posts about flowers and
Fort McMurray residents and 40 Follows.
quilting.
family, but after the fire only
posted about flowers and
quilts.
Fort
A page to keep the pictures
45 Likes.
153
Posts about missing
McMurray
of displaced pets and
45
animals and animal care.
CNR 6
livestock that are not yet
Followers.
claimed as a result of the Fort
McMurray fire 2016
Fort
This page took names and
479 Likes.
17
Posts about B.C. wildfires,
McMurray
numbers of those who need a 454
and a few about Fort
CNR 7
place to stay, and those that
Followers.
McMurray fire.
can provide a place.
Fort
This page was created by a
66 Likes.
1
1 post about the plan of
McMurray
teen who wanted to help with 62
getting horses back to Fort
CNR 8
relief efforts despite being
Followers.
McMurray.
told he was too young to
help.
Fort
This page posts information
436 Likes.
1
Posted a video about a dog
McMurray
regarding the wellbeing of
407
suffering in a hot car.
CNR 9
pets that the administrator is
Followers.
tending or has rescued.
Table 18: Facebook CNRs That Have Posted Since July 2016 (* Page Names and Descriptions have
been anonymized).
Table 18 shows that 4 of the 9 CNRs have generated only 1 post since the wildfire was under control. One
of these resources (Fort McMurray CNR 8) was created by a teen, who felt that this Facebook page was the
only way he could meaningfully help. His single post following the fire talked about how he still plans to
continue his efforts in getting the displaced horses back to Fort McMurray and that he is still concerned about
helping around the event. We also found that 1 CNR (Fort McMurray CNR 2) has posted only 4 messages.
All these messages were about the Fort McMurray wildfire, so this resource is still being used for the wildfire
response. Another CNR (Fort McMurray CNR 3) has posted 17 times after the wildfire. All these posts were
about the issues and challenges at the local (public inquiry on Fort McMurray wildfire, mental health
challenges and increased unemployment of wildfire-affected oil workers), state (increase in the
unemployment rate of Alberta), and national level (immigration, use of toxic Bromine in British Columbia
(B.C.), and the B.C. wildfire). Furthermore, we found one CNR (Fort McMurray CNR 5) that was created
on May 2, 2016. The administrator(s) of this CNR posted on May 4, 2016, after which this resource became
idle for a while. The page became active again during August – September 2017, when the administrator(s)
of this resource posted 23 times. All of these posts were related to flowers and quilting; none were related to
the wildfire. After this activity, the page has once again become idle. We also found 1 CNR (Fort McMurray
CNR 6) that has expanded its mission of reporting on the animals affected by the wildfire to missing animals
and animal care, in general, with 153 posts following the wildfire. Another CNR (Fort McMurray CNR 7)
has been sharing information about a wildfire in the southern Cariboo region of B.C. Even though this CNR
is informing (or hoping to inform) people about a recent wildfire in B.C., it is unclear how people, ones who
are not following this resource, would come to know that it could be useful in getting information about the
B.C. wildfire. The online activity shown by these CNRs demonstrate how after the completion of an event
CNRs sometimes broaden their goals (e.g., by putting their efforts towards animal safety on a broader scale,
or by informing people about surrounding wildfires) or change their goals (e.g., by talking about quilts).
Relevance of Crisis Named Resources
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After identifying the Fort McMurray named resources on Facebook and Twitter, we assessed whether they
were posting about the wildfire. We read each message posted by the CNRs that existed throughout the
wildfire and marked each message as on-topic (event-related) or off-topic (not related to the event). Examples
of on-topic posts included messages about the fire size, evacuations, fire containment, re-entry, etc. Off-topic
posts included posts about other local and national wildfires, Canada Day, etc. We did not mark the messages
posted by the CNRs that were deleted before July 5 (the day the wildfire was classified as ‘under control’) as
on- or off-topic due to terms-of-service obligations that require consumers of this data to remove deleted
social media posts (Maddock et al. 2015).
Table 19 shows that the majority of the messages posted by these resources on Facebook (99.3%) and Twitter
(99.2%) were related to the wildfire. However, there were a few resources (12 (of 54) on Facebook and 3 (of
13) on Twitter) that have no posts, not even posts irrelevant to the wildfire. We include these resources
because these resources can still potentially be seen as sources of information about an event (even if they
have no posts). Among the remaining 42 Facebook and 10 Twitter CNRs that posted information about the
wildfire, 35 Facebook and 7 Twitter CNRs had less than 100 on-topic posts. This means that there were only
7 (12.9%) Facebook and 3 (23%) Twitter CNRs that were heavily used during the wildfire.
Total Number of On-Topic Posts
Facebook
2639 of 2657 posts (99.3%)
Twitter
4974 of 5011 tweets (99.2%)
Table 19. Number of On-Topic Posts by CNRs on Facebook and Twitter.
We compared the number of on-topic posts per week during the wildfire timeframe to see if there is a
correlation between the number of on-topic posts and event progression. Figure 1 shows that the highest
number of on-topic messages on Facebook and Twitter were posted during the first two weeks of the wildfire.
This finding indicates most of the online chatter about the event fell on the days when mandatory evacuations
were in place.
To identify the administrator(s) of these CNRs, we analyzed the CNRs’ names, their descriptions, and the
messages they posted. We could only identify 9 (16.6%) CNR administrators on Facebook (1 via the CNR’s
description and CNR’s posts, and the remaining 8 only through post content) and 2 (15%) CNR
administrators on Twitter (1 via through the account description and the other via tweet content). The
administrators for the other CNRs (i.e., 84% on Facebook and 85% on Twitter) are unknown.

Figure 4. Number of On-Topic Messages Posted by CNRs over the Data Collection Timeframe.
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Types of Crisis Named Resources

To better understand the different types of CNRs people create around a wildfire, we categorized each CNR
by its content. We report only on the 54 Facebook and 13 Twitter CNRs that existed throughout the wildfire
timeframe.
CNRs
Categories
Donations
Fundraisers
Prayers
Reactions
Reports
Needs &
Offers
Stories

Unrelated
Unclassifie
d

Definition
Resources asking for money or items for the Fort McMurray
wildfire victims.
Resources used for selling or auctioning items, money of which
was/would be used for the benefit of wildfire victims.
Resources used for sending best wishes and messages of hope
for wildfire victims.
Resources used to express personal views and opinions about
handling of the Fort Mac wildfire.
Resources used for reporting on the Fort McMurray wildfire
event.
Resources used by people to ask for or provide help.
Resources that were asking for stories from individuals about
their individual experiences, regarding evacuations, cheating,
etc.
Resources that were named after the event but did not post
about it.
Resources that lacked enough information to classify; ones with
generic names (such as Fort McMurray wildfire), no selfdescription, and no posts.
Table 20. Types of CNRs.

# Facebook
Pages
8

# Twitter
Accounts
0

13

1

1

2

1

1

18

7

15

2

4

0

0

1

3

2

We identified 3 parameters—the CNR 1) name, 2) description, and 3) message content—that could be used
to categorize a CNR. We found that 8 (14.8%) Facebook pages and 6 (46.1%) Twitter accounts, in our dataset,
had a generic name (such as “Fort McMurray Wildfire 2016” or “Fort Mc Fire”). Also, 15 (27.7%) Facebook
pages and 6 (46.1%) Twitter accounts had no page or account description. Additionally, 13 (24%) Facebook
pages and 2 (15.3%) Twitter accounts posted no messages. Thus, none of our three parameters were sufficient
by themselves to categorize a CNR. As a result, we included all 3 parameters to categorize a CNR. We looked
for purpose-defining keywords (such as recovery, support, fundraiser, etc.) in the name and description of
the CNRs. We also read the on-topic messages posted by the CNRs to see if there were any posts from the
CNR administrators that reveal their purpose for creating these resources, or if there are themes around the
posts. Once we found a consistent theme around each CNR in its name, description, and/or messages, we
assigned a brief description, such as ‘collecting donations.’ Over time, after a number of discussions between
the authors, we grouped our CNRs into 8 categories. Table 20 lists these categories and the number of
Facebook and Twitter CNRs that fit within each category. Note that a CNR could fall into multiple categories.
Table 20 shows that most creators of Fort McMurray CNRs reported information about the event (reports),
sought and/or provided resources (needs and offers), and raised money for victims (fundraisers). The most
frequent CNR type was the ‘reports’ category. Reports in our dataset, were mostly about wildfire updates
(such as fire size, fire containment, etc.), evacuation notifications, alerts and advisories, or re-entry
information. Reporting found in these CNRs was done through rebroadcasts (sharing or retweeting a web
link), status updates, and links to other sources of information. The next most frequent CNR type was ‘needs
and offers,’ the resources used by people to ask for things they needed, and to provide offers of help such as
rescuing pets, building restoration, providing temporary accommodation, fuel, and other necessary items.
Offers of help, in our dataset, were provided from individuals, families, and businesses. The third most
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frequently appearing type of CNR was ‘fundraisers.’ Fundraisers for this event included live auctions and the
selling of items (such as sea salt scrub, hoodies and tanks, sports memorabilia, etc.).
Popular Crisis Named Resources

We define the most popular CNRs as those that received the highest number of Facebook likes or Twitter
followers. A large number of page likes or Twitter followers indicates what resources people were paying
attention to during this wildfire. ‘Fort McMurray Evacuee Open Source Help Page’ and ‘YMMHelps’ were
the most popular CNRs in our dataset on Facebook and Twitter respectively (see Table 21).

Facebook

Twitter

Most Popular
CNR
Fort McMurray
Evacuee Open
Source Help
Page

CNR Description

#on-topic
posts
932 out of 932
(100%)

This is an open source page to
help Albertan's Evacuating
from Fort McMurray wildfires.
Albertan's are encouraged to
post offers of help.
Website:
https://ymmhelp.com
YMMHelps
Fort McMurray Evacuee Open
950 out of 951
(@YMMhelp)
Source Help Page (99.9%)
Crowdsourcing support for
evacuees, and all subsequent
volunteer/community
rebuilding efforts.
ymmhelp.com
Table 21. Most Popular CNR on Facebook and Twitter.

#likes/#followers
(MAX)
41,428

1,446

Looking at the self-descriptions for these resources (see Table 21), it appears they were administered by the
same entity (the administrator of ymmhelp.com). To take a deeper look at these CNRs, we analyzed the
messages they posted. Both Facebook and Twitter CNRs used the social platforms heavily to share wildfirerelated messages with a rate of on-topic posts of 100% and 99.9% respectively. Also, both these CNRs are
of the ‘needs and offers’ type i.e., they contained posts regarding the resources needed and resources available
(known through offers of help). Both accounts acquired a large number of likes/followers, though the
Facebook page had many more followers than the Twitter account (41,428 followers versus 1,446 followers).
Next, we looked at the distribution of on-topic posts for both of these CNRs over the wildfire timeframe, and
also the number of likes/followers they gained over time. We found that both our most popular CNRs posted
messages only in the month of May. The most on-topic posts on both the Facebook page (811 of 932; 87.0%)
and Twitter account (616 of 951; 64.7%) were posted during the first week of the wildfire (May 1 – May 7).
To break that down, the most number of on-topic posts on both the Facebook page (718 messages) and
Twitter account (339 tweets) were posted on May 4, 2016 – a day after the massive evacuations (mass
evacuations were forced on the night of May 3). Also, both of these accounts were created on May 3, 2016.
The similarities between the accounts is not surprising given these resources appear to be managed by the
same party.
We also looked at their follower counts in March 2018 and found that the Facebook page has 38,764 likes
and the Twitter account has 1,244 followers. These findings reflect a small decrease in the number of
followers on both these resources after the wildfire was controlled.
DISCUSSION

In this paper, we examined the online behaviors of the 2016 Fort McMurray wildfire CNRs. Findings show
that these CNRs primarily posted wildfire-related information and tried to help the wildfire-affected public
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in different ways. We also found that a large number of these CNRs were created during the wildfire, most
of which became inactive or were deleted after the wildfire. Additionally, we discovered that most of the
CNRs’ owners did not explicitly disclose their identities, which raises questions of credibility. Below, we
discuss these findings in more detail and offer broader implications and future directions for this research.
The CNRs in this study covered a diverse range of topics around the wildfire, from information dissemination
(reports), to offers of help (donations, fundraisers, needs and offers), to expressions of solidarity (reactions,
stories, prayers). We would expect to see more of these behaviors on a larger scale for larger events. We did
not see any fake or malicious CNRs for the Fort McMurray wildfire, though that does not mean that they do
not occur in other events. The list of categories developed in this work was specific to this event and would
likely vary based on the context of the crisis event. Nonetheless, it does serve as a starting place for further
investigation.
Most of the CNRs were used to post wildfire related information, but there were some resources that were
never used to share anything. This is interesting because if someone creates a CNR, it implies that s/he
intended, at some point in time, to post event-related content or something that would potentially be found
by those looking for information about the event. Because the owners of these CNRs never posted or shared
anything, it is difficult to evaluate the roles that these CNRs played in wildfire response efforts. We speculate
that there could be multiple reasons for not posting. For instance, the owners of these resources may not have
felt skilled enough to use their CNR, or they may have been directly affected by the wildfire leaving no time
to use their resource.
While the majority of the Fort McMurray CNRs were created during the wildfire, we did find two CNRs that
were created long before the wildfire but were adapted for the event. The owners of these two CNRs never
stated reasons for changing the names of their accounts/pages, but there are likely many possible reasons for
this behavior. First, changing the name to something related to the Fort McMurray wildfire could be a way
to show support to the wildfire-affected public. Researchers saw similar behavior during the Virginia Tech
Shootings of 2007, when Facebook users changed their profile picture to an image that demonstrated their
support for the Virginia Tech community (Hughes et al. 2008). Second, it could be a way to publicly let
people know they are participating in the wildfire response efforts. Third, it could be a tactic to gather more
attention for their account/page. Fourth, the CNR owner may want to build on their current network instead
of starting a new CNR as a way to share their wildfire-response efforts with a broader, already-familiar
audience. Lastly, it could be a way for a CNR owner to build trust by letting everyone see their past activity,
especially if they have prior experience in crisis response. Findings also indicate that many of the CNRs
became inactive after the wildfire. However, a few CNRs are still in use, some of which continue to report
on the Fort McMurray wildfire, while the others have either broadened their goals or have moved on to a
new cause. This implies that the owners of these CNRs have found the social media platforms to be useful in
working toward their goals.
Many of the CNRs created during the event were later deleted. Deleting a resource after an event concludes
might be understandable, but it does make one wonder whether these resources should be curated to preserve
a history of how people have responded to past events. Such archives might be useful for future crisis events.
Most puzzling was the large number of CNRs that were deleted during the event. Unfortunately, we were
unable to discern why these resources were deleted with the data we collected. Investigation of upcoming
crisis events could provide opportunities to explore this phenomenon, though researchers would have to act
quickly to collect the information before it disappears.
CNRs are named after events and thus are easier to find on social media when someone searches for
information about a particular crisis event. Because of their naming convention, they also have greater
potential to be mistaken as official sources of information. Surprisingly, we were unable to identify most of
the administrators of the CNRs in our dataset. We were also unable to identify the intentions of CNRs that
had a generic name, no account description, or had very limited to no posts. This finding is consistent with
the findings of our previous study, where we studied the CNRs created in response to the 2014 Carlton
Complex wildfire (Chauhan and Hughes 2017). A similar finding was also reported in a study conducted by
Zhao and colleagues (2008). The researchers in this study examined the identity construction of 63 Facebook
accounts and found that the majority of these users did not provide explicit self-descriptions, and rather chose

32
to present themselves indirectly by sharing their pictures, posting wall posts, and/or stating their interests and
hobbies. The unknown administrators of these CNRs and the unknown intentions behind creating these CNRs
could make it difficult to judge the veracity of the information provided by them. Further, there is cause for
concern, because these anonymous resources could potentially spread misinformation or false rumor with
little accountability, especially if they later delete the social media page or account. This concern is at least
partially validated by Oh and colleagues (2013) who report that information with no clear source is the most
important rumor causing factor on Twitter in crisis situations. Because CNRs are highly visible sources of
information with potential credibility issues, emergency responders will likely want to quickly identify and
monitor CNRs during a crisis event for potential misuse.
Limitations & Future Work

The data in this study is limited to publicly available Facebook pages and Twitter accounts and does not
include CNRs found on websites, blogs, or other social media. To continue investigating CNRs, we plan to
compare the roles played by CNRs in crisis response across different events. We also plan to interview the
owners of CNRs of future crisis events to determine ‘who’ creates CNRs and ‘why.’ These interviews will
also determine ‘what’ approach (if any) the administrators of these CNRs take to ensure the veracity of
information that they share. Additionally, we plan to interview and survey people about how they perceive
CNRs. The aim of these activities will be to determine the factors that people consider when evaluating the
trustworthiness and usefulness of these resources.
CONCLUSION

This paper offers empirical insight into the lifecycle of CNRs, the relevance of CNR content to the events
they are named after, and the types of informational content CNRs can offer. While the study revealed much
about CNRs and their activity, it also raised many new questions for future investigation, such as: Why do
people delete accounts about a crisis event while the event is still occurring? Why do some accounts named
after a crisis event never post any information? What are the intentions of CNR administrators? This study
lays the foundation for this future investigation.
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CHAPTER IV

Factors that Influence the Trustworthiness of Social
Media Accounts and Pages Named after a Crisis
Apoorva Chauhan
Utah State University

ABSTRACT
People sometimes create social media accounts
and pages that are named after a crisis event. We
named such resources Crisis Named Resources
(CNRs). CNRs share information around crisis
and are followed by many. Yet, in most cases, the
owners of these resources are unknown. Thus, it
can be challenging for crisis-affected audiences to
know whether to trust (or not trust) these CNRs
and the information they provide. In this study,
using surveys and interviews, we determined the
factors that influence the trustworthiness of
CNRs. Findings showed that participants
evaluated a CNR’s trustworthiness based on their
perceptions of its content, information source,
owner, and profile.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Social media
KEYWORDS
Social Media, Crisis Named Resources, Trust.
INTRODUCTION
Social media are increasingly used for
information exchange during crisis events.
Members of the public often use social media to
access and share crisis-related information, ask
for and offer help, and show solidarity around
crisis situations [1, 27, 30]. One way that people
facilitate information exchange is by creating
Crisis Named Resources (or CNRs). CNRs are
social media pages and accounts that are named
after a crisis event. They are easily identifiable
and visible due to their names and are known to
share information, as well as support and help
crisis affected individuals [10]. In most cases,
however, the owners of these resources are
unknown. Yet, they are often followed and liked
by a large number of people [11]. A large number
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of followers for a social media page or account is
an indicator of broader social influence and can
lead to more amplification of its content [3].
Information coming from an unknown source can,
however, be hard to evaluate on trustworthiness.
This paper aims to determine the factors that
influence (or do not influence) the trustworthiness
of these resources. Evaluating the trustworthiness
of CNRs is important because they provide
information during a crisis event and they are
often the first resources found when searching
because they are named after the event. Crises
create a need for immediate and accurate
information and require sensemaking from both
disaster-affected people and decision makers [33].
This research is, therefore, an attempt to aid
sensemaking by identifying the factors that make
a crisis-information provider seem trustworthy (or
not trustworthy). The research question for this
study is as follows: What factors influence the
trustworthiness of CNRs?
To answer this research question, we conducted
105 surveys and 17 semi-structured interviews
with members of the public and experts in crisis
informatics, communication studies, and
emergency response. In both studies, participants
were shown 2017 Hurricane Irma CNRs and were
asked to evaluate the trustworthiness of these
resources. Our analyses reveal that people
evaluate the trustworthiness of CNRs based on
their perceptions of CNR content, information
source, owner, and profile.
BACKGROUND
Social media are changing the information
landscape for participation in crisis response and
recovery activities [36]. They have been used for
crisis response during a variety of crisis events

35
worldwide [35, 20, 9, 13, 42]. False rumors,
however,
also
spread
intentionally or
unintentionally on social media during crisis
events [38, 45, 22, 37]. Additionally, both official
and unofficial sources use social media to share
information. This increases the uncertainty and
difficulty in identifying trustworthy sources of
information [18]. Therefore, it is important to
understand how social media are used and
evaluated so that we can improve the quality of
interactions on social media during a crisis event.
In this study, we focus on how people determine
the trustworthiness of CNRs. CNRs are
interesting to study as they play diverse roles in
crisis response, such as, raising money,
expressing support and personal opinions and
experiences, and providing information and help
for crisis-affected individuals [11]. Yet, in most
cases, owners of these resources are unknown [10,
11]. Thus, it is challenging to categorize these
resources as trustworthy or untrustworthy sources
of information.
The focus of this study is on online trust. Online
trust has been defined differently depending on
the context. Most existing literature on online
trust is grounded in e-business, particularly online
shopping [34, 5, 41, 6]. Trust has also been
studied in the context of user-generated content
(UGC) in online communities. For instance,
Golbeck and Fleischmann [15] studied the
perceived trustworthiness of the answerers in
social Q & A. Their results showed that text cues
improved trust in the answerer among all
populations, however photo cues improved trust
only among the population with no personal
connection to the topic being discussed. Ayeh and
colleagues [4] also examined online travelers’
perceptions of the credibility of UGC sources and
found that both perceived trustworthiness and
perceived expertise positively influence the
attitude and the behavioral intention of using
UGC for travel planning. They also found that
perceptual homophily positively influences the
perceived trustworthiness, perceived expertise,
and attitude toward using UGC for travel
planning. Similarly, Ma and colleagues [28]
examined how hosts describe themselves on
Airbnb profile pages, and what contributes to the
perceived trustworthiness of these profiles. Their
findings showed that hosts, who disclosed more

assessment signals (ones that can be verified
easily) than conventional signals (ones that cannot
be verified easily) were perceived more
trustworthy by the guests.
Studies on people’s perceptions of trust in the
information and information providers during
crisis events also exist. For instance, Hagar [17]
conducted interviews with farmers on their
information seeking and use during the UK foot
and mouth disease crisis and found that
information from local sources (except local
government) was generally trusted, while
information from central government was not
trusted. A study by Haciyakupoglu and Zhang
[16] on how trust was built and maintained among
the protestors during the 2013 Gezi protests
revealed that social trust and system trust were
intertwined in actual practices. Szymczak et al.
[40] also examined the factors that influence the
perceived trustworthiness of Facebook in crisis
situations and showed that general trust towards
Facebook predicts trust towards Facebook in
crisis situations. Halse and colleagues [19]
studied tweets around a natural (2012 Hurricane
Sandy) and a man-made (2013 Boston Bombing)
crisis event. They found that similar factors, such
as, support for the victims, informational data, use
of humor, and type of emotion used influence the
trustworthiness and usefulness of tweets around
both disaster types.
Our definition of trust aligns the most with Pee
and Lee [31], who defined trust as “the extent to
which one feels secure and comfortable about
relying on the information on social media.” In
addition, we also build this study on the work of
Mayer and colleagues [29], who showed ability,
benevolence, and integrity to be the three main
characteristics of a trustee (a trusted party). They
defined ability as the group of skills,
competencies, and characteristics that make a
party influential in a specific domain,
benevolence as the extent to which a trustee is
believed to work in the trustor’s interests, and
integrity as the extent to which a trustee adheres
to the principles acceptable by the trustor. We
used these two theories to construct our interview
and survey questions.
METHODS
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We conducted a survey and interview study to
better understand how people evaluate the
trustworthiness of CNRs. The same questionnaire
was used for both studies. The difference was that
the survey questions were closed-ended, while the
interview
questions
were
open-ended
(participants were prompted to provide reasons
for their evaluations). We conducted these studies
to develop both an in-breadth (using surveys) and
an in-depth (using interviews) understanding of
the factors that influence participants’ perceptions
of trustworthiness of these resources. We describe
the method used below.
Research Participants
Research participants for both the survey and
interview study included members of the public
and experts in crisis informatics, communication
studies, and emergency response. We included
two types of participants because we believed that
experts might have different perceptions of
trustworthiness than non-experts or members of
the public. Members of the public were 18 years
or older and had a profile on either Facebook or
Twitter. An individual’s presence on either of
these sites provided some level of assurance that
s/he had a basic level of experience with social
media. Experts in crisis informatics and
communication studies included individuals who
conduct research in these areas. Experts in
emergency response included people who have
experience with crisis response (e.g., individuals
from a fire or police department). We obtained
Institutional Review Board approval for both
studies.

responses. Participants were 50% male and 50%
female. Most participants (60%) belonged to the
age group 18 – 34, which implies that the opinions
expressed in this study may not fairly represent
the opinions from all age groups. The majority
(85%) of participants were members of the public,
which means that the opinions presented here are
heavily representative of the public. Also, while
half of the participants (50%) were extremely
comfortable with Facebook, only 21%
participants were extremely comfortable with
Twitter.
Table 22: Survey and Interview Research
Participants Demographics
Demographic

Gender

Age

Highest
level
of
Education
Completed

Expert

Survey Recruitment and Demographics

We contacted potential participants through
online media. We posted the survey description
and link to the survey on our Facebook and
Twitter accounts and professional websites and
requested people share our post. We also designed
a survey recruitment card with the name of the
study, contact information, and a link to the
survey. These cards were used to share the survey
information with people in-person. See Appendix
B for survey recruitment materials. Taking these
approaches, we collected 148 survey responses
(105 complete responses and 43 incomplete
responses) between March 30 and June 17 of
2018. Table 1 contains the survey participants’
demographic information for the 105 complete

Comfort
level using
Facebook

Comfort
level using
Twitter

Interviewees
(N = 17)

Male
Female
18 - 24
25 - 34
35 - 44
45 - 54
55 - 64
65 - 74
High
school
graduate
Some college
2-year degree
4-year degree
Master's degree
Doctorate
Yes
No
Extremely
uncomfortable
Somewhat
uncomfortable
Neither
comfortable nor
uncomfortable
Somewhat
comfortable
Extremely
comfortable
Extremely
uncomfortable

7 (41.1%)
10 (58.8%)
2 (11.7%)
3 (17.6%)
8 (47.0%)
4 (23.5%)
-

Survey
Participants
(N = 105)
53 (50.4%)
52 (49.5%)
32 (30.4%)
31 (29.5%)
16 (15.2%)
11 (10.4%)
13 (12.3%)
2 (1.9%)
4 (3.8%)

2 (11.7%)
3 (17.6%)
7 (41.1%)
5 (29.4%)
5 (29.4%)
12 (70.5%)
-

19 (18.0%)
7 (6.6%)
38 (36.1%)
24 (22.8%)
13 (12.3%)
17 (16.1%)
88 (84.7%)
7 (6.6%)

2 (11.7%)

8 (7.6%)

1 (5.8%)

9 (8.5%)

5 (29.4%)

29 (27.6%)

9 (52.9%)

52 (49.5%)

-

15 (14.2%)

Somewhat
uncomfortable
Neither
comfortable nor
uncomfortable
Somewhat
comfortable

4 (23.5%)

22 (20.9%)

4 (23.5%)

22 (20.9%)

6 (35.2%)

24 (22.8%)
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Demographic

Extremely
comfortable

Interviewees
(N = 17)
3 (17.6%)

Survey
Participants
(N = 105)
22 (20.9%)

Interview Recruitment and Demographics

We contacted experts and members of the public
via emails, Facebook, and Twitter. Members of
the public were recruited using snowball
sampling. Experts in crisis informatics and
emergency response were recruited through prior
research
contacts,
while
experts
in
communication studies were identified and
recruited through Google searches in top and/or
near-by institutions. See Appendix A for
interview recruitment materials. We conducted 17
interviews between March 7 and June 4 of 2018.
Of these 17 interviewees, 59% were female and
41% were male. About half of the participants
(47%) belonged to the age group 35 – 44 and none
were older than 55 years of age. More than half
(70.5%) of the participants had a graduate degree,
likely as a result of the snowball sampling. The
majority (71%) of participants were members of
the public. This discrepancy is to be expected
because we intentionally recruited more members
of the public than experts. Also, while half of the
participants (53%) were extremely comfortable
with Facebook, only 18% participants were
extremely comfortable with Twitter (see Table 1).
Survey and Interview Questionnaire
The questionnaire for both studies included two
blocks. Questions in the first block gathered
information about participants’ perceptions on the
trustworthiness of CNRs. Questions in the second
block gathered information about participants’
demographics. See Appendix C for Survey
Questionnaire.
Block I Questions

Q1.3: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter
account (or Facebook page) has your best
interests in mind?
Q1.4: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter
account (or Facebook page) understands
your situation?
Q1.5: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter
account (or Facebook page) will provide
misleading information intentionally?
Q1.6: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter
account (or Facebook page) will make
efforts to correct any false rumor or
misinformation as soon as it comes to
his/her notice?
Q1.7: Would you trust the information on this
Twitter account (or Facebook page)? Trust
is defined as the extent to which you feel
secure and comfortable relying on the
information.
Yes, because _______________________
Maybe, because _____________________
No, because ________________________
All questions in block I were based on the work
of Mayer et al [29] and Pee & Lee [31] and were
asked for each CNR. The first 6 questions
gathered participant’s perceptions on the CNR
owner’s ability (Q1.1 and Q1.2), benevolence
(Q1.3 and Q1.4) and integrity (Q1.5 and Q1.6).
They required closed-ended responses on a 5point Likert scale ranging from ‘extremely
unlikely’ to ‘extremely likely’ from survey
participants and open-ended responses from
interview participants. The last question (Q1.7)
requested the participants’ overall opinion on the
trustworthiness of a CNR and required an openended response for both studies.

Block I had the following seven questions:
Block II Questions

Q1.1: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter
account (or Facebook page) has prior
experience in crisis response?
Q1.2: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter
account (or Facebook page) is capable of
helping you respond to hurricane Irma?

Questions in this block collected information
about the participants’ gender, age, highest level
of education completed, expertise, and comfort
level when using Facebook and Twitter. All these
questions required closed-ended response(s) for
both studies.
Differences Between Survey and Interview
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Though the survey and interview studies used the
same questionnaire, there were a few differences
in their design and execution. First, survey
participants evaluated 5 CNRs while interviewees
evaluated 10 CNRs. Second, surveys sessions
were designed to last 15 – 20 minutes, while
interview sessions were designed to last 45 – 60
minutes. Third, while most survey questions
required a closed-ended response, all interview
questions required open-ended responses. We
also asked interviewees to think aloud while they
were looking at the CNR screenshots so that we
could observe their thinking process when
evaluating CNRs. Fourth, the survey did not
require the researchers’ presence and was
designed to record responses in Qualtrics (an
online survey tool). Interview sessions were either
conducted in-person or on Skype and voice
recordings were made after obtaining permission.
All voice recordings were transcribed. Finally, the
incentive for the two studies differed. Each
interviewee was given a $20 Amazon Gift Card.
For the survey, participants had the option to enter
a drawing where one participant won a $50
Amazon Gift Card.
Hurricane Irma Contextual Scenario
To provide context to participants during surveys
and interviews, we designed a disaster scenario.
In the scenario, the participants imagined they
were in Florida and had been affected by
Hurricane Irma. The 2017 Hurricane Irma served
as a prompt for these studies as it was a recent
major crisis event and the most intense Atlantic
hurricane to strike the United States since Katrina
in 2005 [26]. In the beginning of each study,
participants were briefly reminded about
Hurricane Irma. They were told that Hurricane
Irma made its first landfall as a category 5 storm
in Cuba on September 8, 2017 [43]. On
September 10th, Irma made its first landfall on the
US mainland at Cudjoe Key, Florida as a category
4 storm, and its second landfall on the US
mainland at Marco Island, Florida [39]. To
prepare for the hurricane, a state of emergency
was declared for Florida [44]. Also, 5.6M people
in Florida and 540K people on the Georgia coast
were ordered to evacuate, making it one of the
nation’s largest evacuations [2]. Participants were
then told that they were looking for information
on how to respond to this event.

CNR Selection for Survey and Interview
Studies
We identified Hurricane Irma CNRs by searching
pages and accounts that had “Hurricane Irma” in
their name on the Facebook and Twitter
platforms. We searched for these CNRs a month
following Irma’s US landfall. In total, we
identified 32 Hurricane Irma CNRs: 20 Facebook
pages and 12 Twitter accounts. To pick a
reasonable number of CNRs that could
demonstrate some variation in content and still be
manageable for the studies, we selected 5
Hurricane Irma CNRs (CNRs 1 through 5) for the
survey and 10 (CNRs 1 through 10) for the
interviews. When selecting these CNRs, we tried
to vary them along several dimensions. First, we
chose CNRs on different social media platforms:
6 from Facebook (CNR 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, and 9) and 4
from Twitter (CNR 1, 5, 7, and 10). Second, we
selected CNRs that had different purposes: 6
(CNR 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10) reported about the
event, 2 (CNR 1 and 4) provided humor, 1 (CNR
3) fundraised money, and 1 (CNR 6) shared needs
and offers around the crisis. Third, we chose
CNRs that varied in popularity: 2 (CNR 7 and 9)
had a significant number of page likes and follows
(Facebook) and account followers (Twitter), and
2 (CNR 1 and 10) had a fewer number of account
followers. Fourth, we selected CNRs that varied
in the completeness of the profile (in terms of
profile picture, cover photo, and self-description):
1 (CNR 10) CNR had no bio and 9 had complete
profiles. Finally, we selected CNRs that varied in
their account activity: 1 (CNR 5) that tweeted
frequently throughout the event and 1 (CNR 10)
that never tweeted. We chose these variations to
ensure that study participants were exposed to the
different kinds of CNRs that are created around
events.
When retrieving these CNRs, we captured
screenshots of these resources (see Appendix D)
as opposed to the actual on-line pages, so that all
interviewees and survey participants would see
the same information. Otherwise, participants
may see different content depending on how these
resources change over time and findings may not
be comparable. The downside of static
screenshots was that participants were restricted
in their ability to click on links and photos, which
they could have done on actual on-line pages.
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Table 2 provides details for each of the selected
CNRs. The number of account followers (for
Twitter accounts) and page follows (for Facebook
pages) mentioned for these CNRs are as of
December 20, 2017. All CNR names and
descriptions have been anonymized.
DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In this paper, we report only on the findings of our
qualitative analysis. The findings from our
quantitative analysis are not reported because they
are beyond the scope of this initial analysis and
still in progress.
Table 23: Selected CNRs
CNR Name and Description

CNR 1 (Twitter account) – Tweets were
written in the first person, as if Hurricane
Irma herself had created the account. All
tweets were either sarcastic or humorous
with frequent political references.
CNR 2 (Facebook page) – This page was
created by the editor and proprietor of a
news media outlet in Florida because she
had difficulty finding news and information
specific to Key West and the Lower Keys
where she had family. The Page owner
provided her phone number, email address,
and website and shared many hurricanerelated posts, photos, and videos.
CNR 3 (Facebook page) – This page
provided a link to a fundraiser site without
stating who owns this page and who is
raising the funds, why, and how. It shared
many hurricane-related posts and pictures.
CNR 4 (Facebook page) – This page
claimed to be the official page for Hurricane
Irma memes, and indeed all posts were
memes. Page claimed to be ‘just for fun’
and it provided a link to a shop that sells
hemp wick.
CNR 5 (Twitter account) – This account
tweeted actively about hurricane-related
information during the storm. The account
bio showed the owner’s location as Florida
and provided a link to their Instagram
account. It followed the city mayor and
people from news stations. CNR 5 also had
8 lists, all related to news stations and
weather channels.
CNR 6 (Facebook page) –This page
claimed to be the official page for the
Hurricane
Irma
Rescue
Dispatch
Operations. All posts were hurricanerelated. The page owners, however,
cautioned people that it is not monitored by

CNR
Follows/
Followers
3

emergency services and people should call
9-1-1 in a life-threatening emergency.
CNR 7 (Twitter account) – This account
was created by self-proclaimed weather
nerds in Tampa Florida who were tracking
Irma 24/7. This account shared photos and
videos of the path of Hurricane Irma and its
bio provided a link to nhc.noaa.gov. It also
followed many accounts, most of which
were verified accounts and belonged to
weather professionals and organizations.
CNR 8 (Facebook page) – This page shared
many hurricane-related posts, photos, and
live camera feeds. The owners mentioned
that it is not the official page for Hurricane
Irma, instead it is a page is to let everyone
know the safe points and news regarding the
Hurricane.
CNR 9 (Facebook page) – Despite being
named after Hurricane Irma, this page’s
user handle was named after Hurricane
Sandy and it was created in 2012. The page
claimed to be the official page of Hurricane
Irma and it provided a lot of information
about the event.
CNR 10 (Twitter account) – This account
was created in September 2017 but it had no
profile picture, no cover picture, no bio, and
no location.

28,591

7,917

37,338

7

13,209

4,116

899

167

260

To determine the factors that influence the
trustworthiness of CNRs, we analyzed our
qualitative data using affinity diagrams [7]. We
first read all the open-ended survey responses and
all the interview transcriptions. This was useful in
determining common themes across the data (see
Appendix F for qualitative analysis). Identified
common themes then influenced our coding
process, where we formulated codes to represent
various themes. These codes were then merged
into categories. The codebook was consolidated
and calibrated through weekly discussions and
deliberation. Once the codebook was finalized,
we applied it to the participant interviews and
open-ended survey responses and resolved all
disagreements to reach consensus on our code
applications. In some cases, multiple codes were
applied to an excerpt.
Our findings show that participants when
evaluating the trustworthiness of CNRs, talked
about their perceptions of CNR content,
information source, profile, and owner.
Participants perceptions about the information
found on the CNRs were coded as content. When
participants discussed from where the CNRs were
obtaining their information, we coded these
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excerpts as information source. Participants
perception of how these resources were designed,
in terms of how authentic and/or professional they
appear or how many followers they have or if they
are created with the purpose to help crisis-affected
individuals were coded as CNR profile.
Participants perceptions of the ability, identity,
and intentions of CNR owners were coded as
owners. Table 3 shows the number of interviews
and surveys excerpts coded in each category. We
did not find a noticeable difference between
experts and members of the public in their
evaluation of the trustworthiness of CNRs. We
now explain each of our codes in detail.
Content
When evaluating the trustworthiness of CNRs,
participants frequently talked about the content
found on a CNR. Table 3 shows that 517 excerpts
in the interview data and 214 excerpts in the
survey data were coded in this category. We
further classified content into 7 subcategories:
relevant, quality, quantity, media, timely, useful,
or veracity. We explain these sub-categories and
their importance in the following sub-sections.
Relevant
Many participants felt that an important factor in
determining whether a CNR was trustworthy was
whether the content was related to Hurricane
Irma. Excerpts coded as relevant include 181
excerpts from the interview data and 102 excerpts
from the survey data. Participants tended to trust
a CNR if they perceived that CNR content was
related to Hurricane Irma. For instance, SID 72 1
trusted CNR 2 because “most of the information
is relevant to the context and pictures are also
shared.” In contrast, if participants perceived that
a CNR was not related to Hurricane Irma, they
tended not to trust it. For example, SID 84 did not
trust CNR 1 because “it seems that their
comments are all politically focused, and
AGAINST [sic] Donald Trump.” The frequent
appearance of this code implies that for a CNR to
be perceived as trustworthy, it is critical that the
content it provides is relevant to the crisis it was
created for.

1 We identify survey participants and interviewees with their
survey ID (SID) and interviewee ID (IID) respectively.

Table 24: Factors that Influence CNRs’
Trustworthiness

Primary Codes

Content

Interviews
Excerpt
Count
517

Surveys
Excerpt
Count
214

Information Source

175

92

CNR Profile

408

298

CNR Owner

1053

169

Quality
This code was applied to the data where
participants talked about the quality of CNR
content. We coded 34 excerpts from interviews
and 29 excerpts from surveys for quality. If a
CNR’s content was seen as having high quality, it
tended to increase its trustworthiness and viceversa. IID 03, who chose to ‘maybe’ trust CNR 8
said, “they have some good pictures of what the
situation was.” SID 52 did not trust CNR 3
because according to him, it “feels like it is really
vague on information and details.” This code
suggests that perceived trustworthiness of a CNR
depends upon the perceived quality of the
information found on a CNR.
Quantity
When evaluating the trustworthiness of CNRs,
participants often discussed whether the CNR
provided enough content for decision making. We
coded 143 excerpts from the interview data and
14 excerpts from the survey data in this category.
Participants perceptions of whether a CNR shared
an adequate amount of content seemed to
influence its trustworthiness. For example, IID
10, who trusted CNR 5 said, “there are so many
tweets, 531. So, it looks like it has been quite
active, and for a person that’s been struck, like, if
I am being struck, I would be waiting for more and
more tweets, more and more updates, which they
are providing.” In contrast, SID 67 did not trust
CNR 3 and wrote, “there's pretty much no
information.” This code suggests that the amount
of information found on a CNR can influence its
perceived trustworthiness. This is especially
applicable to the context of crisis, where there is
an increased need for information.
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Media
Excerpts coded for media include participants’
perceptions of whether a CNR shared (or did not
shared) multimedia content, such as photos,
videos, or maps. We coded 110 excerpts in the
interview data and 36 excerpts in the survey data.
Our data suggest that participants appreciated the
presence of multimedia content in the hurricane
related posts and tweets. IID 17, who chose to
‘maybe’ trust CNR 8 said, “there is a lot of
sharing of videos about what’s going on and
photos of damage in different places.” In contrast,
IID 11 did not trust CNR 10 and said, “they don’t
really design their page. They leave no
information, provide no information, no pictures,
no videos, no followers, no likes, no anything. No
information at all! So, it is useless and a waste of
time to look at this one.” Participants found CNRs
that shared more media (such as photos and
videos) to be more trustworthy, whereas a lack of
media content tended to make CNRs less
trustworthy.

Participants often shared their perceptions of
whether a CNR’s content could be used (or not
used) to respond to Hurricane Irma. We coded 187
excerpts from interview data and 46 excerpts from
survey data as useful. Unsurprisingly, participants
tended to trust a CNR that shared useful
information and vice-versa. IID 03 trusted CNR 8
and said, “the news links seems very helpful. I
would probably follow those.” SID 89 did not
trust CNR 1 and wrote, “there is no official
information that I could use and/or apply to my
emergency situation.” Our findings suggest that
the perceived usefulness of the information found
on a CNR affects its perceived trustworthiness.
Veracity
When evaluating the trustworthiness of CNRs,
participants often discussed the accuracy of the
CNR content. We coded such excerpts as
veracity. The veracity dataset includes 46
excerpts in the interview data and 33 excerpts in
the survey data. Participants tended to trust a CNR
if they perceived its content to be accurate. SID
51 trusted CNR 2 and wrote, “I think it's telling
the truth.” On the other hand, participants did not
trust a CNR if they perceived the content was
inaccurate. IID 07, who chose to ‘maybe’ trust
CNR 8, said, “I think that this is a page that is not
very likely to find out if something is misleading
information or false information. It looks like that
they are just sharing things that they find, which
means that it could be accurate or inaccurate and
I don’t think they would know.” Accurate
information is one of the very basic needs in the
times of crisis. This is also reflected here, such
that the perceived accuracy of the information
found on a CNR influence its perceived
trustworthiness.

Timely
Participants’ perceptions of whether a CNR’s
content is up-to-date (or not up-to-date) were
coded as timely. The Timely dataset includes 57
excerpts from the interview study and 11 excerpts
from survey. CNRs that shared timely content
seemed trustworthy to many participants. IID 16
trusted CNR 7 because “it seems like they are
trying to share information and share tracking
and provide real time information about what the
storm is doing and where it is hitting.” Similarly,
IID 12 did not trust CNR 9 and stated, “they have
failed that bar that they changed their name from
Sandy to Irma. They still have outdated
information, misleading information. Let’s say
somebody is not that aware with the different
hurricanes, they might think that the name of Irma
was changed to Sandy. So, you know, that could
be really, really bad because it shows the same
side of Atlantic and people who are not quite
versed in geography, a lot of people are not, this
could be way misleading.” This code suggests that
the timeliness of the information found on a CNR
influences its perceived trustworthiness. Timely
information is known to be key in crisis-response
[48] and is also reflected in our findings.

Information Source
Participants often considered the source of the
information found on a CNR when evaluating its
trustworthiness. Table 3 shows that 175 excerpts
from the interview study and 92 excerpts from the
survey data were coded for this category. We
further classified information source category into
four sub categories: Known Trusted Source,
Local, Connected, and Refers Recommends
Rebroadcasts. Each of these sub-categories are
discussed in-depth below.

Useful

Known Trusted Source
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Instances where participants thought information
was coming (or not coming) from known and/or
trusted sources, were coded as Known Trusted
Source. Only 14 excerpts from the interview data
and 13 excerpts from the survey data were coded
in this category. Findings show that participants
tend not to trust information if they were not able
to identify its source. For example, IID 07, who
did not trust CNR 3 said, “they are not giving any
context for where they are getting their
information and so that makes me unsure of how
careful they will be with what their sources are,
and like if they may be listening to rumors and
sharing those.” This suggests that perceived
trustworthiness of a CNR is influenced by the
source of the information.
Local
This code was applied to the excerpts that
contained participants perceptions of whether the
information was coming from Florida, the
disaster-affected area, were coded as local. Only
32 excerpts from the interview data and 13
excerpts from the survey data were coded in this
category. Information from locals seemed
trustworthy to many of our participants. IID 17
trusted CNR 2 because to her “it seems like they
are also in Florida.” This code suggests that our
participants believed the information coming
from people-on-the-ground to be more
trustworthy.
Connected
Participants’ perceptions of whether a CNR
follows or links to or is associated with reliable
and/or familiar information sources were coded as
connected. We coded 101 excerpts from interview
data and 44 excerpts from survey data under this
category. Participants trusted CNRs that seemed
to be linked to an authority. For example, SID 31
trusted CNR 5 because it “subscribed to news
anchors and followed various weather stations.”
On the other hand, SID 129 did not trust a CNR 1
and wrote, “I have no reason to believe the
account has any relation to official sources.
Furthermore, the presence of political/partisan
commentary increases the untrustworthiness.”
This suggests that the CNRs that seemed to be
connected to reliable or familiar information
sources were perceived as more trustworthy by
our research participants.

Refers, Recommends, or Rebroadcasts
This code was applied to the data when
participants mentioned if a CNR cites,
recommends, and/or rebroadcasts information
from reliable and/or familiar information sources.
We coded 56 excerpts from interview data and 38
excerpts from survey data under this category.
CNRs that seemed to have an association with an
authority were considered trustworthy. For
example, IID 16 trusted CNR 5 and said, “it looks
like they are tweeting and retweeting information
from some reliable sources that help with crisis
response, like, National Weather Report, Weather
Syndicates, and some local news outlets.” In
contrast, IID 04 did not trust CNR 8 because
“there is nothing in the post that gives me
information on what to do, dos and don’ts, no
links, no relief efforts, no shelters.” This implies
that if CNRs owners refer, recommend, and/or
rebroadcast other reliable information sources, it
increases the perceived trustworthiness of their
source.
Profile
This category includes participants perceptions of
a CNR profile. It appeared frequently throughout
the data; 408 excerpts in the interview data and
298 excerpts in the survey data were coded for
perceptions of the CNR profile (see Table 3).
There are four sub-categories under CNR profile:
professionalism, popularity, authenticity, and
self-identification. We discuss each of them in
detail below.
Professionalism
Participants’ perceptions of a CNR’s look and feel
were coded for professionalism. This code
includes 73 excerpts from the interview data and
70 excerpts from the survey data. Participants in
our study, when evaluating the trustworthiness of
a CNR paid a lot of attention to whether it was
well organized and/or had content with correct
grammar and spelling, and preferred CNRs with
meaningful names. For example, SID 69 trusted
CNR 5 because “it looks very professional and
serious. Like people have put good time into
making a helpful resource for people.” Contrarily,
SID 17 did not trust CNR 1 because according to
her, CNR 1 owner has an “informal, messy and
unprofessional manner of speaking.” This implies
that the perceived trustworthiness of a CNR can
be influenced by the extent to which its owner is
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perceived to be professional in his/her interactions
on social media.
Popularity
Participants when evaluating the trustworthiness
of CNRs, often shared their perceptions of how
well a CNR was received by others. We coded
119 excerpts from interview data and 27 excerpts
from the survey data in this category. Our findings
indicate that participants tended to trust CNRs
with a significant number of followers and/or
good reviews. SID 45 trusted CNR 2 because “It
has a large following and good reviews.” On the
other hand, IID 06 perceived CNR 1 as
untrustworthy because “I see a lot of, I don’t
know, kind of personal stuff and political
statements, and then they don’t have a lot of, like
he doesn’t have a reputation. I think that there are
just 3 followers.”
Authenticity
Participants sometimes talked about whether a
CNR seemed legitimate or not. We coded 70
excerpts from the survey data and 54 excerpts
from the interview data in this category. We found
that participants trusted a CNR, if it seemed
authentic to them and vice-versa. For instance,
SID 112 trusted CNR 5 because he perceived its
“content and sources seem legitimate.” However,
SID 45 did not trust CNR 1 because “it seems like
a fake account.” This code suggests that the
perceived authenticity of the source of
information found on a CNR influences its
perceived trustworthiness.
Purpose
When evaluating the trustworthiness of CNRs,
participants often discussed whether or not the
CNR’s purpose was to help crisis affected
individuals. This code appeared frequently in the
interview data (98 excerpts) and was the most
used code (142 excerpts) in the survey data.
Findings show that participants preferred CNRs
that seemed to be created in the interests of
hurricane-affected people and vice-versa. For
example, SID 13 trusted CNR 2 and said, “she is
pulling from multiple sources in the area and
trying to connect those in the Lower Keys area.
The fact that it is a public account where those
who live in that area can post real time images of
the situation, makes this a more believable
source.” On the other hand, SID 57 did not trust

CNR 4 because she perceived, “this Facebook
page is clearly set up to be funny and have fun
memes, not to provide real information.” The
frequent appearance of this code suggests that the
perceived purpose of a CNR, which means,
whether it is created for the crisis-affected
individuals or not, influences its trustworthiness.
Self-Identification
This code was applied to the data when
participants mentioned whether a CNR
administrator disclosed his/her identity and/or
intentions. 191 excerpts from the interview data
and 66 excerpts from the survey data were coded
for self-identification. Participants trusted CNRs
when they knew who was behind them. For
example, SID 24 trusted CNR 2 and wrote, “The
owner gives a name and 3 ways to contact. Owner
said she will moderate postings.” On the contrary,
SID 83 did not trust CNR 3 and wrote, “there is
no information about who runs this page or what
they are doing.”
Owner
This category includes data about participant
perceptions of the CNR owner. Table 3 shows that
1053 excerpts from the interview study and 169
excerpts from the survey study were coded for this
category. This code has three subcategories,
namely, ability, identity, and intentions, each of
which is explained below.
Ability
This code is applied to the data, where the
participants mentioned their perceptions of the
CNR owners’ ability. More specifically, this
included if the CNR owner had prior experience
in crisis response, was capable of helping the
hurricane-affected public, or could manage the
CNR he or she created. 340 excerpts from the
interview study and 9 excerpts from the survey
study were coded in this category. When
evaluating the trustworthy of a CNR, participants
usually considered its owners’ ability to help in
crisis response. For example, IID 16 said in the
context of CNR 7 that “It looks like it because they
state that they are bunch of weather nerds
tracking Irma. So, they have some prior
experience with weather and then some of the
resources that are posted and government
resources and they talk about preparedness. So, I
think, they have some.” Similarly, SID 11, who is
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not sure about the trustworthiness of CNR 2,
wrote, “this person is trying to disseminate
information about the hurricane. I doubt their
ability to exhaustively cover every aspect of the
hurricane, but they have interesting and
potentially helpful information.” This suggests
that CNR owners’ perceived ability, whether the
owner of a CNR is capable of helping crisisaffected individuals to respond to a crisissituation, affects its perceived trustworthiness.

interviews and surveys with members of the
public and experts. Our data analysis revealed that
factors
that
influence
the
perceived
trustworthiness of a CNR are CNR content,
information source, profile, and owner. It is
important to note that the aforementioned factors
affect the perceived trustworthiness of CNRs and
we haven’t evaluated the actual trustworthiness of
CNRs. This was out of the scope for this study and
we plan to address this issue in future studies.

Identity
This category included excerpts that contained
perceptions about a CNR owner’s identity, for
example, observations about his/her age,
profession, personality traits, and nature (human
or bot). We coded 306 excerpts in the interview
data and 55 excerpts in the survey data for
identity. CNR owner’s perceived identity seemed
to influence the trustworthiness of the CNR. For
example, IID 03, who chose to ‘maybe’ trust CNR
8 believed that its owners “are either there or are
in contact with people who are there, because
they have some good pictures of what the situation
was.” In contrast, SID 42 did not trust CNR 1 and
wrote, “it seems like a teenager is running the
account.”

Our research, in many ways, is consistent with
existing literature. For instance, our findings
showed that content that seems relevant, timely,
and from local, reliable and/or familiar (refers,
recommends, or rebroadcasts) sources are
perceived as trustworthy. These findings offer
support for the hypothesis of Hughes and
Chauhan [23], who offered ‘supply timely and
relevant information’, ‘serve as a local authority
for information in your domain’, and ‘cite others
for information outside your domain’ as
recommendations for building trust on social
media with members of the public for emergency
responders. We suspect that the reason our
findings are consistent is that both of these studies
used Mayer and colleagues [29] trust framework.
Similarly, our findings showed that participants
trusted CNRs whose owners disclosed their
identity and/or intentions (Self-Identification).
These findings are consistent with Ma and
colleagues [28] who also used Mayer et al., trust
framework and discovered that guests trusted the
Airbnb hosts who disclosed more assessment
signals (ones that can be verified easily) than
conventional signals (ones that cannot be verified
easily). Additionally, we found that participants
trusted information coming from locals. This
finding is consistent with Hagar [17] who found
that farmers during the UK foot and mouth
disease crisis trusted information from local
sources (except local government) and
information from central government was not
trusted. One of our findings also suggests that
participants, in general, trusted CNRs that had
appropriate usernames, page descriptions and
account bios, and that shared content with correct
grammar and spelling (Professionalism). This
finding aligns with Morris and colleagues [46],
who studied users’ perceptions of tweet
credibility and found that use of non-standard
grammar damaged credibility more than any other

Intentions
This was one of the most-frequently occurring
codes in the dataset. It includes perceptions of the
CNR owner’s intentions behind creating a CNR.
597 excerpts from the interview study and 137
excerpts from the survey data were coded under
intentions. Participants tend to trust CNRs that
seem to be owned by people with good intentions.
For example, SID 62 trusted CNR 5 because he
perceived that CNR 5 owners “have the sole
interests of spreading information about the
hurricane.” In contrast, IID 07 perceived CNR 1
as untrustworthy and said, “I don’t feel that they
are trying to help with the crisis. It just sounds like
that they are just making jokes about it.” The
frequent occurrence of this code suggests
perceived trustworthiness of a CNR depends a lot
upon the perceived intentions of its owner.
DISCUSSION
This research determined the factors that experts
and members of the public considered when
judging the trustworthiness of a group of CNRs.
The methods used in this research include
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factor in their survey. Like many scholars who
studied the trustworthiness of online resources
suggested ways to improve the trustworthiness of
a resource, we do the same. For instance, we
suggest that CNR owners clearly identify
themselves and be cognizant of how they design
their profile, what content they share, and which
information sources they quote to increase the
perceived trustworthiness of their resource. We
are, however, concerned that one can use the
findings of this study to make a CNR appear more
credible than it is. Also based on our findings, it
appears that most people still continue to pay
attention to the very basic elements, all of which
can be easily spoofed. For example, anyone can
share relevant content, indicate that s/he is local
to the crisis-affected area, buy followers, or use a
fake identity. As people continue to place their
trust on the face value and there is no “online
police,” who verify account owners’ identity, it
appears that designing trustworthy interfaces may
only be part of a viable solution.
Though findings of this study are based on the
trustworthiness of CNRs named after Hurricane
Irma, it is broadly related to the “fake news”
problem. One of the ways researchers suggest
reducing the problem is to design machine
learning (ML) or Artificial Intelligence (AI)
algorithms that rank resources on their
authenticity and flag or remove the fake accounts.
Facebook and Twitter, for instance, have removed
millions of fake accounts in 2018 [25, 32].
Recently, Facebook also removed a fake page
titled, ‘Black Lives Matter’ that had about
700,000 followers and generated at least $100,000
in donations, but was run by a white man in
Australia who used the funds for himself [21].
However, there have been cases, where these
algorithms fail to spot a fake account or flag a
genuine account. For example, AI algorithms, at
times, cannot understand subtleties of tone,
cultural context, memes, or jokes. They can also
eliminate content containing bad spelling and
grammar, which may not necessarily be fake news
[47]. We, therefore, suggest that future studies
continue to investigate trustworthiness and derive
robust trustworthiness rubrics to evaluate these
resources. One way to correctly classify accounts
on trustworthiness could be to combine
algorithms with human judgement. For example,
after an algorithm lists fake accounts, a moderator

could randomly spot check a portion of the
accounts to verify they were correctly classified.
Our next step, in this direction would be to
empower social media users with knowledge and
tools to understand what is trustworthy on the
social media. For our future work, we plan to
create educational materials, such as infographics,
short videos, and games, especially for youth and
senior adults, to help them understand the kind of
things to look for when assessing the
trustworthiness of an online resource.
In future, we also plan to conduct interviews with
the owners of CNRs named after a future event to
investigate what measures do they take to increase
the perceived trustworthiness of their resources. It
would then be interesting to compare the findings
of that work to our current work to see if owner’s
understanding or indicators of trustworthiness
aligns to that of the social media users.
Limitations
This study has several limitations. First and
foremost, the findings reported in this paper are
based entirely on the open-ended responses to our
survey and interviews. Our immediate next step,
therefore, will be to do a quantitative analysis,
where we determine if participants’ demographics
have any impact on their perspectives of
trustworthiness of CNR. This analysis would also
be useful in determining the parameter(s) that
influence the trustworthiness of a CNR. For
instance, if CNR owners’ ability to help people
respond to Hurricane Irma has positive and direct
influence on its trustworthiness. Second,
participants were asked to make trust decisions
based on a hypothetical situation, therefore they
may or may not have been as critical in evaluating
the trustworthiness of CNRs as they would have
been if they were really affected. In the future, we
plan to conduct a study, where we conduct semistructured interviews with the people, who are in
evacuation shelters or camps to see if they trust
these resources. Finally, participants were shown
CNR screenshots and not real pages, which did
not allow them to click and explore the CNRs,
something they could have done in a real scenario.
We plan to address these issues by conducting a
study with crisis-affected individuals, where we
show them CNRs and see if they trust these
resources and the content found on them. The
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findings of this study would also be helpful in
assessing if crisis-affected individuals consider
CNRs useful. If not, which sources of information
do they consider useful and why?
CONCLUSIONS
This study showed that factors that influence the
perceived trustworthiness of CNRs fall under the
broad categories of CNR content, information
source, profile, and owner. We found that
participants tended to consider a CNR trustworthy
if they perceive its content as relevant,
personalized, high quality, adequate in quantity,
timely, useful, and accurate, and if it contained
media. Participants also trusted CNRs that either
linked to authoritative and/or local sources or
mentioned
their
information
sources.
Additionally, participants considered a CNR as
trustworthy if they perceived it to be professional,
popular, authentic, purposeful, and transparent.
Lastly, participants tended to trust CNRs if they
perceived that its owners could help and/or had
good intentions for crisis-affected individuals.
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ABSTRACT

Crisis named resources (CNRs) are the social media pages and accounts that are named after a crisis event.
CNRs’ owners may disseminate misinformation intentionally or unintentionally. Therefore, it is important to
determine if and why people trust (or do not trust) these CNRs. We conducted surveys with experts and
members of the public and asked them to evaluate the trustworthiness of CNRs named after the 2017
Hurricane Irma. Findings show that if participants perceived that a CNR owner had prior experience in crisis
response, could help people respond to the on-going crisis, had the best interests of the crisis-affected people
in mind, or would make efforts to correct misinformation, they tended to trust that CNR. Conversely,
participants did not trust a CNR if they perceived its owner was insensitive to crisis-affected populations or
would disseminate misinformation intentionally. Participant demographics seemed to have no effect on
perceptions of trustworthiness.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION

Social media continue to play an important role in crisis response (Al-Akkad and Zimmermann 2012; Liu et
al. 2008; Palen and Hughes 2018). While social media can contribute to situational awareness (Vieweg et al.
2010) and facilitate community building around a crisis event (Dufty 2012), outdated, inaccurate and false
information can also disseminate through these platforms (Lindsay 2011). It is then often the responsibility
of those who access this information to determine its credibility before sharing or acting upon it.
In this work, we aim to better understand this sensemaking process by assessing the factors that make a crisisinformation provider seem trustworthy (or not trustworthy). We conducted 105 surveys with experts in crisis
informatics, emergency response, and communication studies and members of the public. During the surveys,
participants were shown five Crisis Named Resources (CNRs) named after the 2017 Hurricane Irma and were
asked to evaluate these resources on trustworthiness. CNRs are social media pages and accounts that are
named after a crisis event. Evaluating the trustworthiness of CNRs is important because they are highlyvisible sources of information during a crisis response and are frequently followed by many people (Chauhan
and Hughes 2017, 2018). Additionally, it is unknown in most cases who manages these resources, how, and
why (Chauhan and Hughes 2017, 2018).
Our inquiry is guided by the question: How do people assess the trustworthiness of CNRs? Findings show
that participants tended to trust a CNR if they perceived that a CNR owner had prior experience in crisis
response, was capable of helping people respond to the on-going crisis, had the best interests of the crisisaffected people in mind, or would make efforts to correct misinformation. Conversely, participants tended to
mistrust a CNR, if they perceived its owner was insensitive to crisis-affected populations or might
disseminate misinformation intentionally. Participant demographics seemed to have no effect on perceptions
of trustworthiness.
BACKGROUND
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People increasingly use online platforms to connect with people, share information and news, and voice their
opinions (Java et al. 2007). The information generated by people on online platforms is popularly known as
user-generated content, or UGC (Krumm et al. 2008; Tirunillai and Tellis 2012). CNRs are one type of UGC
that people create to raise money, ask for and offer help, and share information, opinions, and experiences
during a crisis event (Chauhan and Hughes 2018).
UGC during a crisis event has the potential to contribute to situational awareness (Vieweg et al. 2010) but at
the same time it can also be inaccurate or misleading (Starbird et al. 2014). A study with hundreds of local
journalists reported that while journalists value interactions with users and acknowledge the ability of UGC
to contribute to local coverage and boost website traffic, they are often concerned about the low-quality and
credibility of UGC (Singer 2010). Studies with emergency responders have also reported that emergency
responders often have concerns about the trustworthiness of the content found on social media and worry
that people will act on incorrect information (Hughes and Palen 2012; Plotnick and Hiltz 2016).
Several researchers have studied the trustworthiness of UGC in crisis contexts. For instance, Endsley and
colleagues (2014) examined the factors that affect perception of credibility of crisis information about natural
disasters. Their study showed that people’s perceptions of the credibility of crisis information are based on
the source of information. They found that people consider the printed news to be the most credible source
of information. Another study by Plotnick and colleagues (2018) explored people’s practices when assessing
trustworthiness of social media posts. Their findings demonstrated that the trustworthiness of the sender is
deemed to be the strongest indicator of trustworthiness of social media posts. Both studies find that the
trustworthiness of information depends on who shares it, which has interesting implications for CNRs, as in
most cases, we do not know who is sharing the information and why (Chauhan and Hughes 2017, 2018).
The definition of trust that we use in this study aligns best with that of Pee and Lee (2016), who defined trust
as “the extent to which one feels secure and comfortable about relying on the information on social media.”
We also build our work on the trust framework provided by Mayer and colleagues (1995). They showed that
ability (trustee’s skillset), benevolence (trustee’s work in the trustor’s interest), and integrity (trustee’s
adherence to principles acceptable by the trustor) are the three main characteristics of a trustee. We used
these theories and framework to inform our study design, particularly in formulating our survey questions.
METHODS
Research Participants

We recruited two types of research participants for our study: experts and members of the public (see
Appendix B for Survey Recruitment Materials). Experts are the individuals who either conduct research in
crisis informatics or communication studies or have experience with emergency response. Members of the
public are individuals who are above the age of 18 and have a profile on either Facebook or Twitter. An
individual’s presence on either of these sites provides some level of assurance that s/he has a basic
understanding of how social media works. We chose two types of participants because we believed that
experts will have different perceptions of trustworthiness of CNRs than non-experts.
Participant Recruitment and Demographics

After obtaining Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, we contacted potential participants through
online media. We posted the survey description and a link to the survey on our Facebook and Twitter accounts
and professional websites. We also designed a survey recruitment card with the name of the study, a link to
the survey, and our contact information. These cards were used to share survey information with people who
came in our contact in professional settings and had the necessary background for our study. Our survey was
active March 30 – June 17, 2018, during which we collected 148 survey responses (105 complete responses
and 43 incomplete responses). Table 1 shows research participant demographics. Of these 105 survey
respondents, 50% were male and 50% were female. Most participants (60%) belonged to the age group 18 –
34. The majority of these respondents (85%) were members of the public. Also, while half of the participants
(50%) were extremely comfortable with Facebook, 20.9% participants were extremely comfortable with
Twitter. This means that more participants were more comfortable with Facebook.
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Table 25. Research Participants Demographics
Demographic
Gender
Age

Highest Level of Education Completed

Participants
(N = 105)
Male

53 (50.4%)

Female

52 (49.5%)

18 – 24

32 (30.4%)

25 – 34

31 (29.5%)

35 – 44

16 (15.2%)

45 – 54

11 (10.4%)

55 – 64

13 (12.3%)

65 – 74

2 (1.9%)

High School Graduate

4 (3.8%)

Some College

19 (18.0%)

2-year Degree

7 (6.6%)

4-year Degree

38 (36.1%)

Master’s Degree

24 (22.8%)

Doctorate

13 (12.3%)

Expert in Crisis Informatics,
Communication Studies, or Emergency
Response

Yes

17 (16.1%)

No

88 (84.7%)

Comfort Level Using Facebook

Extremely Uncomfortable

7 (6.6%)

Comfort Level Using Twitter

Somewhat Uncomfortable

8 (7.6%)

Neither Uncomfortable nor Comfortable

9 (8.5%)

Somewhat Comfortable

29 (27.6%)

Extremely Comfortable

52 (49.5%)

Extremely Uncomfortable

15 (14.2%)

Somewhat Uncomfortable

22 (20.9%)

Neither Uncomfortable nor Comfortable

22 (20.9%)

Somewhat Comfortable

24 (22.8%)

Extremely Comfortable

22 (20.9%)

Questionnaire Design

We used Qualtrics to administer our survey. Table 2 shows the questionnaire for our study. Questions in
block I gathered information about participants’ perceptions on the trustworthiness of CNRs. These questions
were based on the work of Mayer et al (1995) and Pee & Lee (2016) and were asked for each CNR. The first
6 questions in block I asked about the CNR owner’s ability (Q1.1 and Q1.2), benevolence (Q1.3 and Q1.4),
and integrity (Q1.5 and Q1.6). Q1.1 – Q1.6 required closed-ended responses on a 5-point Likert scale from
‘extremely unlikely’ to ‘extremely likely.’ Q1.7 collected participants’ overall perception on the
trustworthiness of a CNR and required an open-ended response. Questions in block II gathered demographic
information about the participant. We included an optional drawing for survey participants as an incentive
(one participant received a $50 Amazon Gift Card). See Appendix C for Survey Questionnaire.
To provide context to our participants, we included a scenario in our survey design. The scenario asked
participants to imagine that they were in Florida and had been affected by Hurricane Irma. The 2017
Hurricane Irma served as a prompt for these studies as it was a recent major crisis event at the time and the
most intense Atlantic hurricane to strike the United States since Katrina in 2005 (Kettley, 2017).
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Table 26. Survey Questionnaire
Block I: Perceptions on Trustworthiness of Crisis Named Resources
Q1.1: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has prior experience in crisis response?
Q1.2: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) is capable of helping you respond to
Hurricane Irma?
Q1.3: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has your best interests in mind?
Q1.4: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) understands your situation?
Q1.5: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will provide misleading information
intentionally?
Q1.6: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will make efforts to correct any false
rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes to his/her notice?
Q1.7: Would you trust the information on this Twitter account (or Facebook page)? Trust is defined as the extent
to which you feel secure and comfortable relying on the information.
o Yes, because: __________________________________________________
o Maybe, because: ________________________________________________
o No, because: ___________________________________________________
Block II: Demographics
Q2.1: Please select your gender.
o Male
o Female
Q2.2: Please select your age.
o 18 – 24 o 25 – 34

o

o 35 – 44

Other
o 45 – 54

o 55 – 64

o 65 – 74

Q2.3: Please select the highest level of education you have completed.
o Less than high school o High school graduate o Some College
o Master’s Degree
o Doctorate

o 75 – 84

o 2-year degree

o 85 or older
o 4-year degree

Q2.5 Do you consider yourself as an expert in Crisis Informatics, Communication Studies, or Emergency
Response?
o Yes o No
Q2.4 Please select your comfort level when using Facebook.
o Extremely uncomfortable o Somewhat uncomfortable
o Somewhat comfortable
o Extremely comfortable

o Neither uncomfortable nor comfortable

Q2.5 Please select your comfort level when using Twitter.
o Extremely uncomfortable o Somewhat uncomfortable
o Somewhat comfortable
o Extremely comfortable

o Neither uncomfortable nor comfortable

Selecting Crisis Named Resources

We searched for pages and accounts that had “Hurricane Irma” in their name on Facebook and Twitter
platforms one month following Irma’s US landfall. In total, we identified 32 Hurricane Irma CNRs: 20
Facebook pages and 12 Twitter accounts. To pick a reasonable number of CNRs that could demonstrate some
variation in content and still be manageable for our study, we selected 5 Hurricane Irma CNRs (see Table 3,
all CNR names and descriptions are anonymized). When selecting these CNRs, we varied them along several
dimensions (i.e., different social media platforms, purposes, and number of followers). We chose these
variations to ensure that participants were exposed to the different kinds of CNRs that are created around
events. When retrieving these CNRs, we captured their screenshots as opposed to the actual online pages, so
that all participants would see the same information. See Appendix D for Crisis Named resources’
Screenshots. Otherwise, participants may see different content depending on how these resources change
over time, and findings may not be comparable. However, the downside of static screenshots was that
participants were restricted in their ability to click on links and photos, which they could have done on actual
online pages.
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Table 27. 2017 Hurricane Irma CNRs Used in the Survey (Status as of Dec 20, 2017).
CNR Name and Description

CNR 1 (Twitter account) – Tweets were written in the first person, as if Hurricane Irma herself had
created the account. All tweets were either sarcastic or humorous with frequent political references.
CNR 2 (Facebook page) – This page was created by the editor and proprietor of a news media outlet
in Florida because she had difficulty finding news and information specific to Key West and the Lower
Keys where she had family. The Page owner provided her phone number, email address, and the
website and shared many hurricane-related posts, photos, and videos.
CNR 3 (Facebook page) – This page provided a link to a fundraiser site without stating who owns this
page and who is raising the funds, why, and how. It shared many hurricane-related posts and pictures.
CNR 4 (Facebook page) – This page claimed to be the official page for Hurricane Irma memes, and
indeed all posts were memes. Page claimed to be ‘just for fun’ and it provided a link to a shop that
sells hemp wick.
CNR 5 (Twitter account) – This account tweeted actively about hurricane-related information during
the storm. The account bio showed the owner’s location as Florida and provided a link to their
Instagram account. It followed the city mayor and people from news stations. CNR 5 also had 8 lists,
all related to news stations and weather channels.

CNR
Follows/
Followers
3
13,209

4,116
899

167

DATA ANALYSIS

In this paper, we report on our analyses of the survey responses. To begin, we exported all the responses from
Qualtrics and cleaned the data. The cleaning process involved removing unnecessary columns, redundant
information, and rows with incomplete responses. The aim of these analyses was to assess the factors that
influence the trustworthiness of CNRs and associations between participants’ perceptions of CNRs’
trustworthiness and their demographics.
We started our data analysis by determining the degree to which each participant trusted (or did not trust)
each CNR. If a participant selected that s/he did not trust a CNR, we gave it a 0. Similarly, “maybe trust” and
“trust” responses were coded as 1 and 2 respectively. We also coded “extremely unlikely,” “somewhat
unlikely,” “neither unlikely nor likely,” “somewhat likely,” and “extremely likely” as 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4
respectively.
We next calculated the Spearman correlations between the trustworthiness of all 5 CNRs (see Figure 1). This
calculation tells us if participants’ perceptions of trustworthiness of one CNR affected their perceptions of
trustworthiness of other CNRs. Thereafter, we analyzed the open-ended survey responses for each of the
CNR and determined participants’ rationale behind categorizing a CNR as trustworthy or untrustworthy.
Finally, we determined correlations between the perceived ability, benevolence, integrity, and
trustworthiness of each CNRs.
FINDINGS

This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first section describes the factors that influence the
trustworthiness of CNRs and the second section describes the correlation trends between the factors that
influence the trustworthiness of CNRs.
Factors that Influence the Trustworthiness of CNRs

Our analysis reveals that most participants trusted CNR 5 (see Table 4). In comments, participants
appreciated that it provided hurricane-related information and connected to other Twitter accounts through
Twitter lists. We also found that most participants did not trust CNRs 1, 3, and 4 (see Table 4). CNRs 1 and
4 mostly provided comedic accounts of the Hurricane event. Many of the participants felt the information on
these CNRs were irrelevant and in some cases insensitive to the disaster circumstances. CNR 3 was a
Facebook page that asked for money without sharing where the money would go and how it would be used.
Finally, most participants were unsure about whether to trust CNR 2 (see Table 4). While some trusted CNR
2 for sharing useful hurricane-related information, some did not trust it because they believed that it to be
impossible or too much work for the CNR 2 owner (an individual) to keep up with all the hurricane-related
information while also managing misinformation. See Appendix E for all the survey data.
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Table 28. Participants’ Perceptions on Trustworthiness of CNRs
CNR ID

Do Not Trust

Maybe Trust
10 (9.5%)

Trust

CNR 1

92 (87.6%)

3 (2.8%)

CNR 2

10 (9.5%)

53 (50.4%)

42 (40.0%)

CNR 3

56 (53.3%)

37 (35.2%)

12 (11.4%)

CNR 4

96 (91.4%)

7 (6.6%)

2 (1.9%)

CNR 5

6 (5.7%)

44 (41.9%)

55 (52.3%)

Figure 1 shows a relatively high correlation between
CNR 1 and CNR 4 and between CNR 2 and CNR 5. The
Spearman correlation (0.31) between Trust CNR 1 and
Trust CNR 4 signifies that participants who trusted CNR
1 also tended to trust CNR 4. Also, people who did not
trust CNR 1 tend to not trust CNR 4 as well. This is most
likely because both accounts were similar, in that they
both shared comedic commentary on the event and did
not seem to be focused on hurricane response. These
results are also reflective of participants’ beliefs. For
example, several participants indicated that humor
would not help them respond to Hurricane Irma in their
written comments. ID 73 did not trust CNR 1 and CNR
4. For CNR 1, he wrote, “This is obviously a joke account
Figure 5. Correlations between
and more than likely will not report anything with real
Trustworthiness of the 5 CNRs
value.” For CNR 4, he wrote, “Meme pages are not
sources of information. Good for laughs and not much else.” The Spearman correlation (0.34) between Trust
CNR 2 and Trust CNR 5 signifies that participants who trusted CNR 2 also tended to trust CNR 5. It also
means that people who did not trust CNR 2 tended not to trust CNR 5. This is most likely again because both
accounts were similar, in that they shared a lot of information about Hurricane Irma. There are no other
significant correlations between the other CNRs.
The following three subsections take a closer look at the CNRs that most participants 1) did not trust, 2)
trusted, or 3) were unsure whether to trust.
CNRs that Most Participants Did Not Trust

The majority of our participants did not trust CNR 1, CNR 3, and CNR 4. We now describe their
perceptions of these CNRs in detail.
CNR 1

Our findings indicate that most participants (87.6%) did not trust CNR 1 (see Table 4). Some participants did
not trust CNR 1 because they felt that its owners provided irrelevant information. For instance, ID 2 24 did
not trust CNR 1 because she found that most of the tweets were “about dis/approval of US Pres rather than
how to survive hurricane damage.” Some participants also felt that CNR 1 had not been created by an
authoritative source. ID 129 did not trust this CNR and wrote, “I have no reason to believe the account has
any relation to official sources. Furthermore, the presence of political/partisan commentary increases the
untrustworthiness.” Additionally, some participants believed that CNR 1 had not been created with the
intention of helping the disaster affected public. As ID 58 wrote, “They're way more interested in Donald

2

To protect participant anonymity, we use an unique study identifier.
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Trump than providing useful information. It seems to me that whoever created this account wants to make
cheap jabs at politicians more than they want to help hurricane victims.”
CNR 3

More than half (53.3%) of the participants chose not to trust CNR 3. Our findings indicate that many
participants did not trust CNR 3 because they believed it to be a scam that provided a link to a fundraising
site but never shared who was collecting the money and where the money was going. ID 123 did not trust
CNR 3. She wrote, “it is raising money without additional information -- who is it fundraising for, how will
the money be disseminated, etc. Feels like a scam.”
CNR 4

Most (91.4%) participants in our dataset chose not to trust CNR 4. Most participants felt it had not been
created by an official, was providing irrelevant information, and was not created in the interest of crisisaffected individuals. For instance, ID 11, who did not trust CNR 4, wrote, “this site is making jokes and
memes about the hurricane, not intending to help or disseminate information.”
Based on the analyses of open-ended survey responses of the CNRs that most participants did not trust, we
found that the factors that decrease the perceived trustworthiness of resources are irrelevant content, lack of
authority, and a lack of information about the owner and the intentions of the owner.
CNR That Most Participants Trusted

We now report on CNR 5, a Twitter account that more than half (52.3%) of the participants trusted and over
40% said that they might trust it. Our findings indicate that many participants trusted CNR 5 because they
perceived that CNR 5 owners provided hurricane-related information, linked to many other resources using
Twitter Lists, and were professional in manner. ID 42 trusted CNR 5 and wrote, “it seems legit because of
the information that has been posted about updates and disaster preparedness plans. The design also is more
professional and they even have famous news-stations' news-anchors' Twitter accounts attached to it, which
makes it seem more legit.” Some participants also felt that the CNR 5 owners created this CNR to help the
crisis-affected public and shared useful content. For example, ID 62 trusted CNR 5 because it seemed “to
have the sole interest of spreading information about the hurricane.” ID 14, who also trusted CNR 5 wrote,
“it looks professional and the content seems relevant to information I may need if I was affected by hurricane
Irma.”
CNR that Received Mixed Reactions

Lastly, we report on CNR 2, a Facebook page that received mixed reactions on trustworthiness. Table 4 show
that while 40% participants trusted CNR 2, half (50.4%) of the participants were on the fence about whether
to trust it or not. CNR 2 is an example that shows how a CNR that seems trustworthy to some participants,
does not seem trustworthy to others.
We first analyzed the open-ended responses of participants who trusted CNR 2. Our analysis shows that some
participants trusted CNR 2 because the owner of this page revealed her identity. ID 15 trusted CNR 2 and
wrote, “she's given credentials, explained who she is, her personal situation - which gives the reader the
confidence to trust the information she's gathering and dispersing. She's also provided personal information,
which lends credence.” Some participants also trusted it because they believed that the owners of this page
had good intentions. ID 37 trusted CNR 2 and perceived that its owners “have good intentions and a good
purpose.” Participants also trusted CNR 2 because they thought that it shared relevant information and was
well-received by the public. ID 39 trusted CNR 2 and wrote, “she has many followers and her page is
dedicated to providing up to date information on the storm crisis. She also has many photos and videos
providing further details.”
Next, we analyzed open-ended responses of participants, who were on the fence about whether to trust CNR
2 or not. We found that some participants did not like that CNR 2 was a public page and that the page owner
asked people to use it as a resource and a place to share information. Others questioned the page owner’s
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ability to run the page and described how they would verify the information provided on this page before
taking any action. ID 88 chose to ‘maybe’ trust CNR 2 and wrote, “it is intended as a share point where
anybody can post info about the event. So, depending on the primary source of the posted info, I'll be willing
to trust it or not.” ID 67, who also chose to ‘maybe’ trust CNR 2 wrote, “the page owner seems to have good
intentions, but I have doubts about her competence in maintaining the page.”
Table 29. Participants’ Perceptions and Rationale on Trustworthiness of CNRs
CNR ID

Participants’ Opinions on
Trustworthiness

Participants’ Rationale on the Trustworthiness (Code
Categories Ref. Chapter IV)

CNR 1

Most participants did not trust it.

Content found on this CNR was not Relevant. Information did not
seem to come from Known Trusted Sources. Owner Intentions
did not seem to help the affected public.

CNR 2

Most participants were unsure
about its trustworthiness

On one hand, participants trusted CNR 2 because the owner selfidentified herself. Some participants also felt that the CNR 2 owner
had good intentions and shared relevant information. Some
participants also trusted CNR 2 because it was popular. On the
other hand, some participants did not trust CNR 2 because thy
doubted CNR 2 owner’s ability (as an individual) to help the crisisaffected public.

CNR 3

Most participants did not trust it.

Lack of Self Identification.

CNR 4

Most participants did not trust it.

Content found on this CNR was not Relevant. Information did not
seem to come from Known Trusted Sources. Owner Intentions
did not seem to help the affected public.

CNR 5

Most participants trusted it.

Content found on this CNR seemed Relevant to the event. This
CNR Connected to many other officials and seemed to follow
Professionalism. The Intentions of this CNR owner seemed to
help crisis affected public.

Correlation Trends between the Factors that Influence the Trustworthiness of CNRs

We also determined correlations between the perceived
ability, benevolence, integrity, and trustworthiness of
each CNR’s owner and found many consistent trends.
Perceived ability was measured by asking the participant
if they felt the owner had prior experience and whether
that owner had the capability to help respond to a
disaster. Figures 6-7 show a positive Spearman
Correlation (ranging from 0.39-0.63) between Trust in a
CNR and has prior experience. This correlation
indicates that participants tended to trust a CNR if they
believed that the owner had experience in crisis
response. The correlation also shows the opposite to be
true, that participants tended to not trust a CNR if they
believed that the owner did not have experience in crisis
response. Figures 6-7 also show a positive Spearman
Correlation (ranging from 0.48-0.79) between Trust in a
CNR and the ability to help respond to disaster. This
indicates that participants tended to trust a CNR if they
believed the CNR owner has the capability to help
respond to the event. It also means that when participants
felt that a CNR owner is not capable to help respond to
the event, they tended not to trust the CNR.

Figure 6. Correlations between
Participants Perceptions of CNR 1
Owner’s Perceived Ability, Benevolence,
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Perceived benevolence was measured by having the participant determine if they felt the owner had the best
interests of the public in mind and that the owner understood the situation of the Hurricane-affected public.
Figures 6-7 show a positive Spearman Correlation (ranging from 0.44-0.73) between Trust in a CNR and has
best interests. This correlation indicates that participants tended to trust a CNR if they believed that the owner
had the best interests. The correlation also shows the opposite to be true, that participants tended to not trust
a CNR if they believed that the owner did not have the best interests. Figures 6-7 also show a positive
Spearman Correlation (ranging from 0.4-0.64) between Trust in a CNR and understands situation. This
indicates that participants tended to trust a CNR if they believed that the owner understands the situation of
crisis-affected populations. It also means that participants tended not to trust a CNR if they believed that the
owner does not understand the situation of crisis-affected populations.
Finally, perceived integrity was measured by asking the participants if they felt the owner would not provide
misinformation intentionally and would correct misinformation if it comes to his/her notice. Figures 6-7 show
a negative Spearman Correlation (ranging from -0.56 to -0.22) between Trust in a CNR and will provide
misinformation. This implies that when participants felt that the owner of a CNR would provide
misinformation intentionally, they tended not to trust it. Or, when participants felt that the owner of a CNR
would not provide misinformation intentionally, they tended to trust it. Figures 6-7 also show a positive
Spearman Correlation (ranging from 0.4-0.59) between Trust in a CNR and will correct misinformation. This
implies that participants tended to trust a CNR, if they felt the owner of a CNR will correct misinformation
and vice-versa.
In addition to the correlations already discussed, we found several high-level correlations between some of
the trust factors across all of the CNRS. These correlations are listed below:
• “prior experience” and “capability to help” - Our findings indicate that when participants felt that
a CNR owner had prior experience with crisis response, they were more likely to feel that the CNR
owner was also capable of helping them to respond to crisis and vice versa. High correlation between
these two factors (ranging from 0.62-0.8) are reflected in Figures 6-7.

•

“best interests” and “understands your situation” - We found that when participants felt that a CNR
owner has their best interests in mind, they tended to feel that s/he also understands their situation.
This is reflected by the high correlations ranging from 0.43-0.79 in Figures 6-7.

•

“best interests” and “will correct misinformation” - Our data suggests that participants are most
likely to believe that a CNR owner will correct misinformation, if they felt that s/he has their best
interests in mind. This finding is supported by Figures 6-7 that show high correlations between these
two factors ranging from 0.53-0.69.
“will provide misinformation” and “trustworthiness” - We found that participants tended not to trust
a CNR if they believed that it’s owner will provide misinformation. Conversely, participants tended
to trust a CNR, if they believed that it’s owner will not provide misinformation. This is reflected in
Figures 6-7 by negative correlations as -0.22, -0.54, -0.34, -0.56, and -0.33 respectively.

•
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Figure 7. Correlations between Participants Perceptions of CNR 2-5 Owner’s Perceived Ability,
Benevolence, Integrity, and Trustworthiness.
Participant Demographics and Trustworthiness Perceptions of CNRs

To see if there is a correlation between participant demographics and their perceptions of trustworthiness, we
calculated Spearman correlations among these parameters. Our findings indicated a small, insignificant
correlation (0.23) between a participants’ age and their trustworthiness of resources. We did not find
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correlations between a participant’s perception of trustworthiness of a CNR and the participant’s educational
background and/or expertise. We were surprised to find that there was no significant difference in trustworthy
opinions between experts and members of the public, but we acknowledge that it is likely due to a skewed
dataset with many more members of the public than experts. We also calculated the correlations between a
participant’s comfort level with Facebook or Twitter and his/her perceptions of the trustworthiness of the
shown Facebook pages (CNR 2, CNR 3, and CNR 4) or Twitter accounts (CNR 1 and CNR 5) and found no
correlations. Appendix G and H contain results of our quantitative analyses using MS Excel and R. We state
these observations with caution as our survey data comprises only 105 survey responses, a sample size that
does not allow for robust generalization. Additionally, our dataset was skewed in many cases (for example,
a significant number of participants were highly educated, members of the public, and younger than the age
of 55 years) making it insufficient for any kind of causal relationships and generalizations.
DISCUSSSION

In this research, we assessed known factors that tend to increase the trustworthiness of CNRs. Our findings
indicate that a participant’s perceptions of trustworthiness of a CNR is based on their perceptions of the
abilities and intentions of the owners of the CNR. For instance, if participants perceived that the owner of a
CNR had prior experience in crisis response, the capability to help respond to crisis, the best interests of the
affected population in mind, an understanding of the crisis situation, or was likely to correct misinformation,
they tend to trust it. These findings are consistent with the findings of Endsley and colleagues (2014), who
showed that the source of information influences the perceived credibility of the information shared during
crisis events. Our findings also align with those of Plotnick and colleagues (2018), who showed that people
assess the trustworthiness of social media posts based on their perceptions of the trustworthiness of the
sender.
This research has implications for emergency managers and response organizations that want to increase their
perceived trustworthiness on social media. We found that participants tended to trust a CNR if they believed
the CNR owner had prior experience in crisis response or the ability to help people respond to the disaster.
Based on this finding, emergency managers may want to clearly state their expertise and affiliation(s) on
their social media accounts. We also found that people tended to trust a CNR, if they perceived that a CNR
owner had their best interests or an understanding of the situation. Emergency responders can therefore craft
social media messages that show that they understand the needs of the crisis-affected populations and have
their best interests in mind. Another finding of this study suggests that people tend to trust a CNR if they
believed that its owner is likely to correct misinformation. Therefore, whenever possible, emergency
managers should correct misinformation that comes to their notice and attempt to make these correction
efforts visible. Similar recommendations for improving trust were provided by Hughes and Chauhan (2015),
who studied the online communications of Hurricane Sandy affected fire and police departments.
Findings of this research also have direct implications for those who want to design trustworthy CNRs.
Specifically, this research could inform the design of an interface that guides people step-by-step in designing
a trustworthy CNR. The first step would be to guide people to complete their profile, i.e., to give an
appropriate name and handle to their resource, as well as write a bio that clearly states their expertise (ability)
and affiliations. People could then be asked to publish their first post or tweet, where they state their goals
and intentions for creating a CNR. This first post should be crafted in such a way that shows that the CNR
owners have the best interests of the crisis-affected populations in mind and their understanding of the
situation of the event (benevolence). Finally, people would be guided to ensure that they verify each piece of
information before publishing it and monitor the UGC content on their CNR for misinformation (integrity).
However, we provide the above suggestions with caution, because people could use such an interface to make
their untrustworthy accounts and websites appear more trustworthy. Ultimately it is the responsibility of the
people who look for information online to vet the information in the best way they can. Also, if people
continue to evaluate trustworthiness of online resources only based on surface features (e.g., an appropriate
profile or cover photo, number of likes, etc.) of these resources, they might perceive “fake news” as
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trustworthy. In the future, we plan to create educational materials to educate people to distinguish fake news
on social media.
This study has a few limitations. Participants were asked to make trust decisions based on a hypothetical
situation, therefore they may or may not be as critical in evaluating trustworthiness of CNRs as they would
have been if they were really affected. Additionally, participants were shown CNR screenshots and not the
real pages, which in turn did not allow them to click and explore CNRs in-depth, something they would have
done in a real scenario. Furthermore, there were only 105 complete survey responses, therefore the findings
of this study may be difficult to generalize regarding the effect of participants’ demographics on
trustworthiness of CNRs. Finally, all our participants were English speaking and from the United States,
therefore, we did not consider cultural differences in this work.
In the future, we plan to conduct an interview study with people who have recently faced a disaster and ask
them about the usefulness of CNRs. Doing so, will overcome the issue of including participants who have
never faced a disaster or are unaware about the crisis response procedures or needs of crisis-affected
populations. We also plan to build on the findings of this research and identify factors that influence the
trustworthiness of CNR posts. To do so, we will choose a CNR, and show participants its posts one-by-one.
This will allow us to garner participants perceptions of trustworthiness on each post and will also allow us to
understand how trust may develop and evolve over time.
CONCLUSION

This research determines how people assess the trustworthiness of CNRs. Findings of this research show that
if people perceive that a CNR owner has prior experience in crisis response, can help crisis-affected public
to respond to the event, understands the situation and has best interests of affected individuals, or will correct
misinformation that comes into his/her notice, they tend to trust that CNR. In contrast, if people feel that
CNR owner can share misinformation intentionally, they tend not to trust that CNR. No significant correlation
between participants perceptions on the trustworthiness of CNRs and their demographics was found.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

In this final chapter, I summarize the findings of this dissertation research. I also
reflect upon the use of social media in crisis events. Finally, I discuss the limitations of this
research and offer suggestions for future work.

Dissertation Summary
The aim of this dissertation is to study crisis communications on social media and to
determine the factors that contribute to the trustworthiness of Crisis Named Resources
(CNRs). This dissertation consists of three studies.
STUDY 1
In this study, I identified Local Responders, Local News Media, Cooperating Agencies,
and a set of social media accounts and pages named after the wildfire as the four online
information sources that provided official information during the 2014 Carlton Complex
Wildfire. I analyzed the communication behaviors of these resources and assessed the
relevance and timeliness of the information provided by them. The data show that the

Local News Media provided the highest quantity of relevant information and the
timeliest information. I also found that the social media resources named after the
wildfire (also known as CNRs) posted the highest percentage of relevant posts around the
wildfire. Though they seemed official, it was often unclear who created them and why.
This finding laid the foundation for my second study, where I studied these CNRs in depth.
STUDY II
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This study provided an examination of the social media accounts that are named after
a crisis event, called CNRs. Specifically, I studied the crisis response role of CNRs around
the 2016 Fort McMurray Wildfire. Findings showed that CNRs appear spontaneously
around an event and are often deleted or left unused after the completion of an event. These
resources shared a lot of relevant information and covered a range of topics from
information dissemination, to offers of help, to expressions of solidarity. The most liked
CNRs were the ones that provided platforms for people to ask for or provide help.
Additionally, in most cases, the creators of these resources chose to stay anonymous, which
may or may not have been intentional. Despite having anonymous owners, these resources,
at times, were followed by tens of thousands of people. A large number of followers for a
social media page or account is an indicator of broader social influence and leads to more
amplification of its content [12]. Information coming from an anonymous source can,
however, be hard to evaluate on trustworthiness. This observation laid the foundation for
my third and final study, where I determined how people evaluate the trustworthiness of
CNRs.
STUDY III
In this study, I focused on the trustworthiness of the Facebook and Twitter CNRs
created around the 2017 Hurricane Irma. This study included 105 surveys and 17
interviews with members of the public and experts in Crisis Informatics, Communication
Studies, and Emergency Management. During the interview and survey sessions,
participants were asked to evaluate the trustworthiness of CNRs created around 2017
Hurricane Irma. Findings from the interview study showed that the factors that influenced
trustworthiness of CNRs the most were the participants’ perceptions of CNR content,
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information source, owner, and profile. Also, CNRs that shared content which were seen
as insensitive and/or irrelevant to Hurricane Irma were not trusted by the majority of
participants. Findings from the survey study showed that participants tended to trust CNRs
if they perceived the CNR owner had prior experience in crisis response, the capability to
help respond to disaster, the best interests, and an understanding of the situation. Also, if
participants believed that a CNR owner is unlikely to share misinformation and likely to
correct misinformation, they tended to trust the CNR. There was no correlation between
perceived trustworthiness and a participants’ gender, age, education, expertise, and comfort
level with Facebook or Twitter.

Implications for Social Media Use in Emergency Response
Past literature has demonstrated the ways social media have been used during crisis
events [13]–[17]. In this dissertation, I continue looking at how social media are used
during crisis events. Doing so, led to the discovery of Crisis Named Resources (CNRs)—
the social media pages and accounts that are named after a crisis event. CNRs seem to
provide yet another way of facilitating engagement around a crisis event.
All studies in this dissertation research affirmed that CNRs appear around crisis
events and participate actively in crisis response. CNRs offer platforms for people to obtain
information and participate in a crisis response. Findings from Study II (Chapter III)
revealed 8 types of CNRs: donations, fundraisers, needs & offers, prayers, reactions,
stories, and reports. Donations, fundraisers, and needs & offers CNRs offered platforms
for individuals or organizations to ask for/offer help in terms of money and resources.
Providing and asking for help online lead to community building in times of need. Prayers,
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reactions, and stories CNRs are also another way of community building, which allow
individuals to share their support, opinions, and experiences during a crisis event. Reports
CNRs, on the other hand, facilitate information dissemination and/or exchange around a
crisis event. Such CNRs have the potential to contribute to situational awareness, a
phenomenon that commonly appeared throughout the crisis informatics literature [18]. All
of the CNRs found in Study II seemed to be altruistic in purpose, however, that is not
always the case. Study III (chapter IV and V) revealed two CNRs whose content appeared
to be insensitive to the situation of crisis-affected populations. While one resource trolled
President Trump, the other shared humorous memes about Hurricane Irma. Such resources
do not provide information that can be used to respond to the event but nonetheless could
help in community building by providing people with comic relief during crisis. It seems
likely that other “less useful” CNRs exist, and it would be interesting to study future crisis
events to identify and study them.
Another consistent finding across these studies was that most of the CNR owners
were anonymous and did not explicitly disclose the purpose of their CNR, which may or
may not have been intentional. While anonymity may allow people to freely express their
situation or opinions [19], [20], anonymity can also encourage cybercrimes such as trolling
[21] or money laundering [22]. Anonymity can also lead to lesser perceived accountability
or trustworthiness. In the case of this research, anonymity could be a particular issue for
CNRs that are of the donations, fundraisers, and needs & offers type. When following
advice from such a CNR, one should take steps to ensure that it is not a hoax.
This research has implications for people seeking information on social media
during a crisis event. As found in this research, numerous resources disseminate
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information around crisis events, some of which are more trustworthy than others.
Knowing how people make decisions on the trustworthiness of social media content, can
help members of the public to look for markers (such as clearly stated goals or people
identifying themselves and their expertise and intentions) of trustworthiness. For example,
if people find a resource whose owner seems to be sharing misinformation or is not
monitoring the content on his/her resource for outdated or incorrect information, they can
either choose not to follow it or verify information from others before taking any action.
This research also has implications for emergency response. I recommend that
official emergency responders monitor CNRs to ensure that the information they provide
is accurate, especially if the public sees them as a source of official information. Resources
that are insensitive to the crisis should be monitored for sharing misinformation.
Monitoring these accounts will allow emergency responders to know what people are
concerned about or what types of information they need. This will allow them to adjust
their own communications to correct misinformation or respond to requests for
information. If during monitoring these resources, responders find a very useful CNR, they
may reach out to the CNR owners and offer to work together. Responders may even point
the public to these sources if the information they provide is credible and meets a particular
need that cannot be met by the official response (e.g., helping reunite pets with their
owners).

Broader Implications
This research also has implications for the broader consumption of social media
data. Many people on social media tend to believe fake news [23]. This phenomenon was
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highlighted in the case of the 2016 US Presidential election, where people believed
reliable-looking fake websites and social media bots to be reliable sources of information
[24]. Given this, Google and many of social media platforms, including Twitter and
Facebook, have adjusted the way they present news and information. For instance,
Facebook recently updated its ad policy and ensured that the policy update will not allow
the flow of fake news stories through its news feed [25]. Facebook, recently, also made
several attempts to address hoaxes and fake news. First, it made it easier for users to report
a hoax post. Second, it started working with third-party fact-checking organizations, where
once a fake story is identified, Facebook flags it as “disputed” and shows it lower in the
news feed. Third, it has started analyzing the stories that are less shared. Finally, Facebook
is taking steps to reduce the financial incentives, one of the biggest motivations for those
who spread fake news [26]. More recently, Twitter has also acquired a London-based startup named “Fabula AI, which claims to identify fake news [27]. One contribution of this
research is, therefore, to aid members of the public with a list of factors that affect the
trustworthiness of online sources. I, however, caution that some of these factors can be
easily spoofed, thus members of the public would have to use their discretion to identify
trustworthy resources. Also, as there are different types of online resources, some which
raise money, whereas some that share humor, factors to consider when evaluating the
trustworthiness of a resource might vary. For example, it is not as critical to know the CNR
owner for an account that provides humor as for the one that asks for money.
Limitations and Future Work
In this section, I list the limitations of this dissertation work and offer
recommendations for future work. First, the data was limited to Facebook and Twitter
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platforms. In future research, I would be more inclusive of other social media, mobile and
web platforms. Each of these platforms have different affordances, thus the users on these
platforms might consider different factors to judge the trustworthiness of profiles. For
instance, on WhatsApp one has to verify his/her phone number to create an account, while
on Redditt one can create throwaway (or one-time-use) accounts. Second, only natural
crisis events are considered (i.e., wildfires and hurricanes). It would be interesting to
compare the findings of this dissertation with CNRs created during man-made crisis events,
which are not only sudden but are also short-lived. During a man-made crisis, such as an
active shooter scenario, people must take immediate action and do not have time to create
Facebook or Twitter profiles with a complete bio and suitable profile and background
pictures. Also, most of the CNRs, in this case, would be created after the event and would
likely consist of reactions on gun violence or speculations about the identity and intentions
of the shooter. Therefore, it seems that CNRs may vary widely in their role and purpose in
a different kind of crisis event. Third, I studied only one kind of social media resource that
appears around a crisis event (CNRs). In the future, I plan to do a comparative study on the
trustworthiness of resources that are created just-in-time (CNRs) versus the established
accounts that belong to well-known organizations or celebrities.
In future work, I plan to continue investigating the trustworthiness of CNRs. I plan
to conduct an interview study, where I ask members of the public to evaluate the
trustworthiness of CNRs whose owners stay anonymous versus those who clearly state
their identity and intentions. This study would be useful to infer the influence of anonymity
in crisis communications on trustworthiness.
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Finally, this research could be used to inform the design of a machine learning
algorithm that identifies CNRs as they appear and calculates a trustworthiness score for
them. Such an algorithm could assign each CNR profile a score based on its completeness
(complete bio, presence of profile or cover picture), relevance to the event, and popularity.
These scores could then be aggregated to give a final trustworthiness score. People would
be able to view these scores as well as sort and search across them. Such an algorithm could
be helpful to people who are not familiar with social media or the nuances of indicators of
credibility. A possible downside of this approach is that if the algorithm was openly
available, people could manipulate the generated results of the algorithm. For example, if
someone knew that a completed bio, presence of a profile and cover photo, relevant posts,
and more followers would get them a higher trustworthiness score, they might choose to
manipulate the system by filling in the bio information, uploading a profile and cover
picture, writing posts using relevant hashtags, and buying followers. Doing so, would rank
them higher on their trustworthiness, despite not being very trustworthy. These issues and
ways to counter them would have to be investigated as part of future work in this area.
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Appendix A: INTERVIEW RECRUITMENT MATERIALS
Email Script (Experts)
TO: Select Crisis Informatics Experts
SUBJECT: Interview about Trustworthiness of Crisis-Related Social Media
BODY:
Dear <Name of Crisis Informatics Expert>,
I am a Computer Science doctoral student at Utah State University who is studying the
communications found in Facebook and Twitter accounts about Hurricane Irma. My work
is advised by Professor Amanda Lee Hughes (http://amandaleehughes.com).
I am contacting you because you have expertise in crisis informatics and are familiar with
this kind of research. I would like to interview you about your opinions on the
trustworthiness of these resources. The interview will be about 45-60 minutes. All
interviewees will receive a $20 Amazon Gift Card at the end of interview!
If you would like to participate, please either reply to this email or email me directly
(apoorva.chauhan@aggiemail.usu.edu). Also, please feel free to contact me to find out
more about this study. Any help from you will be greatly appreciated!
Thank you for your consideration,
Apoorva Chauhan
http://www.apoorvachauhan.com/
Email Script (Members of Public)
TO: Select Members of Public
SUBJECT: Interview about Trustworthiness of Crisis-Related Social Media
BODY:
Dear <Name of a Person>,
I am a Computer Science doctoral student at Utah State University whose work is advised
by Professor Amanda Lee Hughes (http://amandaleehughes.com).
I am contacting you to invite you to an interview study that determines the factors that
people consider when evaluating the trustworthiness of social media profiles that are
created around crisis events. The interview is expected to be 45-60 minutes long and all
interviewees will receive a $20 Amazon gift card at the end of the interview. To be eligible
for the interview, you must be older than 18 years of age and should have either a Facebook
or Twitter account.
This study is approved by the Computer Science department and Institutional Review
Board at Utah State University. To participate in this study, either reply to this email or
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email me directly (apoorva.chauhan@aggiemail.usu.edu). I am happy to answer any
questions regarding this study. Any input from you will be greatly appreciated!
Thank you for your consideration,
Apoorva Chauhan (http://www.apoorvachauhan.com/)
Facebook Script (Experts and Members of the Public)
Hi! I am a doctoral student in the Department of Computer Science at Utah State
University, who is studying the public communications of Hurricane Irma named accounts
on Facebook and Twitter. If you are 18 years or older and are interested in sharing your
opinions on the trustworthiness of social media profiles created around crises, you are
invited to participate in an interview study. To participate in this study, or to ask questions
regarding this study, either reply to this post or email me at
apoorva.chauhan@aggiemail.usu.edu. Any input from you will be much appreciated and
will make a difference in the area of online trust! (All interviewees will receive a $20
Amazon Gift Card at the end of the interview.)

Best Regards,
Apoorva Chauhan (http://www.apoorvachauhan.com/)
Twitter Script (Experts and Members of the Public)
18+? Voice your opinions on the trustworthiness of social media profiles that are created
around crises. Contact @HCI_researcher (All interviewees will receive a $20 Amazon Gift
Card.)
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Appendix B: SURVEY RECRUITMENT MATERIALS
Facebook Script (Experts and Members of the Public)
Hi! I am a doctoral student in the Department of Computer Science at Utah State University
(USU). I am conducting a study to determine how people judge the trustworthiness of
social media profiles that are created in response to crisis events. My work is advised by
Prof. Amanda Lee Hughes, and is approved by the Computer Science department and
Institutional Review Board at USU. If you are 18 years or older and are interested in sharing
your opinions on the trustworthiness of social media profiles created around crises, please
complete this survey <survey link>. To know more about this study, either reply to this
post or email me at apoorva.chauhan@aggiemail.usu.edu. Any input from you will be
much appreciated and will make a difference in the field of online trust!
Best Regards,
Apoorva Chauhan (http://www.apoorvachauhan.com/)
Twitter Script (Experts and Members of the Public)
18+? Take a survey <survey link> to voice your opinions on the trustworthiness of social
media profiles created around crises. Direct any related questions to @HCI_researcher
Email Script (Experts and Members of the Public)
TO: Select Members of Public
SUBJECT: Survey about Trustworthiness of Crisis-Related Social Media
BODY:
Dear <Name of a Person>,
I am a Computer Science doctoral student at Utah State University whose work is advised
by Professor Amanda Lee Hughes (http://amandaleehughes.com).
I am conducting a study to determine the factors that people consider when evaluating the
trustworthiness of social media profiles.
I am contacting you to invite you to complete a survey <survey link> about the
trustworthiness of online resources created around crises. To participate in this study, you
must be older than 18 years of age, and should have a Facebook or Twitter account. This
study is approved by the Computer Science department and Institutional Review Board at
Utah State University. To participate in this study, either reply to this email, or email me
directly (apoorva.chauhan@aggiemail.usu.edu). Feel free to contact me to find out more
about this study. Any input from you will add to the research!
Thank you for your consideration,
Apoorva Chauhan
http://www.apoorvachauhan.com/
Survey Cards (Experts and Members of the Public)
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I created survey cards (size 2 x 3.5 inches) that had details about the survey study with
survey link and QR code and contact information. These cards were printed on a thick sheet
of paper and were handed to experts and members of the public who were eligible for my
study in person.

Figure 8: Survey Recruitment Cards.

77
Appendix C: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
The survey comprises of 4 blocks. Block 1 includes the informed consent form for the
survey. Block 2 has questions that determine participants’ opinions on the trustworthiness
of the shown 5 CNRs. Block 3 has questions that gather participants’ demographic
information. Block 4 asks participants’ their email address for the participation in the
lottery. This block is optional.
Trustworthiness of Crisis Event Based Resources on Facebook and Twitter
Start of Block: Informed Consent

Q1.1 Informed Consent: Trustworthiness of Crisis Event Based Resources on Facebook
and Twitter – Survey
Introduction
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Amanda Lee Hughes and
Apoorva Chauhan, an assistant professor and a PhD student in the Department of Computer
Science at Utah State University. The purpose of this research is to determine the
trustworthiness of social media profiles named after and created for a particular crisis
event. This form includes detailed information on the research to help you decide whether
to participate in this research. Please read it carefully and ask any questions before you
agree to participate.
Procedures
Your participation will involve a survey. If you agree to participate, the survey will begin
by asking your age, gender, education level, computer proficiency, and profession. Next,
you will be asked to imagine you have been affected by Hurricane Irma and you are looking
for information on how to respond to this event. You will then be shown images of a few
Twitter accounts and Facebook pages named after Hurricane Irma. For each of these
accounts and pages, you will be asked a series of survey questions about whether you would
trust them. The survey is expected to take 15-30 minutes to complete. We anticipate that
about 70 people will participate
Risks & Benefits
This is a minimal risk research study. That means that the risks of participating are no more
likely or serious than those you encounter in everyday activities. There is also a small risk
of loss of confidentiality, but we will take steps to reduce this risk. If you have a bad
research-related experience, please contact the principal investigator of this study right
away at 435-797-3671 or amanda.hughes@usu.edu.
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There is no direct benefit to you for participating in this research study. More broadly, this
study will help the researchers learn more about how people trust (or do not trust) social
media profiles and may help future researchers to understand the factors considered by
experts and members of the public when evaluating the trustworthiness of social media.
Confidentiality
The researchers will make every effort to ensure that the information you provide as part
of this study remains confidential. Your identity will not be revealed in any publications,
presentations, or reports resulting from this research study. We will collect your
information through the Qualtrics survey software. This information will be securely stored
in a restricted-access folder on Box.com an encrypted, cloud-based storage system. This
data will be kept for three years after the study is complete, and then it will be destroyed.
It is unlikely, but possible, that others (Utah State University or state or federal officials)
may require us to share the information you give us from the study to ensure that the
research was conducted safely and appropriately. We will only share your information if
law or policy requires us to do so. The research team works to ensure confidentiality to the
degree permitted by technology. It is possible, although unlikely, that unauthorized
individuals could gain access to your responses because you are responding online.
Voluntary Participation & Withdrawal
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary. If you agree to participate now
and change your mind later, you may withdraw at any time by leaving the survey. If you
choose to withdraw after we have already collected information about you, we will delete
your information to the extent to which withdrawal is possible.
Compensation
On completing the survey, you will be given a choice to participate in the lottery, where
one individual will receive a $50 Amazon gift card. If you wish to participate in the lottery,
you will be asked to provide your email address.
IRB Review
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the protection of human research participants at
Utah State University has reviewed and approved this study. If you have questions about
the research study itself, please contact the Principal Investigator at (435) 797-3671 or
amanda.hughes@usu.edu. If you have questions about your rights or would simply like to
speak with someone other than the research team about questions or concerns, please
contact the IRB Director at (435) 797-0567 or irb@usu.edu.
Amanda Hughes
Principal Investigator
(435) 797-3671; amanda.hughes@usu.edu
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Apoorva Chauhan
Student Investigator
apoorva.chauhan@aggiemail.usu.edu
Informed Consent
By agreeing to participate in this study below, you indicate that you understand the risks
and benefits of participation, and that you know what you will be asked to do. You also
understand that your participation is voluntary and you may leave the survey at any time.
If you are over the age of 18 and agree to participate in this study, please sign below.
If you are not over the age of 18 or you do not agree to participate in this study, please exit
the survey.
End of Block: Informed Consent
Start of Block: Introduction

Q2.1 Imagine you are in Florida and have been affected by Hurricane Irma. You are
looking on social media for information about how to respond to this crisis event.
You will now be shown images of 5 Facebook pages and Twitter accounts named after
Hurricane Irma. You will then be asked to evaluate the trustworthiness of these social
media resources.
Your responses will help us learn more about how people trust (or do not trust) social media
profiles.
End of Block: Introduction
Start of Block: Social Media Profile 1

Q3.1 Please look at the images of the Twitter account below and then answer the following
questions.
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Q3.2 Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account has prior experience in crisisresponse?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
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Q3.3 Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account is capable of helping you respond
to Hurricane Irma?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q3.4 Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account has your best interests in mind?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q3.5 Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account understands your situation?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q3.6 Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account will provide misleading
information intentionally?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
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o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q3.7 Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account will make efforts to correct any
false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes into his/her notice?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q3.8 Would you trust the information on this Twitter account? Trust is defined as the extent
to which you feel secure and comfortable relying on the information.

o Yes, because ________________________________________________
o Maybe, because ________________________________________________
o No, because ________________________________________________
End of Block: Social Media Profile 1
Start of Block: Social Media Profile 2

Q4.1 Please look at the images of the Facebook page below and then answer the following
questions.
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Q4.2 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page has prior experience in crisisresponse?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q4.3 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page is capable of helping you respond
to Hurricane Irma?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
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Q4.4 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page has your best interests in mind?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q4.5 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page understands your situation?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q4.6 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page will provide misleading information
intentionally?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q4.7 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page will make efforts to correct any
false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes into his/her notice?

o Extremely unlikely
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o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q4.8 Would you trust the information on this Facebook page? Trust is defined as the extent
to which you feel secure and comfortable relying on the information.

o Yes, because ________________________________________________
o Maybe, because ________________________________________________
o No, because ________________________________________________
End of Block: Social Media Profile 2
Start of Block: Social Media Profile 3

Q5.1 Please look at the images of the Facebook page below and then answer the following
questions.
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Q5.2 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page has prior experience in crisisresponse?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q5.3 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page is capable of helping you respond
to Hurricane Irma?

o Extremely unlikely
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o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q5.4 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page has your best interests in mind?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q5.5 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page understands your situation?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q5.6 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page will provide misleading information
intentionally?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
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o Extremely likely
Q5.7 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page will make efforts to correct any
false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes into his/her notice?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q5.8 Would you trust the information on this Facebook page? Trust is defined as the extent
to which you feel secure and comfortable relying on the information.

o Yes, because ________________________________________________
o Maybe, because ________________________________________________
o No, because ________________________________________________
End of Block: Social Media Profile 3
Start of Block: Social Media Profile 4

Q6.1 Please look at the images of the Facebook page below and then answer the following
questions.
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Q6.2 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page has prior experience in crisisresponse?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q6.3 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page is capable of helping you respond
to Hurricane Irma?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q6.4 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page has your best interests in mind?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q6.5 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page understands your situation?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
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o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q6.6 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page will provide misleading information
intentionally?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q6.7 Do you feel that the owner of this Facebook page will make efforts to correct any
false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes into his/her notice?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q6.8 Would you trust the information on this Facebook page? Trust is defined as the extent
to which you feel secure and comfortable relying on the information.

o Yes, because ________________________________________________
o Maybe, because ________________________________________________
o No, because ________________________________________________

98
End of Block: Social Media Profile 4
Start of Block: Social Media Profile 5

Q7.1 Please look at the images of the Twitter account below and answer the following
questions.
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Q7.2 Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account has prior experience in crisisresponse?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q7.3 Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account is capable of helping you respond
to Hurricane Irma?
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o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q7.4 Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account has your best interests in mind?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q7.5 Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account understands your situation?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q7.6 Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account will provide misleading
information intentionally?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
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o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q7.7 Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account will make efforts to correct any
false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes into his/her notice?

o Extremely unlikely
o Somewhat unlikely
o Neither likely nor unlikely
o Somewhat likely
o Extremely likely
Q7.8 Would you trust the information on this Twitter account? Trust is defined as the extent
to which you feel secure and comfortable relying on the information.

o Yes, because ________________________________________________
o Maybe, because ________________________________________________
o No, because ________________________________________________
End of Block: Social Media Profile 5
Start of Block: Demographics

Q8.1 Please select your gender.

o Male
o Female
o Other
Q8.2 Please select your age.
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o 18 - 24
o 25 - 34
o 35 - 44
o 45 - 54
o 55 - 64
o 65 - 74
o 75 - 84
o 85 or older
Q8.3 Please select the highest level of education you have completed.

o Less than high school
o High school graduate
o Some college
o 2 year degree
o 4 year degree
o Master's degree
o Doctorate
Q8.4 Do you consider yourself an expert in the area of Crisis Informatics, Communication
Studies, or Emergency Management?

o Yes
o No
Q8.5 Please select your comfort level when using Facebook.

o Extremely uncomfortable
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o Somewhat uncomfortable
o Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable
o Somewhat comfortable
o Extremely comfortable
Q8.6 Please select your comfort level when using Twitter.

o Extremely uncomfortable
o Somewhat uncomfortable
o Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable
o Somewhat comfortable
o Extremely comfortable
End of Block: Demographics
Start of Block: Thank you!

Q9.1 Thank you for completing the survey!
You now have the option of entering a drawing for a $50 Amazon Gift Card. To enter,
please provide your email address below (If you do not wish to participate in the
drawing, there is no need to enter your email address).
________________________________________________________________
End of Block: Thank you!
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Appendix D: CRISIS NAMED RESOURCES’ SCREENSHOTS
The first 5 CNRs’ screenshots are shown in Appendix C: Survey Questionnaire and the
remaining 5 CNRs’ screenshots are as follows.
CNR 6: Hurricane Irma Resource Assistance (Facebook Page)

Figure 9: CNR 6 – Screenshot #1.
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Figure 10: CNR 6 – Screenshot #2.

Figure 11: CNR 6 – Screenshot #3.
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Figure 12: CNR 6 – Screenshot #4.

CNR 7: Track Hurricane Irma (Twitter Account)

Figure 13: CNR 7 – Screenshot #1.
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Figure 14: CNR 7 – Screenshot #2.

Figure 15: CNR 7 – Screenshot #3.
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Figure 16: CNR 7 – Screenshot #4.

CNR 8: Hurricane Irma (Facebook Page)

Figure 17: CNR 8 – Screenshot #1.
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Figure 18: CNR 8 – Screenshot #2.

Figure 19: CNR 8 – Screenshot #3.
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Figure 20: CNR 8 – Screenshot #4.

Figure 21: CNR 8 – Screenshot #5.

CNR 9: Hurricane Irma (Facebook Page)
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Figure 22: CNR 9 – Screenshot #1.

Figure 23: CNR 9 – Screenshot #2.
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Figure 24: CNR 9 – Screenshot #3.
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Figure 25: CNR 9 – Screenshot #4.

Figure 26: CNR 9 – Screenshot #5.

CNR 10: Hurricane Irma News (Twitter Account)
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Figure 27: CNR 10 – Screenshot #1.
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Appendix E: DATA FROM INTERVIEWS AND SURVEYS
CNR 1
Q1.1: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has prior experience
in crisis response?

Extremely Unlikely

Experts
(N = 5)
3 (60%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
9 (75%)

Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

1 (20%)
1 (20%)
-

1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
-

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
13
57 (64.7%)
(76.4%)
3 (17.6%) 22 (25%)
1 (5.8%)
4 (4.5%)
4 (4.5%)
1 (1.1%)

Table 30: CNR 1 (Q1.1)

Q1.2: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) is capable of helping
you respond to hurricane Irma?

Extremely Unlikely

Experts
(N = 5)
3 (60%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
10 (83.3%)

Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

1 (20%)
1 (20%)
-

2 (16.6%)
-

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
12
56 (63.6%)
(70.5%)
3 (17.6%) 24 (27.2%)
1 (5.8%)
4 (4.5%)
1 (5.8%)
4 (4.5%)
-

Table 31: CNR 1 (Q1.2)

Q1.3: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has your best interests
in mind?

Extremely Unlikely

Experts
(N = 5)
3 (60%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
9 (75%)

Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

1 (20%)
1 (20%)

1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
10
40 (45.4%)
(58.8%)
3 (17.6%) 22 (25%)
2 (11.7%) 18 (20.4%)
2 (11.7%) 6 (6.8%)
2 (2.2%)

Table 32: CNR 1 (Q1.3)

Q1.4: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) understands your
situation?
Interviewees

Survey Participants
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Extremely Unlikely

Experts
(N = 5)
3 (60%)

Members of the Public
(N = 12)
7 (58.3%)

Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

1 (20%)
1 (20%)
-

2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)

Experts
(N = 17)
13
(76.4%)
3 (17.6%)
1 (5.8%)
-

Members of the Public
(N = 88)
42 (47.7%)
28 (31.8%)
12 (13.6%)
6 (6.8%)
-

Table 33: CNR 1 (Q1.4)

Q1.5: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will provide
misleading information intentionally?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
3 (60%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
4 (33.3%)
3 (25%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
1 (5.8%)
3 (8.4%)
3 (17.6%) 15 (17%)
3 (17.6%) 21 (23.8%)
8 (47%)
30 (34%)
2 (11.7%) 19 (21.5%)

Table 34: CNR 1 (Q1.5)

Q1.6: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will make efforts to
correct any false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes to his/her notice?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
4 (80%)
1 (20%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
8 (66.6%)
1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
4 (23.5%) 40 (45.4%)
8 (47%)
28 (31.8%)
3 (17.6%) 11 (12.5%)
2 (11.7%) 8 (9%)
1 (1.1%)

Table 35: CNR 1 (Q1.6)

CNR 2
Q2.1: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has prior experience
in crisis response?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
3 (60%)
2 (40%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
3 (25%)
2 (16.6%)
6 (50%)
1 (8.3%)
Table 36: CNR 2 (Q2.1)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
4 (23.5%) 15 (17%)
2 (11.7%) 22 (25%)
6 (35.2%) 21 (23.8%)
4 (23.5%) 24 (27.2%)
1 (5.8%)
6 (6.8%)
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Q2.2: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) is capable of helping
you respond to hurricane Irma?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
1 (20%)
4 (80%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
3 (25%)
7 (58.3%)
2 (16.6%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
7 (7.9%)
4 (23.5%) 15 (17%)
4 (23.5%) 11 (12.5%)
7 (41.1%) 50 (56.8%)
2 (11.7%) 5 (5.6%)

Table 37: CNR 2 (Q2.2)

Q2.3: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has your best interests
in mind?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
1 (20%)
4 (80%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)
4 (33.3%)
6 (50%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
2 (2.2%)
1 (5.8%)
2 (2.2%)
4 (23.5%) 11 (12.5%)
2 (11.7%) 41 (46.5%)
10
32 (36.6%)
(58.8%)

Table 38: CNR 2 (Q2.3)

Q2.4: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) understands your
situation?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
1 (20%)
4 (80%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)
10 (83.3%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
1 (5.8%)
3 (3.4%)
2 (11.7%) 9 (10.2%)
2 (11.7%) 12 (13.6%)
6 (35.2%) 47 (53.4%)
6 (35.2%) 17 (19.3%)

Table 39: CNR 2 (Q2.4)

Q2.5: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will provide
misleading information intentionally?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
4 (80%)
1 (20%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
9 (75%)
2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
6 (35.2%) 38 (43.1%)
8 (47%)
42 (47.7%)
3 (17.6%) 5 (5.6%)
2 (2.2%)
1 (1.1%)
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Table 40: CNR 2 (Q2.5)

Q2.6: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will make efforts to
correct any false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes to his/her notice?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
1 (20%)
2 (40%)
2 (40%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
1 (8.3%)
3 (25%)
8 (66.6%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
1 (1.1%)
2 (11.7%) 3 (3.4%)
3 (17.6%) 9 (10.2%)
5 (29.4%) 55 (62.5%)
7 (41.1%) 20 (22.7%)

Table 41: CNR 2 (Q2.6)

CNR 3
Q3.1: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has prior experience
in crisis response?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
3 (60%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
6 (50%)
1 (8.3%)
3 (25%)
2 (16.6%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
6 (35.2%) 20 (22.7%)
6 (35.2%) 22 (25%)
2 (11.7%) 26 (29.5%)
3 (17.6%) 15 (17%)
5 (5.6%)

Table 42: CNR 3 (Q3.1)

Q3.2: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) is capable of helping
you respond to hurricane Irma?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
5
(100%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
7 (58.3%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
5 (29.4%) 24 (27.2%)

2 (16.6%)
2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)

4 (23.5%)
3 (17.6%)
5 (29.4%)
-

26 (29.5%)
14 (15.9%)
21 (23.8%)
3 (3.4%)

Table 43: CNR 3 (Q3.2)

Q3.3: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has your best interests
in mind?

Extremely Unlikely

Experts
(N = 5)
2 (40%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
5 (41.6%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
3 (17.6%) 17 (19.3%)
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Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

2 (40%)
1 (20%)

1 (8.3%)
3 (25%)
3 (25%)

3 (17.6%)
4 (23.5%)
4 (23.5%)
3 (17.6%)

20 (22.7%)
25 (28.4%)
18 (20.4%)
8 (9%)

Table 44: CNR 3 (Q3.3)

Q3.4: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) understands your
situation?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
3 (60%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)
5 (41.6%)
3 (25%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
3 (17.6%) 12 (13.6%)
5 (29.4%) 25 (28.4%)
5 (29.4%) 20 (22.7%)
3 (17.6%) 29 (32.9%)
1 (5.8%)
2 (2.2%)

Table 45: CNR 3 (Q3.4)

Q3.5: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will provide
misleading information intentionally?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
5 (41.6%)
1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
3 (25%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
4 (23.5%) 11 (12.5%)
5 (29.4%) 30 (34%)
3 (17.6%) 25 (28.4%)
3 (17.6%) 14 (15.9%)
2 (11.7%) 8 (9%)

Table 46: CNR 3 (Q3.5)

Q3.6: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will make efforts to
correct any false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes to his/her notice?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
2 (40%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
5 (41.6%)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)
3 (25%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
3 (17.6%) 13 (14.7%)
8 (47%)
19 (21.5%)
3 (17.6%) 27 (30.6%)
2 (11.7%) 22 (25%)
1 (5.8%)
7 (7.9%)

Table 47: CNR 3 (Q3.6)

CNR 4
Q4.1: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has prior experience
in crisis response?
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Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
5
(100%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
11 (91.6%)
1 (8.3%)
-

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
14
66 (75%)
(82.3%)
1 (5.8%)
10 (11.3%)
1 (5.8%)
6 (6.8%)
1 (5.8%)
5 (5.6%)
1 (1.1%)

Table 48: CNR 4 (Q4.1)

Q4.2: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) is capable of helping
you respond to hurricane Irma?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
4 (80%)
1 (20%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
12 (100%)
-

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
16 (94%)
71 (80.6%)
8 (9.0%)
1 (5.8%)
3 (3.4%)
6 (6.8%)
-

Table 49: CNR 4 (Q4.2)

Q4.3: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has your best interests
in mind?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
3 (60%)
2 (40%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
11 (91.6%)
1 (8.3%)
-

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
9 (52.9%) 44 (50%)
4 (23.5%) 21 (23.8%)
3 (17.6%) 19 (21.5%)
1 (5.8%)
4 (4.5%)
-

Table 50: CNR 4 (Q4.3)

Q4.4: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) understands your
situation?

Extremely Unlikely

Experts
(N = 5)
2 (40%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
10 (83.3%)

Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

1 (20%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
-

1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)
Table 51: CNR 4 (Q4.4)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
11
50 (56.8%)
(64.7%)
5 (29.4%) 25 (28.4%)
1 (5.8%)
9 (10.2%)
4 (4.5%)
-
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Q4.5: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will provide
misleading information intentionally?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
2 (40%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)
4 (33.3%)
5 (41.6%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
2 (11.7%) 6 (10.2%)
2 (11.7%) 8 (9%)
6 (35.2%) 24 (27.2%)
4 (23.5%) 34 (38.6%)
3 (17.6%) 16 (18.1%)

Table 52: CNR 4 (Q4.5)

Q4.6: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will make efforts to
correct any false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes to his/her notice?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N =5 )
5
(100%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
9 (75%)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
-

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
12
43 (48.8%)
(70.5%)
2 (11.7%) 35 (39.7%)
1 (5.8%)
6 (6.8%)
2 (11.7%) 4 (4.5%)
-

Table 53: CNR 4 (Q4.6)

CNR 5
Q5.1: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has prior experience
in crisis response?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
1 (20%)
2 (40%)
2 (40%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
6 (50%)
3 (25%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
3 (3.4%)
5 (5.6%)
6 (35.2%) 18 (20.4%)
9 (52.9%) 38 (43.1%)
2 (11.7%) 24 (27.2%)

Table 54: CNR 5 (Q5.1)

Q5.2: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) is capable of helping
you respond to hurricane Irma?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
1 (20%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
-

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
3 (3.4%)
5 (5.6%)
6 (35.2%) 11 (12.5%)
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Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

1 (20%)
3 (60%)

4 (33.3%)
5 (41.6%)

7 (41.1%)
4 (23.5%)

48 (54.5%)
21 (23.8%)

Table 55: CNR 5 (Q5.2)

Q5.3: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has your best interests
in mind?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
1 (20%)
2 (40%)

Extremely Likely

2 (40%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
1 (8.3%)
5 (41.6%)
6 (50%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
3 (3.4%)
15 (17%)
10
43 (48.8%)
(58.8%)
7 (41.1%) 27 (30.6%)

Table 56: CNR 5 (Q5.3)

Q5.4: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) understands your
situation?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely

Experts
(N = 5)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)

Extremely Likely

3 (60%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
1 (8.3%)
5 (41.6%)
6 (50%)

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
3 (3.4%)
2 (11.7%) 5 (5.6%)
3 (17.6%) 17 (19.3%)
11
44 (50%)
(64.7%)
1 (5.8%)
19 (21.5%)

Table 57: CNR 5 (Q5.4)

Q5.5: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will provide
misleading information intentionally?

Extremely Unlikely

Experts
(N = 5)
4 (80%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public
(N = 12)
11 (91.6%)

Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

1 (20%)
-

1 (8.3%)
-

Survey Participants
Experts
Members of the Public
(N = 17)
(N = 88)
10
42 (47.7%)
(58.8%)
7 (41.1%) 38 (43.1%)
6 (6.8%)
2 (2.2%)
-

Table 58: CNR 5 (Q5.5)

Q5.6: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will make efforts to
correct any false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes to his/her notice?

Experts

Interviewees
Members of the Public

Experts

Survey Participants
Members of the Public
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Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

(N = 5)
2 (40%)
3 (60%)

(N = 12)
1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)
9 (75%)

(N = 17)
1 (5.8%)
4 (23.5%)
5 (29.4%)
7 (41.1%)

(N = 88)
2 (2.2%)
4 (4.5%)
14 (15.9%)
35 (39.7%)
33 (37.5%)

Table 59: CNR 5 (Q5.6)

CNR 6
This CNR was only shown to interviewees.
Q6.1: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has prior experience
in crisis response?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
2 (40%)
3 (60%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
3 (25%)
1 (8.3%)
5 (41.6%)
3 (25%)

Table 60: CNR 6 (Q6.1)

Q6.2: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) is capable of helping
you respond to hurricane Irma?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
2 (40%)
3 (60%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)
7 (58.3%)
2 (16.6%)

Table 61: CNR 6 (Q6.2)

Q6.3: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has your best interests
in mind?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
2 (40%)
1 (20%)
2 (40%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
5 (41.6%)
7 (58.3%)

Table 62: CNR 6 (Q6.3)

Q6.4: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) understands your
situation?
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Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
2 (40%)
1 (20%)
2 (40%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)
3 (25%)
7 (58.3%)

Table 63: CNR 6 (Q6.4)

Q6.5: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will provide
misleading information intentionally?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
3 (60%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
9 (75%)
1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)
-

Table 64: CNR 6 (Q6.5)

Q6.6: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will make efforts to
correct any false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes to his/her notice?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
2 (40%)
1 (20%)
2 (40%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)
3 (25%)
5 (41.6%)

Table 65: CNR 6 (Q6.6)

CNR 7
This CNR was only shown to interviewees.
Q7.1: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has prior experience
in crisis response?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
1 (20%)
2 (40%)
2 (40%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
1 (8.3%)
4 (33.3%)
7 (58.3%)

Table 66: CNR 7 (Q7.1)

Q7.2: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) is capable of helping
you respond to hurricane Irma?
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Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
1 (20%)
2 (40%)
2 (40%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
1 (8.3%)
4 (33.3%)
7 (58.3%)

Table 67: CNR 7 (Q7.2)

Q7.3: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has your best interests
in mind?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
1 (20%)
4 (80%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
3 (25%)
9 (75%)

Table 68: CNR 7 (Q7.3)

Q7.4: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) understands your
situation?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
1 (20%)
4 (80%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
3 (25%)
9 (75%)

Table 69: CNR 7 (Q7.4)

Q7.5: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will provide
misleading information intentionally?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
4 (80%)
1 (20%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
12 (100%)
-

Table 70: CNR 7 (Q7.5)

Q7.6: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will make efforts to
correct any false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes to his/her notice?

Experts (N = 5)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
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Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

1 (20%)
3 (60%)
1 (20%)

1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
9 (75%)
Table 71: CNR 7 (Q7.6)

CNR 8
This CNR was only shown to interviewees.
Q8.1: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has prior experience
in crisis response?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
3 (60%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
7 (58.3%)
1 (8.3%)
3 (25%)
1 (8.3%)

Table 72: CNR 8 (Q8.1)

Q8.2: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) is capable of helping
you respond to hurricane Irma?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
1 (20%)
3 (60%)
1 (20%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
3 (25%)
1 (8.3%)
6 (50%)
2 (16.6%)

Table 73: CNR 8 (Q8.2)

Q8.3: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has your best interests
in mind?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
3 (60%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
2 (16.6%)
6 (50%)
4 (33.3%)

Table 74: CNR 8 (Q8.3)

Q8.4: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) understands your
situation?
Interviewees
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Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
2 (40%)

Members of the Public (N = 12)
1 (8.3%)
7 (58.3%)
4 (33.3%)

Table 75: CNR 8 (Q8.4)

Q8.5: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will provide
misleading information intentionally?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
2 (40%)
3 (60%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
9 (75%)
2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)

Table 76: CNR 8 (Q8.5)

Q8.6: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will make efforts to
correct any false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes to his/her notice?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
2 (40%)
1 (20%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
3 (25%)
1 (8.3%)
4 (33.3%)
4 (33.3%)

Table 77: CNR 8 (Q8.6)

CNR 9
This CNR was only shown to interviewees.
Q9.1: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has prior experience
in crisis response?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
1 (20%)
4 (80%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
3 (25%)
2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
4 (33.3%)

Table 78: CNR 9 (Q9.1)

Q9.2: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) is capable of helping
you respond to hurricane Irma?
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Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
2 (40%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
2 (16.6%)
4 (33.3%)
2 (16.6%)
2 (16.6%)
2 (16.6%)

Table 79: CNR 9 (Q9.2)

Q9.3: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has your best interests
in mind?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
3 (60%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
4 (33.3%)
3 (25%)
1 (8.3%)
3 (25%)
1 (8.3%)

Table 80: CNR 9 (Q9.3)

Q9.4: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) understands your
situation?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
2 (40%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
2 (16.6%)
3 (25%)
1 (8.3%)
4 (33.3%)
2 (16.6%)

Table 81: CNR 9 (Q9.4)

Q9.5: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will provide
misleading information intentionally?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
3 (60%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
8 (66.6%)
4 (33.3%)
-

Table 82: CNR 9 (Q9.5)

Q9.6: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will make efforts to
correct any false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes to his/her notice?

Extremely Unlikely

Experts (N = 5)
3 (60%)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
5 (41.6%)
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Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

1 (20%)
1 (20%)
-

1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)
3 (25%)
Table 83: CNR 9 (Q9.6)

CNR 10
This CNR was only shown to interviewees.
Q10.1: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has prior experience
in crisis response?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
5 (100%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
8 (66.6%)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)
-

Table 84: CNR 10 (Q10.1)

Q10.2: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) is capable of helping
you respond to hurricane Irma?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
5 (100%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
11 (91.6%)
1 (8.3%)
-

Table 85: CNR 10 (Q10.2)

Q10.3: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) has your best
interests in mind?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
5 (100%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
7 (58.3%)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)

Table 86: CNR 10 (Q10.3)

Q10.4: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) understands your
situation?

Experts (N = 5)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
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Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

5 (100%)
-

9 (75%)
1 (8.3%)
2 (16.6%)
-

Table 87: CNR 10 (Q10.4)

Q10.5: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will provide
misleading information intentionally?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
2 (40%)
3 (605)

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
4 (33.3%)
6 (50%)
1 (8.3%)
1 (8.3%)

Table 88: CNR 10 (Q10.5)

Q10.6: Do you feel that the owner of this Twitter account (or Facebook page) will make efforts to
correct any false rumor or misinformation as soon as it comes to his/her notice?

Extremely Unlikely
Somewhat Unlikely
Neither Unlikely nor Likely
Somewhat Likely
Extremely Likely

Experts (N = 5)
2 (40%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
1 (20%)
-

Interviewees
Members of the Public (N = 12)
6 (50%)
1 (8.3%)
4 (33.3%)
1 (8.3%)
-

Table 89: CNR 10 (Q10.6)
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Appendix F: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
Affinity Diagram (Survey Responses)
To determine the factors that influence the trustworthiness of CNRs profiles, I first wrote
each open-ended survey response on a sticky note. To distinguish responses visually, I used
pink, blue, and yellow-colored sticky notes to write ‘I do not trust,’ ‘I might trust,’ and ‘I
trust’ responses respectively. I also used blue, red, gold, and green-colored star-shaped
stickers to visually identify my research participants as male, female, expert, and members
of the public respectively. I then organized all these sticky notes on a large sheet of sticky
note. This helped me determine some common themes that appeared across a number of
survey responses. This exercise was also helpful in determining some of the signs that
made a CNR look trustworthy (or not trustworthy) and in developing code book.
Preliminary findings from Affinity Diagram1. Resources that appeared trustworthy were the ones thata. provided crisis-related information,
b. provided timely crisis-related updates all throughout the hurricane,
c. included multimedia (pictures, videos, or maps) to report the status of the
hurricane,
d. had clear description of their owners and/or administrators and their
intentions,
e. had large following and good reviews,
f. had professional tone and graphics,
g. seemed to have a benign interest, and
h. were linked to authoritative and/or familiar resources.
2. Resources that appeared not-so-trustworthy were the ones thata. provided irrelevant information,
b. provided little to no information about the hurricane,
c. did not provide a list of actionable items,
d. aimed to solicit money,
e. were open to public and were not much moderated,
f. had limited to no disclosure of their administrators and their intentions,
g. lacked professionalism in their tone or profile organization,
h. seemed insensitive to the situation, and
i. were not linked to authoritative resources.
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Figure 28: Affinity Diagram.

Dedoose Coding
After developing my codebook, I uploaded all the open-ended survey responses and
interview transcriptions on Dedoose. Next, I coded all the documents using my codebook.
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Figure 29: SID 59’s Survey Response Codes.

Figure 30: IID 13’s Interview Codes.
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Appendix G: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (using MS Excel)
Perceptions of CNRs by Gender

Figure 31: Perceptions of CNRs by Gender.

Perceptions of CNRs by Age

Figure 32: Perceptions of CNRs by Age.
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Perceptions of CNRs by Education

Figure 33: Perceptions of CNRs by Education Level Completed.

Perceptions of CNRs by Expertise

Figure 34: Perceptions of CNRs by Expertise.

Perceptions of CNRs by Comfort Level Using Facebook
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Figure 35: Perceptions of CNRs by Comfort Levels when using Facebook.

Perceptions of CNRs by Comfort Level Using Twitter

Figure 36: Perceptions of CNRs by Comfort Level using Twitter.
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Appendix H: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (using R)
Including the required libraries
library(janitor)
library(tidyverse)
library(dplyr)
library(furniture)
library(plyr)
library(corrplot)

Reading in the data
I read my data (a csv file) using read.csv.
setwd("C:/Users/apch0/Desktop/R")
myData <- read.csv("TrustSurveyData.csv")

Cleaning (and formatting) the data
1. I copy my data, so that no changes are made to the original data.
2. I clean all the variable names and remove all the empty rows and columns.
3. I remove all the unnecessary columns.
4. I delete the first two rows as it has redundant informaton as headers.
myDataCopy <- myData %>%
janitor::clean_names() %>%
janitor::remove_empty("rows") %>%
janitor::remove_empty("cols") %>%
dplyr::select(-start_date, -end_date, -status, -ip_address, -duration_in_seconds, -fi
nished, -recorded_date, -response_id, -recipient_last_name, -recipient_first_name, -rec
ipient_email, -external_reference, -location_latitude, -location_longitude, -distributi
on_channel, -user_language, -q1_1_id, -q1_1_name, -q1_1_size, -q1_1_type, -q3_8_1_text,
-q3_8_2_text, -q3_8_3_text, -q4_8_1_text, -q4_8_2_text, -q4_8_3_text, -q5_8_1_text, -q5
_8_2_text, -q5_8_3_text, -q6_8_1_text, -q6_8_2_text, -q6_8_3_text, -q7_8_1_text, -q7_8_
2_text, -q7_8_3_text, -q9_1, -q5_8_3_text_topics) %>%
filter(row_number() != 1 & row_number() != 2)

5.

I provide meaningful names to some of the columns.

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::rename("prior_exp_1" = "q3_2",
"capable_to_help_1" = "q3_3",
"best_interests_1" = "q3_4",
"understands_situation_1" = "q3_5",
"provide_misinfo_1" = "q3_6",
"correct_misinfo_1" = "q3_7",
"trust_1" = "q3_8",
"prior_exp_2" = "q4_2",
"capable_to_help_2" = "q4_3",
"best_interests_2" = "q4_4",
"understands_situation_2" = "q4_5",
"provide_misinfo_2" = "q4_6",
"correct_misinfo_2" = "q4_7",
"trust_2" = "q4_8",
"prior_exp_3" = "q5_2",
"capable_to_help_3" = "q5_3",
"best_interests_3" = "q5_4",
"understands_situation_3" = "q5_5",
"provide_misinfo_3" = "q5_6",
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"correct_misinfo_3" = "q5_7",
"trust_3" = "q5_8",
"prior_exp_4" = "q6_2",
"capable_to_help_4" = "q6_3",
"best_interests_4" = "q6_4",
"understands_situation_4" = "q6_5",
"provide_misinfo_4" = "q6_6",
"correct_misinfo_4" = "q6_7",
"trust_4" = "q6_8",
"prior_exp_5" = "q7_2",
"capable_to_help_5" = "q7_3",
"best_interests_5" = "q7_4",
"understands_situation_5" = "q7_5",
"provide_misinfo_5" = "q7_6",
"correct_misinfo_5" = "q7_7",
"trust_5" = "q7_8",
"gender" = "q8_1",
"age" = "q8_2",
"educ" = "q8_3",
"expert" = "q8_4",
"comf_Facebook" = "q8_5",
"comf_Twitter" = "q8_6")

6.

I delete all the rows with missing values.

myDataCopy <- na.omit(myDataCopy)

7.

I create new variables that hold numeric values instead of text. This will be useful in
perfoming statistics.

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(priorExpBin1 = dplyr::case_when(prior_exp_1
,
prior_exp_1
prior_exp_1
kely" ~ 3,
prior_exp_1
prior_exp_1

== "Extremely unlikely" ~ 1
== "Somewhat unlikely" ~ 2,
== "Neither likely nor unli
== "Somewhat likely" ~ 4,
== "Extremely likely" ~ 5))

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(capableToHelpBin1 = dplyr::case_when(capable_to_help_1 == "Extremely un
likely" ~ 1,
capable_to_help_1 == "Somewhat unlikely
" ~ 2,
capable_to_help_1 == "Neither likely no
r unlikely" ~ 3,
capable_to_help_1 == "Somewhat likely"
~ 4,
capable_to_help_1 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(bestInterestsBin1 = dplyr::case_when(best_interests_1 == "Extremely unl
ikely" ~ 1,
best_interests_1 == "Somewhat unlikely"
~ 2,
best_interests_1 == "Neither likely nor
unlikely" ~ 3,
best_interests_1 == "Somewhat likely" ~
4,
best_interests_1 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
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myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(understandsSituationBin1 = dplyr::case_when(understands_situation_1 ==
"Extremely unlikely" ~ 1,
understands_situation_1 == "Somewhat un
likely" ~ 2,
understands_situation_1 == "Neither lik
ely nor unlikely" ~ 3,
understands_situation_1 == "Somewhat li
kely" ~ 4,
understands_situation_1 == "Extremely l
ikely" ~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(provMisInfoBin1 = dplyr::case_when(provide_misinfo_1
kely" ~ 1,
provide_misinfo_1 ==
" ~ 2,
provide_misinfo_1 ==
r unlikely" ~ 3,
provide_misinfo_1 ==
~ 4,
provide_misinfo_1 ==
~ 5))

== "Extremely unli
"Somewhat unlikely
"Neither likely no
"Somewhat likely"
"Extremely likely"

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(CorrectMisInfoBin1 = dplyr::case_when(correct_misinfo_1 == "Extremely u
nlikely" ~ 1,
correct_misinfo_1 == "Somewhat unlikely"
~ 2,
correct_misinfo_1 == "Neither likely no
r unlikely" ~ 3,
correct_misinfo_1 == "Somewhat likely" ~
4,
correct_misinfo_1 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(trustBin1 = dplyr::case_when(trust_1 == "No, because" ~ 1,
trust_1 == "Maybe, because" ~ 2,
trust_1 == "Yes, because" ~ 3))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(priorExpBin2 = dplyr::case_when(prior_exp_2
,
prior_exp_2
prior_exp_2
kely" ~ 3,
prior_exp_2
prior_exp_2

== "Extremely unlikely" ~ 1
== "Somewhat unlikely" ~ 2,
== "Neither likely nor unli
== "Somewhat likely" ~ 4,
== "Extremely likely" ~ 5))

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(capableToHelpBin2 = dplyr::case_when(capable_to_help_2 == "Extremely un
likely" ~ 1,
capable_to_help_2 == "Somewhat unlikely
" ~ 2,
capable_to_help_2 == "Neither likely no
r unlikely" ~ 3,
capable_to_help_2 == "Somewhat likely"
~ 4,
capable_to_help_2 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
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myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(bestInterestsBin2 = dplyr::case_when(best_interests_2 == "Extremely unl
ikely" ~ 1,
best_interests_2 == "Somewhat unlikely"
~ 2,
best_interests_2 == "Neither likely nor
unlikely" ~ 3,
best_interests_2 == "Somewhat likely" ~
4,
best_interests_2 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(understandsSituationBin2 = dplyr::case_when(understands_situation_2 ==
"Extremely unlikely" ~ 1,
understands_situation_2 == "Somewhat un
likely" ~ 2,
understands_situation_2 == "Neither lik
ely nor unlikely" ~ 3,
understands_situation_2 == "Somewhat li
kely" ~ 4,
understands_situation_2 == "Extremely l
ikely" ~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(provMisInfoBin2 = dplyr::case_when(provide_misinfo_2
kely" ~ 1,
provide_misinfo_2 ==
" ~ 2,
provide_misinfo_2 ==
r unlikely" ~ 3,
provide_misinfo_2 ==
~ 4,
provide_misinfo_2 ==
~ 5))

== "Extremely unli
"Somewhat unlikely
"Neither likely no
"Somewhat likely"
"Extremely likely"

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(CorrectMisInfoBin2 = dplyr::case_when(correct_misinfo_2 == "Extremely u
nlikely" ~ 1,
correct_misinfo_2 == "Somewhat unlikely"
~ 2,
correct_misinfo_2 == "Neither likely no
r unlikely" ~ 3,
correct_misinfo_2 == "Somewhat likely" ~
4,
correct_misinfo_2 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(trustBin2 = dplyr::case_when(trust_2 == "No, because" ~ 1,
trust_2 == "Maybe, because" ~ 2,
trust_2 == "Yes, because" ~ 3))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(priorExpBin3 = dplyr::case_when(prior_exp_3
,
prior_exp_3
prior_exp_3
kely" ~ 3,
prior_exp_3
prior_exp_3

== "Extremely unlikely" ~ 1
== "Somewhat unlikely" ~ 2,
== "Neither likely nor unli
== "Somewhat likely" ~ 4,
== "Extremely likely" ~ 5))
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myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(capableToHelpBin3 = dplyr::case_when(capable_to_help_3 == "Extremely un
likely" ~ 1,
capable_to_help_3 == "Somewhat unlikely
" ~ 2,
capable_to_help_3 == "Neither likely no
r unlikely" ~ 3,
capable_to_help_3 == "Somewhat likely"
~ 4,
capable_to_help_3 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(bestInterestsBin3 = dplyr::case_when(best_interests_3 == "Extremely unl
ikely" ~ 1,
best_interests_3 == "Somewhat unlikely"
~ 2,
best_interests_3 == "Neither likely nor
unlikely" ~ 3,
best_interests_3 == "Somewhat likely" ~
4,
best_interests_3 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(understandsSituationBin3 = dplyr::case_when(understands_situation_3 ==
"Extremely unlikely" ~ 1,
understands_situation_3 == "Somewhat un
likely" ~ 2,
understands_situation_3 == "Neither lik
ely nor unlikely" ~ 3,
understands_situation_3 == "Somewhat li
kely" ~ 4,
understands_situation_3 == "Extremely l
ikely" ~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(provMisInfoBin3 = dplyr::case_when(provide_misinfo_3
kely" ~ 1,
provide_misinfo_3 ==
" ~ 2,
provide_misinfo_3 ==
r unlikely" ~ 3,
provide_misinfo_3 ==
~ 4,
provide_misinfo_3 ==
~ 5))

== "Extremely unli
"Somewhat unlikely
"Neither likely no
"Somewhat likely"
"Extremely likely"

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(CorrectMisInfoBin3 = dplyr::case_when(correct_misinfo_3 == "Extremely u
nlikely" ~ 1,
correct_misinfo_3 == "Somewhat unlikely"
~ 2,
correct_misinfo_3 == "Neither likely no
r unlikely" ~ 3,
correct_misinfo_3 == "Somewhat likely" ~
4,
correct_misinfo_3 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
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myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(trustBin3 = dplyr::case_when(trust_3 == "No, because" ~ 1,
trust_3 == "Maybe, because" ~ 2,
trust_3 == "Yes, because" ~ 3))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(priorExpBin4 = dplyr::case_when(prior_exp_4
,
prior_exp_4
prior_exp_4
kely" ~ 3,
prior_exp_4
prior_exp_4

== "Extremely unlikely" ~ 1
== "Somewhat unlikely" ~ 2,
== "Neither likely nor unli
== "Somewhat likely" ~ 4,
== "Extremely likely" ~ 5))

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(capableToHelpBin4 = dplyr::case_when(capable_to_help_4 == "Extremely un
likely" ~ 1,
capable_to_help_4 == "Somewhat unlikely
" ~ 2,
capable_to_help_4 == "Neither likely no
r unlikely" ~ 3,
capable_to_help_4 == "Somewhat likely"
~ 4,
capable_to_help_4 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(bestInterestsBin4 = dplyr::case_when(best_interests_4 == "Extremely unl
ikely" ~ 1,
best_interests_4 == "Somewhat unlikely"
~ 2,
best_interests_4 == "Neither likely nor
unlikely" ~ 3,
best_interests_4 == "Somewhat likely" ~
4,
best_interests_4 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(understandsSituationBin4 = dplyr::case_when(understands_situation_4 ==
"Extremely unlikely" ~ 1,
understands_situation_4 == "Somewhat un
likely" ~ 2,
understands_situation_4 == "Neither lik
ely nor unlikely" ~ 3,
understands_situation_4 == "Somewhat li
kely" ~ 4,
understands_situation_4 == "Extremely l
ikely" ~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(provMisInfoBin4 = dplyr::case_when(provide_misinfo_4
kely" ~ 1,
provide_misinfo_4 ==
" ~ 2,
provide_misinfo_4 ==
r unlikely" ~ 3,
provide_misinfo_4 ==
~ 4,
provide_misinfo_4 ==
~ 5))

== "Extremely unli
"Somewhat unlikely
"Neither likely no
"Somewhat likely"
"Extremely likely"
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myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(CorrectMisInfoBin4 = dplyr::case_when(correct_misinfo_4 == "Extremely u
nlikely" ~ 1,
correct_misinfo_4 == "Somewhat unlikely"
~ 2,
correct_misinfo_4 == "Neither likely no
r unlikely" ~ 3,
correct_misinfo_4 == "Somewhat likely" ~
4,
correct_misinfo_4 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(trustBin4 = dplyr::case_when(trust_4 == "No, because" ~ 1,
trust_4 == "Maybe, because" ~ 2,
trust_4 == "Yes, because" ~ 3))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(priorExpBin5 = dplyr::case_when(prior_exp_5
,
prior_exp_5
prior_exp_5
kely" ~ 3,
prior_exp_5
prior_exp_5

== "Extremely unlikely" ~ 1
== "Somewhat unlikely" ~ 2,
== "Neither likely nor unli
== "Somewhat likely" ~ 4,
== "Extremely likely" ~ 5))

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(capableToHelpBin5 = dplyr::case_when(capable_to_help_5 == "Extremely un
likely" ~ 1,
capable_to_help_5 == "Somewhat unlikely
" ~ 2,
capable_to_help_5 == "Neither likely no
r unlikely" ~ 3,
capable_to_help_5 == "Somewhat likely"
~ 4,
capable_to_help_5 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(bestInterestsBin5 = dplyr::case_when(best_interests_5 == "Extremely unl
ikely" ~ 1,
best_interests_5 == "Somewhat unlikely"
~ 2,
best_interests_5 == "Neither likely nor
unlikely" ~ 3,
best_interests_5 == "Somewhat likely" ~
4,
best_interests_5 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(understandsSituationBin5 = dplyr::case_when(understands_situation_5 ==
"Extremely unlikely" ~ 1,
understands_situation_5 == "Somewhat un
likely" ~ 2,
understands_situation_5 == "Neither lik
ely nor unlikely" ~ 3,
understands_situation_5 == "Somewhat li
kely" ~ 4,
understands_situation_5 == "Extremely l
ikely" ~ 5))
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myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(provMisInfoBin5 = dplyr::case_when(provide_misinfo_5
kely" ~ 1,
provide_misinfo_5 ==
" ~ 2,
provide_misinfo_5 ==
r unlikely" ~ 3,
provide_misinfo_5 ==
~ 4,
provide_misinfo_5 ==
~ 5))

== "Extremely unli
"Somewhat unlikely
"Neither likely no
"Somewhat likely"
"Extremely likely"

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(CorrectMisInfoBin5 = dplyr::case_when(correct_misinfo_5 == "Extremely u
nlikely" ~ 1,
correct_misinfo_5 == "Somewhat unlikely"
~ 2,
correct_misinfo_5 == "Neither likely no
r unlikely" ~ 3,
correct_misinfo_5 == "Somewhat likely" ~
4,
correct_misinfo_5 == "Extremely likely"
~ 5))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(trustBin5 = dplyr::case_when(trust_5 == "No, because" ~ 1,
trust_5 == "Maybe, because" ~ 2,
trust_5 == "Yes, because" ~ 3))

8.

I add an extra column with row ID.

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
mutate(id = row_number(progress))

Knowing my research participants
1. GENDER
Table below shows that this dataset consists of 52 females (49.5%) and 53 males
(50.4%).
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
mutate(gender = case_when(gender == "Female" ~ "Female",
gender == "Male" ~ "Male")) %>%
filter(complete.cases(gender)) %>%
mutate(gender = forcats::fct_drop(factor(gender)))
furniture::tableF(myDataCopy, gender)
##
## ------------------------------------## gender Freq CumFreq Percent CumPerc
## Female 52
52
49.52% 49.52%
## Male
53
105
50.48% 100.00%
## -------------------------------------

2. AGE
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Table below shows that majority of the participants in this dataset belong either to the
18-24 (30.4%) or 25-34 (29.5%) age group.
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
mutate(age = case_when(age == "18 - 24" ~ "18 - 24",
age == "25 - 34" ~ "25 - 34",
age == "35 - 44" ~ "35 - 44",
age == "45 - 54" ~ "45 - 54",
age == "55 - 64" ~ "55 - 64",
age == "65 - 74" ~ "65 - 74")) %>%
filter(complete.cases(age)) %>%
mutate(age = forcats::fct_drop(factor(age)))
furniture::tableF(myDataCopy, age)
##
## -------------------------------------## age
Freq CumFreq Percent CumPerc
## 18 - 24 32
32
30.48% 30.48%
## 25 - 34 31
63
29.52% 60.00%
## 35 - 44 16
79
15.24% 75.24%
## 45 - 54 11
90
10.48% 85.71%
## 55 - 64 13
103
12.38% 98.10%
## 65 - 74 2
105
1.90%
100.00%
## --------------------------------------

3. EDUCATION COMPLETED
Table below shows that majority of the participants in this dataset had either a 4-year
(36.1%) or Master’s (22.8%) degree.
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
mutate(educ = case_when(educ == "High school graduate" ~ "High School Graduate",
educ == "Some college" ~ "Some College",
educ == "2 year degree" ~ "2-year Degree",
educ == "4 year degree" ~ "4-year Degree",
educ == "Master's degree" ~ "Master's Degree",
educ == "Doctorate" ~ "Doctorate")) %>%
filter(complete.cases(educ)) %>%
mutate(educ = forcats::fct_drop(factor(educ)))
furniture::tableF(myDataCopy, educ)
##
## --------------------------------------------------## educ
Freq CumFreq Percent CumPerc
## 2-year Degree
7
7
6.67%
6.67%
## 4-year Degree
38
45
36.19% 42.86%
## Doctorate
13
58
12.38% 55.24%
## High School Graduate 4
62
3.81%
59.05%
## Master's Degree
24
86
22.86% 81.90%
## Some College
19
105
18.10% 100.00%
## ---------------------------------------------------

4. EXPERT
Table below shows that majority of the participants in this dataset were members of the
public (83.8%).
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myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
mutate(expert = case_when(expert == "No" ~ "No",
expert == "Yes" ~ "Yes")) %>%
filter(complete.cases(expert)) %>%
mutate(expert = forcats::fct_drop(factor(expert)))
furniture::tableF(myDataCopy, expert)
##
## ------------------------------------## expert Freq CumFreq Percent CumPerc
## No
88
88
83.81% 83.81%
## Yes
17
105
16.19% 100.00%
## -------------------------------------

5. COMFORT LEVEL WITH FACEBOOK
Table below shows that almost half of the participants (49.5%) in this dataset were
extremely comfortable using Facebook.
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
mutate(comf_Facebook = case_when(comf_Facebook == "Extremely uncomfortable" ~ "Extrem
ely uncomfortable",
comf_Facebook == "Somewhat uncomfortable" ~ "Somewhat uncomfortable",
comf_Facebook == "Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable" ~ "Neither comfortable nor un
comfortable",
comf_Facebook == "Somewhat comfortable" ~ "Somewhat comfortable",
comf_Facebook == "Extremely comfortable" ~ "Extremely comfortable")) %>%
filter(complete.cases(comf_Facebook)) %>%
mutate(comf_Facebook = forcats::fct_drop(factor(comf_Facebook)))
furniture::tableF(myDataCopy, comf_Facebook)
##
## -------------------------------------------------------------------## comf_Facebook
Freq CumFreq Percent CumPerc
## Extremely comfortable
52
52
49.52% 49.52%
## Extremely uncomfortable
7
59
6.67%
56.19%
## Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 9
68
8.57%
64.76%
## Somewhat comfortable
29
97
27.62% 92.38%
## Somewhat uncomfortable
8
105
7.62%
100.00%
## --------------------------------------------------------------------

6. COMFORT LEVEL WITH TWITTER
Table below shows that there is an even distribution across the comfort level when
using Twitter.
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
mutate(comf_Twitter = case_when(comf_Twitter == "Extremely uncomfortable" ~ "Extremel
y uncomfortable",
comf_Twitter == "Somewhat uncomfortable" ~ "Somewhat uncomfortable",
comf_Twitter == "Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable" ~ "Neither comfortable nor unc
omfortable",
comf_Twitter == "Somewhat comfortable" ~ "Somewhat comfortable",
comf_Twitter == "Extremely comfortable" ~ "Extremely comfortable")) %>%
filter(complete.cases(comf_Twitter)) %>%
mutate(comf_Twitter = forcats::fct_drop(factor(comf_Twitter)))
furniture::tableF(myDataCopy, comf_Twitter)
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##
## -------------------------------------------------------------------## comf_Twitter
Freq CumFreq Percent CumPerc
## Extremely comfortable
22
22
20.95% 20.95%
## Extremely uncomfortable
15
37
14.29% 35.24%
## Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable 22
59
20.95% 56.19%
## Somewhat comfortable
24
83
22.86% 79.05%
## Somewhat uncomfortable
22
105
20.95% 100.00%
## --------------------------------------------------------------------

Perceptions of trustworthiness of CNRs
1. Crisis Named Resource 1 (CNR 1)
Most participants (87.6%) do not trust CNR 1.
furniture::tableF(myDataCopy, trustBin1)
##
## ---------------------------------------## trustBin1 Freq CumFreq Percent CumPerc
## 1
92
92
87.62% 87.62%
## 2
10
102
9.52%
97.14%
## 3
3
105
2.86%
100.00%
## ----------------------------------------

2. Crisis Named Resource 1 (CNR 2)
Most participants either trust (40%) or somewhat trust (50.4%) CNR 2.
furniture::tableF(myDataCopy, trustBin2)
##
## ---------------------------------------## trustBin2 Freq CumFreq Percent CumPerc
## 1
10
10
9.52%
9.52%
## 2
53
63
50.48% 60.00%
## 3
42
105
40.00% 100.00%
## ----------------------------------------

3. Crisis Named Resource 3 (CNR 3)
More than half of the partcipants (53.3%) do not trust CNR 3.
furniture::tableF(myDataCopy, trustBin3)
##
## ---------------------------------------## trustBin3 Freq CumFreq Percent CumPerc
## 1
56
56
53.33% 53.33%
## 2
37
93
35.24% 88.57%
## 3
12
105
11.43% 100.00%
## ----------------------------------------

4. Crisis Named Resource 4 (CNR 4)
Most participants (91.4%) do not trust CNR 4.
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furniture::tableF(myDataCopy, trustBin4)
##
## ---------------------------------------## trustBin4 Freq CumFreq Percent CumPerc
## 1
96
96
91.43% 91.43%
## 2
7
103
6.67%
98.10%
## 3
2
105
1.90%
100.00%
## ----------------------------------------

5. Crisis Named Resource 5 (CNR 5)
Most participants either trust (52.3%) or somewhat trust (41.9%) CNR 2.
furniture::tableF(myDataCopy, trustBin5)
##
## ---------------------------------------## trustBin5 Freq CumFreq Percent CumPerc
## 1
6
6
5.71%
5.71%
## 2
44
50
41.90% 47.62%
## 3
55
105
52.38% 100.00%
## ----------------------------------------

Demographics and Trustworthiness
To determine any existing correlation between a demographic variable and
trustworthiness of Crisis Named Resources (hereafter CNR), I create new demographic
variables to hold numeric values.
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(AgeBin = dplyr::case_when(age
age
age
age
age
age

==
==
==
==
==
==

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(EducBin = dplyr::case_when(educ
educ
educ
educ
educ
educ

"18
"25
"35
"45
"55
"65
==
==
==
==
==
==

-

24" ~ 1,
34" ~ 2,
44" ~ 3,
54" ~ 4,
64" ~ 5,
74"~ 6))

"High School Graduate" ~1,
"Some College" ~ 2,
"2-year Degree" ~ 3,
"4-year Degree" ~ 4,
"Master's Degree" ~ 5,
"Doctorate" ~ 6))

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(ExpertBin = dplyr::case_when(expert == "No" ~ 1,
expert == "Yes" ~ 2))
myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(ComfFacebookBin = dplyr::case_when(comf_Facebook
table" ~1,
comf_Facebook
able" ~ 2,
comf_Facebook
e nor uncomfortable" ~ 3,
comf_Facebook
le" ~ 4,

== "Extremely uncomfor
== "Somewhat uncomfort
== "Neither comfortabl
== "Somewhat comfortab
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table" ~5))

comf_Facebook == "Extremely uncomfor

myDataCopy <- myDataCopy %>%
dplyr::mutate(ComfTwitterBin = dplyr::case_when(comf_Twitter
ble" ~1,
comf_Twitter
le" ~2,
comf_Twitter
nor uncomfortable" ~ 3,
comf_Twitter
" ~ 4,
comf_Twitter
ble" ~5))

== "Extremely uncomforta
== "Somewhat uncomfortab
== "Neither comfortable
== "Somewhat comfortable
== "Extremely uncomforta

1. Correlation between participants’ age and their perceptions of trustworthiness of
different Crisis Named Resources
There seems to be a weak correlation between participant’s age and his/her
perceptions on the trustworthiness of CNRs.
myDataCopy %>%
select(AgeBin, trustBin1, trustBin2, trustBin3,trustBin4, trustBin5) %>%
set_names(c("Age", "Trust \nCNR 1", "Trust \nCNR 2", "Trust \nCNR 3", "Trust \nCNR 4"
, "Trust \nCNR 5")) %>%
cor(use = "pairwise.complete.obs", method="spearman") %>%
corrplot(type="upper", diag=FALSE, sig.level = 0.05, addCoef.col = "black")

2. Correlation between participants’ education and their perceptions of trustworthiness of
different Crisis Named Resources
There seems to be a weak correlation between participant’s educational background
and his/her perceptions on the trustworthiness of CNRs.
myDataCopy %>%
select(EducBin, trustBin1, trustBin2, trustBin3,trustBin4, trustBin5) %>%
set_names(c("Education \nCompleted", "Trust \nCNR 1", "Trust \nCNR 2", "Trust \nCNR 3
", "Trust \nCNR 4", "Trust \nCNR 5")) %>%
cor(use = "pairwise.complete.obs", method="spearman") %>%
corrplot(type="upper", diag=FALSE, sig.level = 0.05, addCoef.col = "black")

3. Correlation between participants’ expertise and their perceptions of trustworthiness of
different Crisis Named Resources
There seems to be a weak correlation between participant’s expertise and his/her
perceptions on the trustworthiness of CNRs.
myDataCopy %>%
select(ExpertBin, trustBin1, trustBin2, trustBin3,trustBin4, trustBin5) %>%
set_names(c("Expertise", "Trust \nCNR 1", "Trust \nCNR 2", "Trust \nCNR 3", "Trust \n
CNR 4", "Trust \nCNR 5")) %>%
cor(use = "pairwise.complete.obs", method="spearman") %>%
corrplot(type="upper", diag=FALSE, sig.level = 0.05, addCoef.col = "black")

4. Correlation between participants’ comfort level with Facebook and their perceptions of
trustworthiness of different Crisis Named Resources
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There seems to be a weak correlation between participant’s comfort level with
Facebook and his/her perceptions on the trustworthiness of CNRs on Facebook.
myDataCopy %>%
select(ComfFacebookBin, trustBin2, trustBin3, trustBin4) %>%
set_names(c("Comfort Level \nwhen using Facebook", "Trust \nCNR 2", "Trust \nCNR 3",
"Trust \nCNR 4")) %>%
cor(use = "pairwise.complete.obs", method="spearman") %>%
corrplot(type="upper", diag=FALSE, sig.level = 0.05, addCoef.col = "black")

5. Correlation between participants’ comfort level with Facebook and their perceptions of
trustworthiness of different Crisis Named Resources
There seems to be a weak correlation between participant’s comfort level with Twitter
and his/her perceptions on the trustworthiness of CNRs on Twitter.
myDataCopy %>%
select(ComfTwitterBin, trustBin1, trustBin5) %>%
set_names(c("Comfort Level \nwhen using Twitter", "Trust \nCNR 1", "Trust \nCNR 5"))
%>%
cor(use = "pairwise.complete.obs", method="spearman") %>%
corrplot(type="upper", diag=FALSE, sig.level = 0.05, addCoef.col = "black")

Factors that influence the trustworthiness of Crisis Named Resources
1. Correlation across the trustworthiness of different Crisis Named Resources
It appears that participants who trust CNR 1 also tend to trust CNR 4. Similarly,
participants who trust CNR 2 also tend to trust CNR 5. Additionally, participants who
trust CNR 4 do not tend to trust CNR 5.
myDataCopy %>%
select(trustBin1, trustBin2, trustBin3,trustBin4, trustBin5) %>%
setNames(c("Trust \nCNR 1", "Trust \nCNR 2", "Trust \nCNR 3", "Trust \nCNR 4", "Trust
\nCNR 5")) %>%
cor(use = "pairwise.complete.obs", method="spearman") %>%
corrplot(type="upper", diag=FALSE, sig.level = 0.05, addCoef.col = "black")

2. Factors that influence the trustworthiness of Crisis Named Resource 1
It appears that when participants think that CNR 1 would provide misinformation
intentionally, they tend not to trust it.
myDataCopy %>%
select(trustBin1, priorExpBin1, capableToHelpBin1, bestInterestsBin1, understandsSitu
ationBin1, provMisInfoBin1, CorrectMisInfoBin1) %>%
setNames(c("Trust \nCNR 1", "has prior \nexperience", "capable \nto help", "has best
\ninterests", "understands \nsituation", "will provide \nmisinformation", "will correct
\nmisinformation")) %>%
cor(use = "pairwise.complete.obs", method="spearman") %>%
corrplot(type="upper", diag=FALSE, sig.level = 0.05, addCoef.col = "black")

3. Factors that influence the trustworthiness of Crisis Named Resource 2
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It appears that when participants think that CNR 2 would provide misinformation
intentionally, they tend not to trust it.
myDataCopy %>%
select(trustBin2, priorExpBin2, capableToHelpBin2, bestInterestsBin2, understandsSitu
ationBin2, provMisInfoBin2, CorrectMisInfoBin2) %>%
setNames(c("Trust \nCNR 2", "has prior \nexperience", "capable \nto help", "has best
\ninterests", "understands \nsituation", "will provide \nmisinformation", "will correct
\nmisinformation")) %>%
cor(use = "pairwise.complete.obs", method="spearman") %>%
corrplot(type="upper", diag=FALSE, sig.level = 0.05, addCoef.col = "black")

4. Factors that influence the trustworthiness of Crisis Named Resource 3
It appears that when participants think that CNR 3 would provide misinformation
intentionally, they tend not to trust it. Also, when partcipants think that CNR 3 is either
capable to help them to respond to crisis or has their best interests in mind, they tend
to trust it.
myDataCopy %>%
select(trustBin3, priorExpBin3, capableToHelpBin3, bestInterestsBin3, understandsSitu
ationBin3, provMisInfoBin3, CorrectMisInfoBin3) %>%
setNames(c("Trust \nCNR 3", "has prior \nexperience", "capable \nto help", "has bes
t \ninterests", "understands \nsituation", "will provide \nmisinformation", "will corre
ct \nmisinformation")) %>%
cor(use = "pairwise.complete.obs", method="spearman") %>%
corrplot(type="upper", diag=FALSE, sig.level = 0.05, addCoef.col = "black")

5. Factors that influence the trustworthiness of Crisis Named Resource 4
It appears that when participants think that CNR 4 would provide misinformation
intentionally, they tend not to trust it.
myDataCopy %>%
select(trustBin4, priorExpBin4, capableToHelpBin4, bestInterestsBin4, understandsSitu
ationBin4, provMisInfoBin4, CorrectMisInfoBin4) %>%
setNames(c("Trust \nCNR 4", "has prior \nexperience", "capable \nto help", "has best
\ninterests", "understands \nsituation", "will provide \nmisinformation", "will correct
\nmisinformation")) %>%
cor(use = "pairwise.complete.obs", method="spearman") %>%
corrplot(type="upper", diag=FALSE, sig.level = 0.05, addCoef.col = "black")

6. Factors that influence the trustworthiness of Crisis Named Resource 5
It appears that when participants think that CNR 5 would provide misinformation
intentionally, they tend not to trust it.
myDataCopy %>%
select(trustBin5, priorExpBin5, capableToHelpBin5, bestInterestsBin5, understandsSitu
ationBin5, provMisInfoBin5, CorrectMisInfoBin5) %>%
setNames(c("Trust \nCNR 5", "has prior \nexperience", "capable \nto help", "has best
\ninterests", "understands \nsituation", "will provide \nmisinformation", "will correct
\nmisinformation")) %>%
cor(use = "pairwise.complete.obs", method="spearman") %>%
corrplot(type="upper", diag=FALSE, sig.level = 0.05, addCoef.col = "black")
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Appendix I: COPYRIGHTS

CHAPTER 2:
Dissertation use for ACM (the publisher for CHI) states the following:
" Authors can include partial or complete papers of their own (and no fee is expected) in a
dissertation as long as citations and DOI pointers to the Versions of Record in the ACM
Digital Library are included. Authors can use any portion of their own work in
presentations and in the classroom (and no fee is expected).”
This was found at the following website: https://authors.acm.org/main.html
CHAPTER 3:
The authors retain the copyright for ISCRAM papers.

ISCRAM2018 COPYRIGHT AGREEMENT
This ISCRAM2018 Proceedings copyright agreement and use license is compliant with
the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 ("by-nc-sa") License:
see Annex below for terms.
This copyright agreement and use license firstly states that the author(s) keep their
copyright and secondly permits any user, for any noncommercial purpose — including
unlimited classroom and distance learning use — to download, print out, extract, archive,
distribute and make derivative works of an article published in the ISCRAM2018
Proceedings, as long as appropriate credit is given to the authors and the source of the work
and all derivative works are placed under the same license. This copyright agreement and
use license ensures, among other things, that an article witl be as widely available as
possible and that the article can be included in any scientific archive.

COPYRIGHT AGREEMENT
BETWEEN

(hereinafter referred to as "the Aut. OF", signing as sole author or on behalf of
all co-authors) and
the Proceedings of the ISCRAM2018 Conference (hereinafter referred to as
"the ISCRAM2018 Proceedings"), represented by Kees Boersma and Brian
Tomaszewski, the Editors, regarding the work entitled
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(Contribution No:
152) (hereinafter referred to as "the Work"), submitted to the ISCRAM2018 Conference
and accepted for publication in the ISCRAM2018 Proceedings.
The Author declares and attests that his or her Work:
1. is distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommerciaI-ShareAIike
4.0 License (see Annex below for terms);
2.

is an unpublished and original work and sole property of the Author, who has
received any permission required for the purposes of the present agreement from the
Work's co-authors and, where applicable, the authors of other works or excerpts
presented in the Work;

3.

violates no other copyright or proprietary right, and contains no libelous,
defamatory or confidential material liable to infringe any law or contractual obligation;
and the Author agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Proceedings from and against
any and all legal fees, damages, or other costs resulting from proceedings related to this
matter;

1
The ISCRAM2018 Proceedings undertake to:

A.

publish, in addition to the paper-based Proceedings of ESCRAM2018, the
electronic version of the Work online at http://wvvw.iscram.org/ and enable open access
to the Work at all times under the conditions set out in the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 license cited above;

B.

carry out or foster all actions aimed at increasing the Work's visibility and
dissemination in all forms and media.

Kees Boersma, for the ISCRAM2018 Proceedings
Date
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ANNEX: The Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike
4.0 License with ISCRAM2018 Proceedings related specifications
You are free:
1 . to Share — to copy, distribute, display, and perform the Work
2 to Remix to make derivative works
Under the following conditions:
Attribution. You must attribute the Work in the manner specified by this
copyright agreement and use license (below).
Noncommercial. You may not use the Work for commercial purposes.
Share Alike. If you alter, transform, or build upon the Work, you may
distribute the resulting work only under a license identical to this one.
For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license
terms of the Work.
Any of these conditions can be waived if you get permission from the
copyright holder - in the case of an ISCRAM2018 Proceedings paper: its
author(s).
The
full
legal
text
for
this
License
https://creativecommons.org/licenseslby-ncsa/4.0/legalcode

can

be

found

at

Attribution manner specification: Name Author(s), "Title of the Article", In: Proceedings
of the 1 5th
International Conference on Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management
ISCRAM2018 (Eds. F.K. Boersma and B. Tomaszewski 2018, pp. X (startpage) — Y
(endpage).
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Resources on Facebook and Twitter: Fort McMurray Wildfire, May 2016. USU
Research Week, April 2017.
Chauhan, Apoorva and Amanda Lee Hughes (2016). Online Dissemination of
Official Information – The 2014 Carlton Complex Wildfires. USU Computer
Science Industry Day, April 2016. USU Research Week, April 2016. USU Science
Unwrapped, April 2016.
Chauhan, Apoorva, Dale Flamm, James Nickerson, Sarbajit Mukherjee, and
Amanda Lee Hughes (2016). Haptic Guidance for Persons with Visual Impairment
during Crisis Evacuations. USU Computer Science Industry Day, April 2016. USU
Science Unwrapped, April 2016.
Chauhan, Apoorva and Amanda Lee Hughes (2015). Online Trust-Building
Recommendations for Emergency Responders. USU Computer Science Industry
Day, March 2015.
Demonstration

161
Chauhan, Apoorva (2018). Electronic textiles using Circuit Playground and
LEDs. USU Native American STEM Mentorship Program, May 2018.
PROFESSIONAL COURSES
IDC 2019
‘Quantitative Methods for Child-Computer Interaction’ by Lisa Anthony
(University of Florida).
CHI 2017
‘Introduction to Human-Computer Interaction’ by Jonathan Lazar (Towson
University, MD, USA) and Simone D. J. Barbos (Pontifical Catholic University of
Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil).
ISCRAM 2015
‘Qualitative Research Methods for Crisis Informatics: Thinking Out Loud, Semistructured Interviews, and Focus Groups’ by Dr. Starr Roxanne Hiltz (New Jersey
Institute of Technology, NJ, USA) and Dr. Andrea Tapia, (Pennsylvania State
University, PA, USA).
SERVICE
Committees
Social Media Chair, ISCRAM 2018 at Rochester, NY, USA.
USU Computer Science Student Representative for the Differential Tuition
Oversight Committee, 2016-2017.
Social Media Chair, ISCRAM 2015 in Kristiansand, Norway.
Academic Reviewer
CSCW: 2018.
iConference: 2018, 2017, 2016, and 2015.
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies: 2015.
ISCRAM: 2018, 2017, 2016, and 2015.
ISCRAM Asia-Pacific: 2018.
USU Extension: 2017.
Student Volunteer at International Conferences
CHI 2017 – Denver, CO, USA.
ISCRAM 2015 – Kristiansand, Norway.
Student Volunteer at USU
Playful Explorations Lab (Dr. Jody Clarke-Midura)
Intensive English Language Institute (Dr. Ekaterina Arshavskaya)

Summer 2018.
Spring 2018.

